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To Marwa and her never-ending quest for adventure.
Abstract
This study explores the potential of the cybernetic method of inquiry for the problem of
natural resource governance. The systems way of thinking has already enabled scientists
to gain considerable headway in framing global environmental challenges. On the other
hand, technical solutions to environmental problems have begun to show significant promise,
driven by the advent of technology and its increased proliferation in coupled human and
natural systems. Such settings lie on the interface of engineering, social and environmental
sciences, and as such, require a common language in order for natural resources to be
studied, managed and ultimately sustained. In this dissertation, we argue that the systems
theoretic tradition of cybernetics may provide the necessary common ground for examining
such systems.
After discussing the relevance of the cybernetic approach to natural resource governance,
we present a mathematical model of resource consumption, grounded in social psychological
research on consumer behavior. We also provide interpretations of the model at various
levels of abstraction in the social network of the consuming population. We demonstrate
the potential of the model by examining it in various theoretic frameworks which include
dynamical systems, optimal control theory, game theory and the theory of learning in
games. Each framework yields different policy guidelines to avoid Tragedy of the Commons
like scenarios in the natural resource system.
Mainly, we find that a high importance attached to social information (rather than
ecological information) on part of the consumers helps overcome free-riding behavior and
achieves affluence in both the resource stock and consumption levels. Moreover, we ob-
serve that discounting future utility beyond a specific threshold results in unsustainable
consumption patterns according to a pre-defined notion of sustainability. We study the
optimal control law for both sustainable and unsustainable cases, and give a rigorous cri-
terion for sustainable growth. Later we examine the long-term effects of rational behavior
on the part of the consumers and compare it with the collectively optimal outcome via a
non-cooperative game and see how different societal attributes effect the “tragicness” of the
game. We show that the adoption of a basic fictitious play learning scheme by the consumers
results in the equilibrium solution in a way that avoids free-riding behavior. All aspects
of the analysis are conducted with one single question in mind – what are the favorable
conditions for sustainability?
Preface
My first exposure to environmental problems began in the summer of 2013 when I partici-
pated in the Young Scientists Summer Program at the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria. I had just been admitted in the PhD pro-
gram of Electrical Engineering at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS),
which was set to begin in the fall of 2013. As a typical graduate student just beginning a
PhD, I was still going back and forth over ideas for my doctorate and the work I started at
IIASA four years ago resulted in this dissertation.
The systems way of thinking made me realize how the proper level of abstraction can
reveal similarities between problems originating from completely different disciplines. How
scientific methods and tools developed by scientists of a particular field could be used by
those working in completely different areas. It is exactly the reason how a mechatronics
engineer with a strict background in robotics ended up writing a thesis in natural resource
governance, something that many of my colleagues have found to be peculiar to say the
least. To them, I say that when viewed through the lens of systems theory, robotics (and
all engineering disciplines for that matter) and resource governance do not turn out to be
as disparate as they may appear at first.
I must admit here that my initial comprehension of systems analysis was little more than
just a buzzword that is always fascinating and politically correct. Writing this dissertation
has given me an opportunity to understand better what systems thinking really is, and made
me appreciate the role of a unified articulation for systems independent of their discipline
of origin. Such a thing is necessary for the engineers as they have begun to encounter more
and more human-centric applications of their technologies. The perspective with which
they are accustomed to study their machines has deep philosophical roots which cover not
only man-made but also naturally occurring systems and even living organisms. Such is the
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language of cybernetics, a distinct tradition of systems theory that has sadly disappeared
from the forefront of the engineering community, hidden behind its descendants of control
and communication. Even while we are introduced to the basic concepts of feedback and
control, our vision is so narrow that we do not realize that the underlying philosophy of the
field is so rich. For me this was mind boggling. In contrast however, to quote my advisor
Abubakr Muhammad – It doesn’t surprise me one bit that a mechatronics engineer finally
discovers his machinistic origins of thinking in a different topic.
In this dissertation I argue that the cybernetic way of thinking may provide the common
language that the engineering community requires to study the intricate couplings between
society, technology and the environment. Indeed, as I explain, small factions within the
engineering community are already doing this without explicitly referring to the term cy-
bernetics in its original form. It is my hope that this dissertation may serve as a spring
board to further propagate this view and to guide future work in this area.
List of Contributions
Below is a list of the salient contributions of this thesis. Where applicable, the contributions
are linked in parenthesis to the publications list of the following section.
• A unique discourse on the relevance of cybernetics to natural resources.
• A psychologically justified mathematical model of human behavior in resource con-
sumption (Paper 2).
• An aggregation mechanism to lump communities in the social network to ease tractabil-
ity of the model (Paper 4).
• A mathematical criterion of sustainability (Papers 3 & 6).
• The application of Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle to an optimal control problem
with unbounded control and non-concave Hamiltonian (Papers 3, 5 & 6).
• A notion of “tragedy” in a non-cooperative game describing the Commons dilemma
in our resource consumption model (Paper 2).
• Some results illustrating the dependence of “tragicness” on various societal parameters
and guidelines on how to reduce it (Paper 2).
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• A demonstration of the relevance of the rational outcome for the commons game via
application of the theory of learning in games (Paper 1).
• Various results describing the emergence of free-riding behavior and the role of differ-
ent societal attributes in discouraging such behavior (Papers 1 & 2).
• A Lyapunov function based proof for the asymptotic global stability of the model,
which may also help in determining stability for a class of related systems (Paper 1).
Publications
Below is a list of publications that have resulted directly from the research described in this
thesis. The chapters from the dissertation that include the material from each publication
have also been given in the parenthesis.
Journal articles
Paper 1 (Chapters 6 & 9)
Talha Manzoor, Elena Rovenskaya, Alexey Davydov, Abubakr Muhammad, “Learn-
ing through Fictitious Play in a Game-theoretic Model of Natural Resource Consump-
tion”, IEEE Control Systems Letters, vol. 2, pp. 163-168, Jan 2018.
Paper 2 (Chapters 4, 6 & 8)
Talha Manzoor, Elena Rovenskaya, Abubakr Muhammad, “Game-theoretic insights
into the role of environmentalism and social-ecological relevance: A cognitive model
of resource consumption”, Ecological Modelling, vol. 340, pp. 74-85, Nov 2016.
Book chapters
Paper 3 (Chapters 7 & 9)
Sergey Aseev, Talha Manzoor, “Optimal Exploitation of Renewable Resources:
Lessons in Sustainability from an Optimal Growth Model of Natural Resource Con-
sumption”, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Springer (in
press).
vii
Conference proceedings
Paper 4 (Chapter 5)
Talha Manzoor, Elena Rovenskaya, Abubakr Muhammad, “Structural Effects and
Aggregation in a Social-Network Model of Natural Resource Consumption”, 20th
World Congress of the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC), Toulouse,
France, Jul 2017.
Paper 5 (Chapter 7)
Talha Manzoor, Sergey Aseev, Elena Rovenskaya, Abubakr Muhammad, “Optimal
Control for Sustainable Consumption of Natural Resources”, 19th World Congress of
the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC), Cape Town, South Africa,
Aug 2014.
Working papers
Paper 6 (Chapters 7 & 9)
Sergey Aseev, Talha Manzoor, “Optimal Growth, Renewable Resources and Sus-
tainability”, IIASA Working Paper WP-16-017, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, Dec
2016.
viii
Acknowledgments
During the course of my academic career, I have been blessed with many great teachers.
The work presented herein, is a result of their guidance, perseverance and patience towards
me, and my many flaws as a student. Foremost on this long list is my advisor Abubakr
Muhammad who took me under his wing when I was a young graduate and provided the
environment that was necessary for me to conduct my research. I am thankful to him for
allowing me flexibility in my work, and insulating me from many, many hindrances (both
financial and logistical) that could otherwise have proven detrimental to my focus as a
graduate student. I view this dissertation purely as the outcome of his own intellectual
capability and his capacity as an outstanding advisor.
Next I wish to thank my co-advisor Elena Rovenskaya whose supervision has been
instrumental especially during the foundational stage of my doctoral research. I stumbled
into the 2013 YSSP program under her supervision at IIASA with only a minute idea of
what I wanted to do in my PhD. She contributed in establishing a direction for the research
and also helped me in navigating across a multitude of academic disciplines that were well
beyond my comfort zone.
I am also grateful to Sergey Aseev who led the research on optimal growth that even-
tually formed a vital part of this dissertation. This would not have been possible without
his extensive technical expertise and also his patience with my lack of experience in the
area. I also want to thank Alexey Davydov for providing the proof on stability of our model
that we had struggled with unsuccessfully for months on our own. I am thankful to Momin
Uppal and Naveed Ul Hassan for their guidance as part of my PhD committee and informal
advice at numerous occasions. Also to Tariq Samad, Magnus Egerstedt and Andries Richter
for sparing time from their busy schedules to review an initial draft of the dissertation and
also for providing their constructive feedback and criticism.
ix
The Electrical Engineering Department at LUMS provided the infrastructure and sup-
port that was necessary to facilitate me in my work. I am thankful to Ijaz Naqvi, the Chair
of the Graduate Program Committee who supported me in all the logistics and paperwork
especially during my final phase as a graduate student; to Tariq Jadoon who provided all
necessary support (both within and beyond his job description) as Chair of the Depart-
ment; to Soban Hameed and his tedious hours of administrative assistance. I also want to
give a special mention to the LUMS library and its staff that has helped me greatly during
my studies and still continues to surprise me with the diversity and range of its excellent
collection.
During my stay at LUMS, I have enjoyed the company of many great colleagues and
strong friends. I wish to thank all members of the CYPHYNETS lab for making this
time memorable: Syed Muhammad Abbas, Mudassir Khan, Zahoor Ahmad, Atif Adnan,
Hasan Arshad, Bilal Talat, Zeeshan Shareef, Faiz Alam, Adnan Munawar, Zubair Ahmed,
Sajjad Haider, Ansir Ilyas, Waqas Riaz, Bilal Haider, Hamza Jan, Ali Ahmed, Saad Hassan,
Muhammad Abdullah and Allah Bakhsh (for those whose name I have failed to mention,
please accept my humble apology).
As my advisor says, a PhD is a joint effort on part of the student and his family. In
my case, I would say that the role of my family far exceeds that of my own. I first want to
reach out to my father, Manzoor Hussain, who not only allowed me to pursue a career of
my own choosing, but also supported me through all hardships and difficulties that I faced.
I am rarely able to express how thankful I am to him for providing me a life full of comfort
and void of any liabilities. His support has enabled me to maintain focus on my work and
to enjoy my personal life to the fullest, a luxury seldom available to a doctoral candidate
supporting a wife and child along with his research.
I wish to mention my late grandfather, Chaudhry Rehmat Ali who I am sure would have
been extremely proud at this moment. Also my grandmother, Ramzan Bibi whose constant
prayers and relentless concern have motivated me greatly throughout my studies.
I want to thank my sister, Bazla Manzoor, for supplying a lifetime of joy and memories
as a wonderful sibling. Even as I am here in Lahore, she takes care of our mother to the
best of her ability as a married woman with a promising professional career. This has been
a source of great content and consolation for me during the recent years of my studies.
For my mother, Naheed Manzoor, no measure of text would be sufficient to contain the
x
ocean of praise that she deserves from me. Even so, I am at a total loss of words to express
my gratitude towards her, for nurturing a young soul into the grown man typing in these
words right now. To her I can only say
Thank you mother, for everything.
In the end I wish to acknowledge my wife, Mehwish Pervaiz for providing me the com-
fort of a clean house, ironed clothes, warm meals, and most importantly, a loving family.
Our daughter was born while my PhD was undergoing an extremely critical phase. I could
not be more thankful to Mehwish for taking care of her all through the tedious household
responsibilities and for her moral and emotional support during the difficult times of my
studies. To happily endure the long hours I had to work in the lab, weekends I could not
spend at home and the uncertainty of my finances. I am truly grateful to her, and hope I
can make it worth her while, as we move ahead to the next chapter of our lives together.
Talha Manzoor,
LUMS, 2017.
xi
Contents
Abstract iv
Preface v
Acknowledgments ix
Part I Foundations and Background 1
1 Lessons in Natural Resource Governance 2
1.1 Respecting the Limits of our Habitat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Inability to Act: The Tragedy of the Commons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Other Models of Inevitable Doom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.2 Open-access: The Nature of “Tragic” Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.3 Privatization and State Regulation: The Only Solutions? . . . . . . 12
1.3 Cooperative Solutions to the Commons Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 Eyeing CPRs through the Systems Lens 16
2.1 The Concept of a System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Analysis and Synthesis: The Fundamental Ingredients of Scientific Inquiry . 17
2.3 Systems Analysis: Tackling Complex Systems with an Integrative Perspective 20
2.4 Systems Analysis and Coupled Human Natural Systems . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 From Control of Machines to Cybernetics of Resources 27
3.1 Technical Advancement and the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 Cybernetics and Concepts Defining Feedback Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3 Human-in-the-loop Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.1 Cyber-Physical Systems and the Internet of Things . . . . . . . . . . 34
xii
3.3.2 Cyber Physical Social Systems: Addressing the social component in
CPSs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.3 The Imperative to Understand Human Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4 The Cybernetics of Natural Resource Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4.1 Imagineering the Cybernetic Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.5 Cybernetics and Society: A Word of Caution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Part II Modeling the Dynamics of Resource Based Systems 44
4 A Psychologically Relevant Mathematical Model of Consumer Behavior 45
4.1 Modeling Paradigms in Socio-ecological Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2 The Mathematical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.1 The Ecological Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.2 The Social Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2.3 The Coupled Socio-ecological System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5 Exploiting Community Structure to Create Block-models of Resource
Consumption 55
5.1 Obtaining Simplified Models of Aggregate Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.1.1 Influence and Leadership in the Consumer Network . . . . . . . . . 58
5.1.2 The Canonical Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.1.3 Bonding and Bridging in the Symmetric Semi-
homogeneous Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.2 Aggregation Mechanisms for Non-Canonical Consumer Networks . . . . . . 67
5.2.1 An Aggregation Mechanism for Self-directed Networks . . . . . . . . 67
5.2.2 Aggregation for Self-directed Populations with
Unknown Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Part III Cybernetic Insights, Applications and Extensions 71
6 Understanding Open-loop System Behavior 72
xiii
6.1 The Single-Agent/Homogeneous Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.1.1 Fixed-point Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.1.2 Local Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.1.3 Global Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.2 The Dual-Agent/Semi-Homogeneous Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.2.1 Fixed-point Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.2.2 Local Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.2.3 Global Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7 Optimal Consumption for a Homogeneous Society 90
7.1 Considerations for Studying Optimal Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.2 Formulating the Consumption Problem in an Optimal Control Setting . . . 92
7.2.1 The Optimal Control Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.2.2 Establishing the Notion of Optimality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.3 Reduction to a Problem with Linear Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.4 Existence of an Optimal Control and the Maximum Principle . . . . . . . . 99
7.4.1 Proving the Existence of an Optimal Pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.4.2 Application of the Maximum Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.4.3 The Hamiltonian System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.5 Analysis of the Hamiltonian system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.5.1 The Sustainable Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7.5.2 The Unsustainable Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7.6 Discussion: A Generalized Notion of Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
8 Strategic Interactions in the Game-theoretic Framework 117
8.1 The Continuous Consumption Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8.1.1 Deriving the Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8.1.2 Collective Optimality and the Notion of Tragicness . . . . . . . . . . 120
8.1.3 The Consumption Game and Social-Ecological Relevance . . . . . . 122
8.2 The Discrete Consumption Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
8.2.1 Tragic and non-tragic games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
8.2.2 The Influence of Social Attributes on the Game Nature . . . . . . . 126
xiv
8.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
9 Closing the Feedback Loop 132
9.1 The Optimal Feedback Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
9.2 Learning and Adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
9.2.1 Best-response Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
9.2.2 Convergence to the Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
9.2.3 Overcoming Free-riding Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
9.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
10 Moving Towards Generically Structured Networks 144
10.1 Static Characteristics for Structured Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
10.1.1 Well-mixed population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
10.1.2 Star population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
10.2 System Dynamics and the Role of the Laplacian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
11 Epilogue 158
11.1 Revisiting the Cybernetic Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
11.2 Summary of Main Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
11.3 Open Problems and Future Avenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
11.3.1 A Rigorous Definition of Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
11.3.2 Formulating Social Variables in the Context of Feedback Control . . 164
11.3.3 The Issues of Controllability and Observability . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
11.4 Final Remark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Bibliography 180
A Game Theory Primer 181
A.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
A.2 Dominant Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
A.3 Best Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
A.4 Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
A.5 Games with Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game . . . . . . . . . . . 183
xv
B Basic Concepts in Economic Growth Theory 185
B.1 Early Developments in Growth Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
B.2 A Compilation of Fundamental Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
B.2.1 The production function and returns to scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
B.2.2 The production function and technological progress . . . . . . . . . . 186
B.2.3 A Note on Cobb-Douglass production functions . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
B.2.4 Continuity, differentiability, positive and diminishing marginal prod-
ucts, and constant returns to scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
B.2.5 The Inada conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
B.2.6 Some formal examples of social welfare functions . . . . . . . . . . . 187
B.2.7 The Brundtland Commission and sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
C Network topology and spectrum of the Laplacian matrix 189
Vita 191
xvi
List of Figures
1-1 The prisoner’s dilemma game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1-2 A typology of natural resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3-1 A classification of behavior (reproduced from [167]). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3-2 The feedback control loop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3-3 The cybernetic perspective of NRM. The boldly outlined blocks represent
the basic components of the feedback control loop. The other blocks list
the relevant factors and possible realizations for the different components as
discussed in the text. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5-1 The consumption of i is influenced by j through ωij . The overall effect is
given by bi νiωij where νi is the weight that i gives to social factors in the
decision making process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5-2 Graphical depiction of net-influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5-3 Conditions on cross-influence between groups in the semi-homogeneous net-
work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5-4 Trajectories of original and approximated aggregated systems when P˜ = x¯,
for two different initial conditions. Here n = 100, bi = 1 ∀ i, ωij = 1/n ∀ i 6=
j, αi ∼ U(0, 1) and ρi ∼ U(0, 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6-1 The nature of the fixed point (x¯, y¯), as the system parameters are varied. . 74
6-2 Regions in the parameter space depecting the nature of the equilibrium
for system (6.1). The darkly shaded area represents the oscillatory region
whereas the lightly shaded area represents the nodal region. . . . . . . . . . 75
xvii
6-3 Change in steady state stock and consumption efforts in the two-community
model, as the population characteristics are varied. The nominal values se-
lected for this simulation are b1 = b2 = 1, ν1 = 0.75, ν2 = 0.25, ρ1 = 0.75,
ρ2 = 0.25 and x(0) = 0.5 and y1(0) = y2(0) = 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6-4 Positivity of the equilibrium (6.5) in the ν1, ν2 plane for different values of
ρ1 and ρ2. The plots are symmetric in ρ1 and ρ2and so the missing plots
are simply a reflection of the existing plots about the symmetric axis. The
free-riding equilibrium corresponds to y¯1 < 0 < y¯2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6-5 Evaluation of the roots of q(·). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6-6 Here we evaluate the local stability of (6.4), through inequality (6.7), as the
parameters are varied. The nominal values for the parameters are b1 = 0.2,
b2 = 0.1, and ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.1. The plots obtained by interchanging the indices
of the groups are symmetric to the ones displayed above and thus are not
shown here. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6-7 The limit cycle of system (6.4). Here b1 = 0.2, b2 = 0.1, ν1 = 0.01, ν2 = 0.9,
ρ1 = 0.001 and, ρ2 = 0.1. The red marked points indicate the fixed point
and the initial point for the respective simulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7-1 Phase portrait of (7.42) around (zˆ, λˆ), where δ = 0.01 . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7-2 Phase portrait of (7.42) in the case δ = 10 ≥ 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
8-1 An example of the payoff function of one player, given the other player’s
strategy. The yellow curve represents the best response. Here ρ2 = 0.7 and
ν2 = 0.9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8-2 An example of the social welfare function for ν1 = 0.3 and ν2 = 0.9. The
green curve represents the collective optimal whereas the yellow point repre-
sents the Nash equilibrium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
8-3 An illustration of the definition of the game tragicness. . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
xviii
8-4 Plots for different characteristics of the consumption game at Nash equilib-
rium, shown as the difference and average level of the social relevances ν1, ν2
are varied. For completeness the ν1 and ν2 axes have also been shown in each
plot. The gray areas mark regions for which stability is not guaranteed. The
plots for both groups are symmetric to each other, and so the conclusions
drawn here for group 1 also apply to group 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
8-5 The three tragic realizations of the consumption game along with the labels
commonly associated with them. Nash equilibria are shaded in gray. The
values of the payoffs are hypothetical and have been chosen to illustrate the
relative magnitudes of the payoffs for each outcome. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
8-6 Non-tragic realizations of the consumption game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
8-7 Plot depicting the type of game that each realization of the consumption
game belongs to as the parameters are varied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
8-8 Tragic and non-tragic regions for the consumption game. . . . . . . . . . . . 128
8-9 Resource quantity at the Nash equilibrium for the discrete consumption game.129
9-1 The saddle point ((ˆz), λˆ) and regions of the stable manifold λ−(z) & λ+(z).
Here δ = 0.01 < 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
9-2 The optimal feedback law and a representative solution for the case δ =
0.01 < 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
9-3 Optimal solution for (7.42) in the case δ = 10 ≥ 1. The optimal pair
(z∗(·), y∗(·)) corresponds to curve γ4 in the phase space. . . . . . . . . . . . 135
9-4 Block diagram for (9.6a) coupled with the learning dynamics of (9.6b). The
learning process is part of the social component of the model and is high-
lighted by the shaded area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
9-5 left: The region of stability for (9.6b). The cross-hairs correspond to points
selected for the subsequent simulations. center: The learning process for
identical νi’s. right: The learning process for different νi’s. In both simula-
tions b1 = b2 = 1, x(0) = 0.5, y1(0) = y2(0) = 0, ρ1(0) = 0.8 and ρ2(0) = 0.2.
Note that since b1 = b2, (9.9a) holds true for all ν1.ν2. . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
10-1 Block diagram showing the coupled resource and consumption dynamics. . 156
xix
11-1 The cybernetic picture revisited. This figure has first appeared in Chapter 3
and has been reproduced here for the sake of readability. . . . . . . . . . . . 160
A-1 The prisoner’s dilemma game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
A-2 Illustration of the Cournot Game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
C-1 Different possible networks of varying connectivity along with the eigenvalues
of the respective L matrix. All dashed links carry weight 1 (weak links),
whereas continuously drawn links carry weight 100 (strong links). It can be
seen that as network connectivity increases, so does the magnitude of the
second smallest eigenvalue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
xx
List of Tables
1.1 public and private goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions (as identified
by Ostrom [148]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1 Integrative frameworks for analyzing coupled human natural systems [32] . 24
6.1 Comparative statics results for system (6.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
8.1 Structure of the discrete consumption game. x¯, y¯1 and y¯2 are given by
Equation 6.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
xxi
Glossary
LTG Limits To Growth: An influential text authored by Donella
Meadows et. al. in 1972. LTG models investigate the effects
of exponential growth on the finite resources of the Earth
TOC Tragedy of the Commons
CPR Common Pool Resource
NRM Natural Resource Management
SA Systems Analysis
CPS Cyber Physical Systems
CPSS Cyber Physical Social Systems
SES Social Ecological System
HITL Human In The Loop
IoT Internet of Things
IoE Internet of Everything
NSF National Science Foundation: A United States Government
Agency that supports Research and Education in the Non-
Medical Sciences and Engineering
CHANS Coupled Human And Natural System
SER Social-Ecological Relevance
OCP Optimal Control Problem
BR Best Response
NE Nash Equilibrium
xxii
xxiii
Part I
Foundations and Background
1
Chapter 1
Lessons in Natural Resource
Governance
This chapter marks the beginning of the first part of this dissertation. The three chapters
included in this part are qualitative in nature and are intended to provide context to the
technical work presented afterwards. The first chapter, Chapter 1, highlights the resource
governance problem in general. The second chapter, Chapter 2, discusses the difficulties
associated with the analysis and control of resource based systems and showcases the rele-
vant theoretical tools developed, and research conducted by scientists working in the area.
The third chapter, Chapter 3 focuses on the role of technology in resource based systems
and how engineers may employ cybernetic methods to analyze these systems in an effective
and integrative manner.
1.1 Respecting the Limits of our Habitat
In his thought-provoking book “A Green History of the World” [158], Clive Ponting presents
a narrative on how the uncontrolled exploitation and eventual depletion of natural resources
has played a pivotal role in the collapse of many leading civilizations of the world. It is not
so difficult to comprehend the immense importance of preserving the habitat on which the
human population is increasingly reliant. The finiteness of the planet’s resources dictates
that in order for the human race to satisfy the demands of its increasing population, it must
devise a way of life that does not eradicate the resource base which is so essential for its
survival. As Ponting most aptly recounts, there exist numerous lessons for us throughout
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our history in the form of societies that collapsed as a result of their direct or indirect abuse
of the environment. Perhaps the most appropriate example to discuss here is that of the
Polynesian society of Easter Island.
Easter Island is located in one of the most remote regions on Earth. It is situated in the
south Pacific Ocean over 3,500 km off the west coast of Chile in South America. Populated
by a few dozen Polynesians in the 5th century A.D., the society gradually flourished untill
the population peaked to a few thousand in the 16th century. Their diet consisted mainly of
chicken and sweet potatoes, ensuring the provision of which, did not consume much of their
time. This left a majority of the islanders’ time open for social customs and rituals, avidly
directed by the individual chiefs of the numerous clans that had taken shape over time.
The center of all rituals and worship were the ahu, stone platforms on which large statues
(the Moai) were placed as a symbol of authority and power. These Moai were extremely
large in size and required an enormous amount of labour and also substance in the form
of trees in order to transport them from the quarry to the ahu. As the island population
grew in magnitude, the clans started competing for the felling of trees to transport the
ever-growing Moais which led to the eventual depletion of the forests and degradation of
their ecosystem. By the time that the European explorers first visited the island in the
18th century, the Easter Islanders had been reduced to a meager population engaged in
perpetual warfare over the dwindling resources that remained, reduced to a mere shadow
of the culturally complex and prosperous society they once used to be. Ponting compares
the case of the Polynesians on Eater Island to that of all mankind on planet Earth and
points out striking similarities albeit on different scales. Like Easter Island, the Earth is
also isolated with nowhere the humans can escape to in the event that the environment is
degraded to the point of inhabitability. The question quite rightly put is: have humans
“been any more successful than the islanders in finding a way of life that does not fatally
deplete the resources that are available to them and irreversibly damage their life support
system?”
As human beings, it is easy for us to realize the absolute importance of maintaining a
balanced relationship with the surrounding environment in small isolated territories. For
instance, Easter Island comprises a small area (roughly 160 sq. km.) which can be traversed
in a single day. Moreover, due to the depleting timber and the state of their technology, the
inhabitants were effectively isolated from other lands and so had nowhere to go in the event
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of a crisis. The causality between the deteriorating resource base and the devastating events
that transpired must have been painstakingly apparent to the existing population. However,
the same cannot be said when we think of our planet as a whole. In his famous essay [39],
Kenneth Boulding discusses the need for a change in how we perceive our biosphere. The
primitive society viewed itself as living in a limitless world i.e. a world with unbounded
resources spread out over an infinite plane. Whenever primordial humans were faced with
deterioration of the natural habitat or their social structure, they always had the luxury
of migrating to areas with better prospects. Thus, there always existed a “frontier”, which
separated the known limits of human domain from the promising territory which was yet
to be explored. However as mankind would eventually discover, the Earth is not a limitless
plane, but in fact a closed sphere with limited resources whose boundaries we have now
begun to increasingly stress. Hence there is a need to abandon the “cowboy” view of the
economy which symbolizes the limitless plains and the sense of adventure and exploration
that always comes with the existence of a frontier. The inability of mankind to incorporate
the finiteness of nature’s resources in its economic activities, and the inexorable requirement
to satisfy the needs of a growing world population has led to an extraordinary strain being
put on the Earth’s ecosystem.
Boulding notes that abandoning the image of a limitless Earth in our economic principles
is not an easy task as this image has been inscribed in our minds for centuries. Nevertheless
we must now adopt the idea of a “spaceship” economy, whereby realizing that the earth is
like a spaceship, limited in its resources and isolated from its surroundings. There is no other
planet we can escape to 1 and this is becoming increasingly clear as we are finally beginning
to bear the brunt of our inconsiderate economic activities in the form of phenomena such
as environmental pollution and global warming. As opposed to the cowboy economy, the
magnitude of consumption and production can no longer be held as a metric for success,
but in fact, it is “the nature, extent, quality, and complexity of the total capital stock” that
really matters.
In light of the debate on the potentially lethal relationship between mankind’s economic
activities and the Earth’s environment, one wonders what would happen if human beings
1One solution that immediately comes to mind is undertaking space and sea explorations to expand
the frontiers of the available resources. But even if we extend to the immediate solar system or find new
resources under the sea, it pushes these frontiers only for a finite period of time. It is important to realize
that our unbounded desire to growth may eventually overtake even apparently unbounded resources. So the
basic dilemma is physical and always holds.
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continue the pursuit of economic growth in the current fashion. Jay Forrester was perhaps
the first to address this issue in a mathematically rigorous framework. His book “World
Dynamics” [80] presents a dynamical model of certain global variables that represent the
state of the world economy. These include world population, pollution, quantity of non-
renewable resources, world capital investment and fraction of investment in the agriculture
sector. His model known as World2 marks the beginning of the field of global modeling.
Perhaps the most influential work that resulted as a direct consequence of his efforts is the
book “Limits To Growth” (LTG) [135] with Donella Meadows as the lead author.
Using Forrester’s system dynamics technique and building on his work, the authors of
LTG construct a detailed computer model of the world economy called World3. The purpose
of the model is to demonstrate the effect of limitless exponential growth in a world whose
resources are finite. The relationship between the variables are assumed to be highly non-
linear with parameters regressed from statistical yearbooks. The model also includes various
feedback effects, for example, population growth is positively related to food production.
However population growth is positively related to industrial output, which is positively
related to pollution, which in turn, is negatively related to food production and hence
population growth.
Meadows et. al. ran the model under 12 different scenarios and found that at the time
(in 1972) the world economy was operating inside the planetary boundaries still with room
to grow and an opportunity for mankind to contemplate long-term corrective measures.
However the study predicted a sudden collapse of the world population, a massive die-out
somewhere in the 21st century, if the world economy continued to grow at a positive rate.
Thus the author’s proposed an operating point of zero growth as the only way to avoid
the massive die-out. The original book received a few updates with the latest one [134]
arguing that humanity has already passed the planetary boundaries bringing it in a state
of serious overshoot and much must be changed in order to minimize the impact of the
overshoot. Various studies also observe that the historical data of events after 1972 support
the key features of the predictions made by LTG [192, 193]. Although there has been much
criticism on the methods of the LTG models and interpretation of the results (for instance,
see [24, Chapter 7]), one thing is painstakingly clear: there is a dire need for change if we
hope to live in harmony with the Earth’s natural system which is at the foundation of the
economical system and already showing signs of fragility.
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1.2 Inability to Act: The Tragedy of the Commons
After going through the history of Easter Island, one very intriguing thought strikes the
mind. As mentioned earlier, effects of the rapid deforestation and the impending doom it
would bring, would have been clearly visible to the people of the island at that time. One
might ask what stopped the individual clans from abstaining from deforestation and alter-
ing their lifestyle so as to maintain the intricate balance between mother nature and human
society. After all, if the environmental deterioration stopped it would provide a chance for
the Islanders to rebuild and prosper once more, a situation that would unquestionably be
beneficial for all clans. Yet as we know this did not happen. The history of human civiliza-
tion is filled with accounts of societies that collapsed due to direct or indirect environmental
abuse. For instance, the collapse of the Sumerians in Mesopotamia, the fall of the Mohenjo
Daro and Harappa civilizations of the Indus, Baghdad and the Mediterranean, deforesta-
tion in China and medieval Ethiopia, and the decline of the Mayans in Mesoamerica were
all linked to uncontrolled exploitation of the environment in one form or the other. It is
not unreasonable to assume that the effects of human activity on its surroundings and the
eventual backlash would have been apparent to the individuals of each society in question
at the time that the activities were taking place. Yet somehow, the detrimental activities
continued till the ultimate disintegration of the societies. What prevented those communi-
ties from acting collectively in their own mutual interest? The answer lies in a concept that
has gained the attention of social scientists for the past many decades.
Garrett Hardin introduced the phrase “Tragedy of the Commons” for the first time
in his famous article [97] in 1968. The concept is presented by envisioning a pasture or
grazing commons, filled with grass. The local herdsman bring their cattle to the commons
to graze upon each day. The commons is open to everyone and so their is no restriction
as to how many cattle one can bring to graze upon there. The addition of a single cow
on the commons will present a benefit to the particular herdsman that cow belongs to.
However this addition also holds a cost in the form of additional overgrazing as a result of
the increase in animals. While the benefit of an additional cow is for a single herdsman
to enjoy all by himself, the cost is shared by all herdsmen which means that the cost of
an additional animal (for the individual herdsman) is only a fraction of the benefit. Thus
the only rational action for the herdsman is to expand his herd. This course of action is
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followed by all herdsmen and eventually the number of cattle exceeds the capacity of the
commons thus ruining it for everyone. Rational action on behalf of the herdsmen results
in collective destruction and herein lies the tragedy. What aggravates the tragedy even
more is the fact that the herdsmen continue to act this way even with full knowledge of the
consequence of their actions (hence a tragedy and not a shock or disaster). The commons
dilemma is a specific instance of a social dilemma where individual rationality is in contrast
to the collective benefit of all.
While the concept of the Tragedy of the Commons (TOC) has been defined using the
story of the commons, it has many diverse manifestations in real life and is certainly not
restricted to the grazing pastures only. One example that Hardin discusses in his article
as well is that of overpopulation. An individual couple may embrace parenthood due to
the psychological satisfaction and other benefits that come with offspring, however each
additional human being on the planet increases the strain being put on its resources. If
the increase in population is not stopped soon enough, it may grow beyond what the Earth
is able to support. Here again, the benefits of offspring are enjoyed by the parents only,
while the cost (however small) is incurred by the remaining world population. Another
example is traffic congestion. Here the common resource is public roads. An individual may
quite understandably prefer to commute via public roads in order to save time. However,
if everyone follows this reasoning it would result in congestion of traffic on the public
roads, eventually causing everyone to be late. Another illustration of the Tragedy occurs in
developing communities with shortage of electric supply. In such settings, households often
install an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) system which stores backup electricity for
use during the power outages. While this may ensure that the household gets electricity
even during the outage, it puts additional strain on the supply grid due to its inefficiency
(the power returned by a UPS during an outage is less than the power consumed in order to
charge it). This means that if every household installs a UPS, it would result in even more
outages than before, thus the tragedy. Other real life examples of the commons dilemma
include, but are not limited to, pollution, overfishing (the bluefin tuna is perhaps the most
eyeopening manifestation of the TOC), deforestation, depleting groundwater aquifers (a
prevalent problem in Pakistan and the South-Asian region [180]), animal poaching and
sending spam emails.
The commons serves as a symbol for all resources that are openly accessible to the general
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consumer (more on this in Section 1.2.2) and Hardin argues that in the absence of external
regulation, rational consumers will eventually and most certainly lead to destruction of the
resource. The Tragedy of the commons is one of three metaphorical models which have
until recently been most influential for policy prescription in resource governance problems.
We discuss the others in the following section.
1.2.1 Other Models of Inevitable Doom
The tragedy of the commons has been popularly formalized as a Prisoner’s dilemma game
[65]. The motivation behind this game is the following story. Consider two robbers who are
known to have robbed a bank together. However the police does not have enough evidence
to convict any of the robbers without a confession from at least one of them. Upon capturing
the robbers the police offers each of them the following two choices (in isolation), either they
confess to the crime (the defect strategy) or not (the cooperate strategy). If that prisoner
confesses to the crime and the other does not, then he is freed while the other receives 10
years in jail. If both prisoners confess then both of them receive 5 years in jail. If neither
of them confesses then each will receive a single year in jail on minor charges. The game
is presented in matrix form in Figure 1-1 with the Nash equilibrium shaded in gray (see
Appendix A for a basic introduction to games).
C D
C -1,-1 -10,0
D 0,-10 -5,-5
Figure 1-1: The prisoner’s dilemma game
From the structure of the game, we see that each player has a dominating strategy of
defecting. However if each player plays this strategy then the resulting outcome will be
pareto sub-optimal i.e. there exists some other strategy (in this case: both cooperating)
in which at least one player is better-off without the other being worse-off. The definition
of the more general N-person dilemma which exhibits the same structure can be found in
[66]. It is easy to see how this game also serves as an illustration of the Tragedy of the
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Commons. Assume that the players are now two herdsmen deciding on how many cattle to
keep in their respective herds. If the critical level of total cattle (after which the commons
is destroyed) is L then let the cooperate strategy for each herdsman be to restrict his herd
to under L/2, and the defect strategy be to add as many cattle to his herd as he pleases.
The resulting game also has the same structure as shown in Figure 1-1.
The prisoner’s dilemma is fascinating because it contradicts the inherent belief of humans
that actions that are individually rational also lead to collectively rational outcomes. In
his popular book “The Logic of Collective Action” [145], Mancur Olson challenges the (up
till then widely accepted) basic premise of group theory, that individuals who aim to fulfill
their personal benefits will rationally strive to fulfill the collective benefit of the group as
well. Olson asserts that without any external coercion, large groups of individuals will
not voluntarily act in the common interest of the group. In order for them to collectively
achieve the group’s most beneficial outcome, they would have to exhibit at least some
altruistic tendency which is more of an exception than the norm, especially when there are
economic principles involved. Groups and organizations tend to exist solely to serve the
common goals or benefits of the group itself. If they existed to serve the interests of the
individuals, it would be pointless, since independent, unorganized action on behalf of the
individuals themselves would be most effective in achieving that interest. For instance, the
Labor Union exists to the serve the common interest of higher wages for the workers, but
each worker also has the individual interest in her own personal income which not only
depends on the wages but also on the number of hours she works everyday.
So what circumstances lead to a group of rational individuals directing their actions
towards achieving their collective interest? Olson argues that economic incentives alone
are not enough, there must be some social incentive as well. For instance, individuals
might serve the group in order to win “prestige” within it. Such social dynamics are more
significant in groups of smaller sizes. This implies that one of the most important factors
in determining whether or not individual action will result in the fulfillment of the group’s
mutual benefit is the size of the group. Thus smaller groups are more efficient and viable
than larger ones, which is one of the major conclusions of Olson’s work.
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1.2.2 Open-access: The Nature of “Tragic” Resources
Here we take some time to discuss the nature of the resources prone to the Commons
Dilemma. As we shall soon see, natural resources that are vulnerable to tragedy-like situa-
tions have particular characteristics that are not exhibited by every resource. For example,
their is no TOC in the direct consumption of solar energy which will be available in the
same quantity tomorrow, irrespective of how much it is consumed today. We elaborate
more formally as follows.
Natural resources can be classified as either renewable or non-renewable/exhaustive re-
sources. While renewable resources have the capacity to regenerate over time, non-renewable
resources either do not possess a regenerative capacity or if so, the timescale of the regenera-
tion is of geological magnitude (e.g. fossil fuels). While non-renewable resources are bound
to be exhausted at some future point in time (unless of course consumption is stopped
altogether), renewable resources can be consumed indefinitely while maintaining a positive
stock quantity, provided the consumption is below a certain critical level. This possibility
is what makes the study of renewable resources so much more interesting especially in the
context of sustainability.
Natural resources are also fundamentally classified as either public or private. This
classification [155] is based on the categorization of goods as rivalrous/non-rivalrous and
excludable/non-excludable. An excludable good is one in which individuals who do not pay
for the good can be prevented from consuming it. All private goods such as cellphones,
personal vehicles and clothing, etc, are excludable. Other resources such as public parks,
cinemas and zoos are also excludable. Goods such as fish in the open sea, solar energy,
national television and radio are goods that are non-excludable. It is not possible to prevent
someone from consuming a non-excludable resource, it is open for consumption to anyone
who can do so. A rivalrous good is one in which consumption of the good by one individual
affects the amount available to other individuals. The earlier example of fish in the open
sea is a rivalrous resource. Solar energy is not. The described classification is tabularized in
Table 1.1. The category of major interest here is open-access or common-pool resources
(CPR). Examples of such resources include fisheries, forests, bio-fuels, geo-thermal energy,
minerals, oil pools and many more. Common pool resources may also be either renewable
or non-renewable (see Figure 1-2). It is the open-access, rivalrous nature of these resources
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Excludable Non-excludable
Rivalrous
Purely private good
cellphones
Common pool resource
(CPR)
Fisheries
Non-rivalrous
Congestible resource
public parks
Purely public good
national television
Table 1.1: public and private goods
that make them amenable to phenomena such as the Tragedy of the Commons.
Let us revisit the example of the grazing commons. As the commons is not owned
privately, any new herdsman may approach the commons so that his cattle may graze upon
it. There is also no possibility of removing any existing cattle already on the commons.
These are all characteristics of a non-excludable resource. Furthermore, despite the grass
being a renewable entity, the total amount at any given instant is finite and so, the grass
consumed by some cattle is not available for consumption to the others, i.e., the resource is
rivalrous. Thus according to Table 1.1, the grazing commons is an open-access or a common
pool resource. It is this attribute of the commons that makes the tragedy possible.
Another classification of interest is shown in Figure 1-2, where renewable resources are
classified as either renewable flow resources or renewable stock resources. Renewable stock
resources are resources for which the amount consumed in the present, affects the amount
available for consumption in the future. Examples include fisheries, water resources, forests,
arable and grazing land, etc. Renewable flow resources on the other hand are ones for
which the amount available for consumption in the future is not affected by the amount
Figure 1-2: A typology of natural resources.
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consumed in the present. Examples include solar, wind and geo-thermal energy (although
the sun itself, and the Earth that harbors the winds and geo-thermal reservoirs are physically
depleting albeit over extremely large stellar and geological timescales).
It should be noted that for all practical purposes flow resources (in contrast to stock
resources) are non-depletable. Thus the issues that arise in governing stock resources are
not encountered in flow resources. The concept of a common-pool resource covers only
stock resources (here a non-renewable resource is also considered a stock resource) and thus
renewable flow resources are not generally categorized as CPRs.
1.2.3 Privatization and State Regulation: The Only Solutions?
The implication of Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons and the other metaphorical models
of doom (the prisoner’s dilemma and Olson’s logic of collective action) imply that in the
absence of external coercion by some central authority, consumers of a CPR are trapped in
a downward spiral of resource depletion and ultimate ruin. In his original article, Hardin
posited that the commons dilemma belonged to a class of “no technical solution problems”,
where a technical solution is understood to mean “one that requires a change only in the
techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in
human values or ideas of morality”. Up until recently, it was commonly conceived that
the only way to ensure sustainable consumption of a commons was either privatization or
state regulation, thus fundamentally altering the very open-access nature of the resource.
Indeed these are the very solutions that Hardin advocated for the TOC. No community-
based solution was thought to be feasible. However, as we shall soon see, Elinor Ostrom was
yet to compile several real-world examples of communities, which had collectively devised
their own institutions to use the commons in a renewable and sustainable manner. Not
only this, but she would also enumerate several common characteristics of the institutions
as guidelines for policy prescription, a work which would eventually win her the Nobel prize
in economics.
1.3 Cooperative Solutions to the Commons Dilemma
In her book “Governing the Commons” [148], Elinor Ostrom presents her work on community-
based governance of natural resources in open-access settings. She begins by accepting that
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the three models namely, The Tragedy of the Commons, The Prisoner’s Dilemma and The
Logic of Collective Action all serve very nicely as illustrations of situations in which societies
are not able to fulfill their mutual interests. The underlying aspect of such situations that
these models highlight is the so called tendency of free-riding. Such a phenomenon occurs
when individuals of a group cannot be excluded from enjoying the group’s mutual benefit,
regardless of how much effort he or she exerted towards fulfilling that benefit. Thus fishers
are tempted to individually harvest large stocks of fish while the others abstain to maintain
the stock at a renewable level and factories spill their waste in untreated form leaving it to
others to worry about spending money on waste disposal systems. And so these models are
able to explain (at least up to some convincing extent) why individually rational actions
may lead to collectively irrational outcomes.
Ostrom continues by asserting that while the aforementioned models of inevitable doom
are extremely interesting and powerful they are also extremely dangerous. What makes
them dangerous is the manner in which they are used in policy prescription. Instead of
being used as a guiding tool for the policy-makers the conclusions of the models are taken
as a starting point, a dogma to say the least, and it is accepted without question that
the community itself is unable to sustain its resources without interference of the governing
body. It is not taken into account that the hard constraints that are in place in the assumed
setting of the models are not in fact hard constraints in empirical settings. For instance,
the prisoners in the prisoners dilemma might be able to negotiate beforehand, reaching a
binding agreement to always play the cooperate strategy.
The metaphorical use of these models in Ostrom’s point of view eventually leads to pre-
scribing solutions that are not appropriate in practice. Consider for instance the commonly
prescribed solutions to the CPR problem: privatization and state regulation. While hectares
of land are possible to privatize, how would one effectively do this in the case of fisheries?
Ostrom posits that for effective governance, the resources must belong to institutions that
are collectively owned by the consumers themselves. Such institutions are more likely to
succeed in governance as compared to institutions that are owned by the state or private
enterprises. This is because the users (as stakeholders) themselves have more incentives to
make the arrangement successful. Furthermore they are less likely to make informational
errors e.g. under or over-estimating the carrying capacity of the resource and the wrong
identification of cooperators and defaulters, which may cause the institution to fail in its
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objective. An example of such policy making is the nationalization of forests in Third World
countries, which has been advocated on the grounds that the local villagers are unable to
manage their forests effectively. In order to regulate the forests, the governments usually
deploy officials with salaries that are low enough to propel them to accept bribes (this is
Design Principles Examples
Clearly Defined Boundaries
The individuals who have the right to harvest
the CPR and the boundaries of the CPR itself
are well defined
Fishing licenses, Demarcation of grazing pas-
tures
Proportional Equivalence Between
Benefits and Costs
Individuals who benefit more from the CPR
must incur more of the operational cost
Large benefactors providing more labor for
communal activities, Imposition of taxes pro-
portional to consumption
Collective-choice arrangements
Individuals effected by operational rules also
have influence in changing those rules
Local elections, Referendums, Rotational ros-
ters for irrigation
Monitoring
Monitors/auditors are accountable to the
users
Auditors elected from within the community it-
self, Technological solutions such as smart me-
ters
Graduated sanctions
Violation of rules receive penalties
proportional to the degree of violation
Extra labor in the case of violating a mainte-
nance contribution, Predefined fines or seasonal
bans on resource use stealing
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Users have access to low cost local arenas to
resolve conflicts
Communal judicial systems such as Commu-
nity Courts in the Western countries and the
Panchayati Raj in South Asia
Minimal recognition of rights to
organize
Institutions devised by locals to regulate the
CPR are recognized by external government
authorities
Authoritative powers entrusted to the munici-
palities, Promotion of autonomous tribal area
systems for resource governance
Nested enterprises
Multiple tiers of nested organization
Defining layers of organization, e.g., in irri-
gation systems, for users in the same canal
branch, same headworks, same river basin, and
so on
Table 1.2: Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions (as identified by
Ostrom [148])
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of course not intentional but an implication of the state of the national economies). This
has in many cases resulted in the forests being effectively transformed to an open-access
resource which had previously been limited-access.
The highlight of Ostrom’s work is the enumeration of several communities from diverse
geographical and demographical regions of the world that have devised solutions to sustain
their commons which neither fall in to the category of state-ownership nor privatization.
In all the studied cases, the local communities were able to avoid tragedies without any
external coercion by coming up with regulating institutions of their own. She then presents
the common characteristics of these institutions as guidelines for governance of CPRs. These
characteristics have been reproduced in Table 1.2. An adaptation of the design principles to
irrigation systems is given by Ostrom in [149] and have been upheld by successful irrigation
systems in multiple parts of the world [115, 171]. The principles have also been studied
in the context of other resources such as forests [88], fisheries [174] and rangelands [143]
among various others.
Ostrom’s work contains an important lesson: successful management of open-access
resources is possible through local institutions without the coercion of a central authority.
Knowing that feasible solutions to a problem exist serves as a stimulus for the quest of
those solutions. The case studies of real-world communities living in harmony with their
respective resources provide exactly the inspiration needed as we contemplate a scientific
enquiry of the NRM problem in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Eyeing CPRs through the Systems
Lens
Common pool resources, like all natural resources, are vital components of the complex
ecosystem that sustains the development of human society. Resources are used in the
provision of food & drink, housing & infrastructure, mobility and so many other necessities
for our survival. As we saw in Chapter 1 they can be a cause to initiate war and even spur
the collapse of civilizations. Resources effect the way we live, move and even think. On the
other hand, humans effect the resource through consumption and conservation acts. Hence
common pool resources, like all natural resources, are intricately tied to the human society.
Neither can be studied in isolation without considering the effects of the other. CPRs and
society thus constitute what is known in scientific terms as a system. In this chapter, after
defining the construct of a system, we study the method of inquiry commonly employed to
examine complex systems. This method of inquiry is known as Systems Analysis (or SA
for short).
2.1 The Concept of a System
With the expansion of science and human knowledge, we are being confronted with systems
that are increasingly complex to understand and eventually manage and control. Methods
for scientific inquiry have evolved over the years with the goal of understanding such systems.
Since we will henceforth be employing the concept of a system extensively, it is beneficial
to reflect on what we actually mean by the term.
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A system can be thought of as a whole that consists of more than one component
(these components may also be systems in their own right). According to Ackoff [107], each
component of a system must have the following characteristics
1. Each component is capable of influencing the behavior of the whole system.
2. The way each component influences the overall system is dependent on the state of
the other components. In other words, the components are all interconnected.
3. Any set of components also has the characteristics (as mentioned in the above two
points) of the individual components.
The definition above serves to underpin a very critical property of a system. Namely, the
system holds properties that none of the individual components have. In other words, a
system is more than just a sum of its individual parts.
We now move on to analysis and synthesis, the two modes of inquiry for understanding
a system, both of which form the foundation for Systems Analysis.
2.2 Analysis and Synthesis: The Fundamental Ingredients of
Scientific Inquiry
Analysis stems from the Greek analusis which means “ to loosen up”. As a method of
inquiry it dictates that in order to understand any system, we must decompose it into its
parts and gain an understanding of the individual parts in isolation. For instance, in order
to comprehend the working of a computer we decompose it into parts until we get a CPU,
hard drives, CD ROM, external ports, data and memory buses etc. In order to understand
the computer an understanding of all these parts in isolation is necessary. Thus in order
to understand life, we must understand a cell, the fundamental unit of all living organisms;
and to understand the working of the universe, we must first understand an atom, the
fundamental unit of all matter.
Analysis is hence a process by which a system is taken apart, and the understanding of
the individual parts is then aggregated to gain an understanding of the whole. Consider
the example of the computer again. We already discussed that in order to understand the
computer, we must gain an understanding of the CPU, hard drives, CD ROM, external
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ports etc. However, if we take all these things individually and simply put them together
in one place in front of us, we will surely not get a working computer. The ultimate
purpose of the computer is to perform calculations (admittedly a very crude delineation
of the computer’s purpose, but nonetheless sufficient for the point of this discussion). But
if we take the memory unit and pull it out from the computer, it will cease to serve its
purpose. Analysis prompts us to take the system apart in order to understand it. But as
we have just seen, taking apart the system (in this case a computer) takes away its essential
properties. For it is not only the individual components that make the system, but it is also
the interconnections between them that are equally (if not more) important in its formation.
Synthesis enables us to understand the system with respect to these interconnections.
Synthesis comes from the Greek sunthesis which means “to place together” and as the
literal meaning indicates, it is the opposite of analysis. Let us look at synthesis more closely
by comparing it with analysis. In analysis, we first disintegrate the system into its compo-
nents, understand each component in isolation and then combine the isolated understanding
to form an understanding of the whole. In synthesis, we first view the system as a part of
the larger system which contains it, understand that system and then disintegrate the un-
derstanding of the larger system into that of the system under investigation by identifying
its role in the larger system.
Let us return to the example of the computer. We already discussed that in order to
understand the computer via analysis, we must gain an understanding of its various parts
which include the data, memory and control buses. If we look at each bus in isolation, we
would find them to be identical. However if we understand the larger system i.e. the system
bus, of which all these are a part of, and see how it connects with the CPU, memory unit
and input/output we will be able to identify and understand the individual buses through
these interconnections. Here it is the role each individual bus plays as part of the larger
system (the system bus) that truly defines its purpose.
It is important to note that synthesis is not “better” than analysis for any common notion
of the word. In fact analysis and synthesis are not even comparable, they are complementary
to each other. Let us consider the example of a research institute. If we insist on employing
analysis to understand the working of the institute we disintegrate it into its constituent
programs. But in order to understand the programs we must use analysis again and so
we break them into their constituent clusters. Each cluster then consists of individual
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staff members and to understand each staff member we would again have to disintegrate
perhaps along the lines of that member’s professional profile. Each profile would indicate
association with a particular field of study and so on and so forth in a never-ending process
of continuous disintegration. On the other hand, if we try to understand the institute on
the basis of synthesis, we look at the larger system that institute belongs to. Perhaps it
is part of a university. But the university is again a part of a larger system which is the
educational system, which is in turn part of the governing body and we continue in this
manner ad infinitum. Analysis or synthesis alone cannot furnish a complete understanding
of a system.
We shall now return our focus to natural resource systems. In this dissertation, a re-
source system is understood to be composed of two components: human society (or the
fraction of society consuming the resource) and the resource itself. Thus if we intend to dis-
sect CPR systems for the purpose of analysis, we would obtain at the first step the resource
and the society. The resource itself is a complex system. For example, forests consist of
trees, wildlife and other vegetation. Trees in turn are composed of leaves, branches, roots,
etc. We could delve even deeper till we reach the biological cell and even then, the process
does not end here. The same holds for the consuming society, which is divided into small
communities. The communities consist of households which in turn consist of individual
human beings. Now the human being itself is such a complex entity that one cannot hope
to even begin to understand it fully until the disintegrating process is stopped somewhere
and the context of the study is brought into play to simplify matters. On the other side, to
understand CPR systems by synthesis we search for the containing system. Conceivably,
the CPR system is part of a larger economy belonging to a particular geographical loca-
tion. That economy is a part of the global economy which in turn is a part of our planet’s
ecosystem, which is again part of a larger system, and so on. CPRs as systems comprise of
human society and a natural resource which are both extremely complex systems in their
own right. This is what makes the understanding of CPRs so challenging.
So how does one then actually understand a system? The answer, as we shall see next,
is a blend of analysis and synthesis.
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2.3 Systems Analysis: Tackling Complex Systems with an
Integrative Perspective
When we apply analysis to any system, what we obtain is a set of the individual components.
As Ackoff [107] would say, it yields an understanding of the system’s structure. When
we apply synthesis to a system we understand the role it plays in the larger system of
which it is a part. It thus yields an understanding of the system’s behavior. Ritchey [165]
distinguishes between two levels of abstraction of a system. One level views the system
as a primary functioning unit, a “black box” and what this presents is information on the
system’s behavior (thus the level synthesis is concerned with). Another level views the
system as a set of components working together to achieve some common purpose, yielding
the overall construction or structure of the system (thus the level analysis is concerned
with). As we saw in the case of the research institute, it is only possible to understand the
system at one of these levels. So then the question really is: what type of understanding
do we want to gain about the system?
Perhaps one of the first applications of this intricate relationship between analysis and
synthesis is included in Riemann’s study “The Mechanism of the Ear” [84]. The study
is concerned with how the sound sensation of the human ear works and is one of the
assignments Riemann was engaged in just prior to his death. The departing point for the
study is the late 19th century work of Hermann Helmholtz [200] who used the analytical
method of scientific inquiry to develop a theory of the human ear, and subsequently applied
it to the theory of musical composition. While Helmholtz’s work contains many significant
contributions and has gained the status of a classic in human physiology, it also contained
many flaws. Going into specific details is beyond the scope of this dissertation however
it is sufficient to mention that one of the biggest flaws concerned the role of the middle
ear. Riemann begins his study from a synthetic point of view i.e. the purpose of the
ear. He does not conduct his study with perspective of the anatomy of the human ear
but with the perspective of what the ear actually accomplishes. Indeed this is the same
Georg Friedrich Bernhard Riemann who is primarily known for his significant contributions
in mathematical analysis, differential geometry and number theory. Despite the incomplete
form of Riemann’s manuscript, it includes important conclusions for the principles of human
anatomy. While Riemann did not actually use the term “system” he had unknowingly
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employed what would later come to be known as systems analysis.
Without the knowledge of the ear’s anatomy that Helmholtz’s work contained, Riemann
would not have been able to complete his study. For in his words, “every synthesis rests upon
the results of a preceding analysis, and every analysis requires a subsequent synthesis”. It
is exactly this thought that is at the very core of the Systems approach to scientific inquiry.
Barton and Haslett [26] describe the scientific method as a dialect between analysis and
synthesis. The purpose of Systems Theory is to frame this dialect. Thus, as Ackoff posits
[107], Systems Theory is a fusion of both analysis and synthesis. How much reduction
to apply to the system via analysis before performing the final synthesis is a question of
what we wish to gain from our understanding of the system and must be inferred from
context of the inquiry. The early proponents of the systems approach asserted that every
system has certain characteristics that are independent of the discipline that particular
system is associated with and sought to develop a theory of those characteristics. Ludwig
Von Bertalanffy in his famous paper [198] laid the foundations for General Systems Theory
which later on came to be known as Systems Science. Even with the diversity of systems
that scientists encounter, ranging from living organisms to social systems to man made
machines, there exist several universal properties that all systems possess. Via his General
Systems Theory, Bertalanffy gave mathematical descriptions of some of these properties
such as wholeness, growth, mechanization, centralization, sum and finality to name just a
few.
The term Systems Theory has grown to encompass several related terms such as Systems
Thinking, Systems Science, Systems Analysis, Systems Dynamics, Systems Engineering and
so on (Skyttner [183] gives an excellent review on the subject). We next give an overview of
how the Systems perspective has been utilized by those engaged in natural resource systems.
2.4 Systems Analysis and Coupled Human Natural Systems
The immense significance of TOCs in the future of human development has been the primary
focus of Chapter 1. At this point, we hope the reader has begun to appreciate that the nature
of TOC problems are approachable only through an integrative, multidisciplinary approach
(which is exactly what Systems Analysis has to offer). The problem of the Commons
is one of the major global challenges that scientists working in the environmental and
21
related sciences have confronted through systems analysis. These include issues such as
climate change, population growth, environmental pollution and resource management in
general [131, 90, 103, 202]. Simon Levin [118] considers TOCs as one the three grand
challenges of systems theory. The complete list is enumerated as follows: 1): robustness
and resilience to critical transitions, 2): scaling from the microscopic to the macroscopic,
and 3): dealing with problems of the Commons. We now give a brief overview of the
application of Systems Analysis to TOC problems as part of the more general problem of
natural resource management.
Natural resource systems, as coupled systems between resources and society, represent
a larger class of systems, namely, Coupled Human Natural Systems (or CHANS). CHANS
are characterized by settings in which people interact with natural components. These
components may be natural resources or other elements of the environment which include
wildlife, vegetation, the atmosphere, landscapes, climate, etc. CHANS are characterized
by complex feedbacks between social and ecological components, high non-linearities and
significant time-lags. As such, understanding the system is of critical importance before
any kind of intervention is undertaken. The law of unintended consequences often comes
into play in such systems. For instance, in a bid to increase crop productivity, the “Four-
Pests” campaign of China [181] sought to eradicate the Eurasian Tree Sparrow (along with
mosquitoes, flies and rats) which ate grain, seed and fruit. It was later realized that besides
grain, the sparrows also ate many insects harmful to rice, and as a result, the rice yield
actually decreased. Another example is the policy to eradicate wildfires in American forests
[50]. The policy did lead to fewer fires, but, also led to growth conditions such that when
fires did occur, they were much larger and more damaging. As a result the total acreage of
forests affected by fires increased.
The lesson of the Four-Pest campaign and the American wildfire policy dictates a full
understanding of the system before any intervention is done. For such systems, traditional
ecological research often excludes human impacts while traditional sociological research
often neglects ecological effects. However, as Liu et. al. [120] assert, any effective study on
CHANS must incorporate not only variables related to the social and ecological components,
but also those related to their connections (such as resource consumption and provision of
ecosystem services). The systems perspective is thus a natural way to approach CHANS
and an increasing number of studies are now integrating the ecological and social sciences
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in order to study these systems.
Due to the applicability and effectiveness of systems thinking for analyzing CHANS
problems, numerous interdisciplinary frameworks have emerged to study such systems with
an integrative perspective. Binder et. al. [32] provide a comprehensive comparison of
the different frameworks used to analyze coupled human-natural systems 1. The authors
classify ten different frameworks according to three criteria 1): whether the framework
conceptualizes the interactions between the social and ecological components as uni- or bi-
directional, 2): whether the ecological system is defined according to its utility to humans
(anthropocentric) or its internal functioning, and 3): whether the framework is intended to
provide a common language for formulating and approaching research problems (analysis-
oriented), or with the goal of acting upon or intervening in the system (action-oriented).
Table 2.1 enumerates the list of frameworks and their categorization as given by Binder
et. al. [32]. Three of these frameworks conceptualize the interactions between the eco-
logical and social sub-systems in both directions: the Human Environment Systems (HES)
Framework [178], the Management and Transition Framework (MTF) [153] and the Social-
Ecological Systems Framework (SESF) [150]. The three are similar as far as the concep-
tualization of the ecological subsystem and the orientation of the frameworks’ goal are
concerned. All three are analysis-oriented with the ecological subsystem defined according
to its utility to humans (anthropocentric). However among the frameworks, there exist sub-
tle differences in the disciplines they evolved from, their theoretical origins, fundamental
research questions and the settings to which they have been applied to.
The Management and Transition Framework (MTF) was developed for the application
to water governance problems with a focus on studying the transitional behavior under
regime change. Binder et. al. state that MTF has no specific disciplinary origin but it
may be attributed to complex systems science. The theoretical foundations of MTF are
related to CPR theory, institutional analysis & development and social psychology. As can
be seen in Table 2.1, the MTF conceptualizes the resource in an anthropocentric manner
which means that only those aspects are considered which impact humans significantly.
The MTF goes one step further than the other anthropocentric frameworks and explicitly
considers environmental hazards which pose a significant threat to human well-being. While
1In the cited publication, the authors refer to CHANS as social-ecological systems. Such interchangeable
terminology is common in the literature.
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Framework Interactions
Conceptual-
ization
Orientation
DPSIR
Driver, Pressure, State, Im-
pact, Resource [53]
Social → Ecological Anthropocentric Action Oriented
ESA
Earth Systems Analysis
[173]
Social→Ecological Ecocentric Analysis Oriented
ES
Ecosystems Services [68]
Social→Ecological Ecocentric Analysis Oriented
HES
Human Environment Sys-
tems Framework [178]
SocialEcological Anthropocentric Analysis Oriented
MEFA
Material and Energy Flow
Analysis [95]
Social→Ecological Ecocentric Analysis Oriented
MTF
Management and Transi-
tion Framework [153]
SocialEcological Anthropocentric Analysis Oriented
SESF
Social-Ecological Systems
Framework [150]
SocialEcological Anthropocentric Analysis Oriented
SLA
Sustainable Livelihood Ap-
proach [19]
Social←Ecological Anthropocentric Action Oriented
TNS
The Natural Step [48]
Social→Ecological Ecocentric Action Oriented
TVUL
Turner’s Vulnerability
Framework [191]
Social←Ecological Anthropocentric Action Oriented
Table 2.1: Integrative frameworks for analyzing coupled human natural systems [32]
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MTF was originally intended for water governance systems, it has also been applied to risk
governance and integrated landscape management. In the authors’ opinion, the framework
may be tailored for application to other domains as well.
The Human Environment Systems (HES) framework, as its description in Table 2.1
suggests, was developed as a tool to structure CHANS research. The framework is heuristic
in nature and provides operative concepts to study human-centric environmental problems
(which may include resource governance). The HES framework considers the details of
the ecological system only with reference to the social system. The standard procedure
for analysis is to select a state-of-the-art model for the ecological system and then set its
scale according to the corresponding social system. The framework has emerged from the
environmental decision making and psychology community and is theoretically based on
systems science, decision theory, game theory and sustainability science. It is applicable to
any system where the interactions between humans and the environment play a significant
role e.g., energy, water, waste, etc.
The Social Ecological Systems Framework SESF specifies a set of multi-hierarchical
variables relevant to CHANS. The framework has been proposed by Ostrom [150], who
selects the variables on the basis that they proved to be pivotal in her studies of successful
CPR governance schemes. She places a significant emphasis on hierarchies (note principle
no. 8: nested enterprises, in Table 1.2 of features of successful CPR governance schemes),
with multiple tiers of the variables corresponding to multiple levels of organization. This
aspect of the SESF enables it to support analysis on multiple scales. The SESF also stands
out from the frameworks of Table 2.1 with respect to the degree to which the social and
ecological systems are teated in equal depth. As Binder et.al. [32] note, while the ecocen-
tric frameworks incorporate the ecological system in more detail and the anthropocentric
frameworks incorporate the society in more detail, SESF incorporates both systems in equal
detail. The framework has emerged from political sciences and at its foundation, includes
theories such as collective choice, CPR and natural resource management. The framework
has been developed for resources that are common-pool in nature and has been applied
mainly to forests, pastures, fisheries and water.
The three frameworks HES, MTF and SESF described above have either been devel-
oped specifically for natural resource governance, or can potentially be applied to resource
governance problems. The rest of the frameworks in Table 2.1 also address environmental
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problems (in which humans play a significant role) of immense importance. The inter-
ested reader is referred to the cited references of each framework for specific details. Each
framework includes explicit consideration of the non-linear nature of resource and social
dynamics, uncertainties for key variables, imperfect knowledge of human actors, effects of
social linkages, and so on. As applications of the Systems approach to critical environmen-
tal problems, they touch on many disparate disciplines each of which contribute different
aspects to the study of the coupled human natural system.
Perhaps one of the most fundamental proposition of the systems approach is an aban-
donment of cause and effect as the only possible relationship between two entities, whether
viewed independently or as components of a larger system. This of course is a reference to
the feedback loop, a concept at the foundation of what is known as cybernetics. Cybernetics
is a manifestation of systems theory that was conceived almost parallel to Systems Science.
While the concept has somewhat faded away from the forefront of the scientific community,
the engineering community, motivated by recent advances in technology, is now bringing it
back into focus. The development of cybernetics and its potential application to NRM is
what shall capture our attention for the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
From Control of Machines to
Cybernetics of Resources
The engineering community has achieved great technological advancement by application
of the concepts of control and communication to machines and technical systems. The
philosophy of control and communication is however quite general and is manifested not
only in technical systems but can also be observed in living organisms, society and the object
of interest for this dissertation: natural resource systems. Natural resource systems consist
of an intricate coupling between natural and social systems and as such, have immense
potential to benefit from different lines of research in the ecological, social and engineering
communities. The conception of smart cities and the Internet of Things (IOT) have greatly
stimulated the interest of engineers towards coupled systems of humans and technology.
The growing pervasiveness of such systems has resulted in the emergence of what has come
to be known as Human In The Loop (HITL) control.
In this chapter, after discussing the convoluted relationship between technology and the
environment, we introduce the fundamental concepts of cybernetics that have spawned the
disciplines of communication and control. We then give an account of how recent progress
in technology has led to more and more human-centric realizations of control, including
resource related applications. We then consider a cybernetic perspective for NRM, thus
framing the research presented in the remaining part of this dissertation.
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3.1 Technical Advancement and the Environment
The Industrial Revolution of the 19th century saw great technological advancement and led
to an (at that time) unfathomable improvement in the quality of the common individuals’
life. However the subsequent gains in economic prosperity have come at a heavy price
which the natural environment has had to pay in the form of increased global emissions,
melting glaciers, depleting ozone, deforestation and so on. The complete list of these effects
is quite long, well-known and depressing. The 20th century thus saw a growing awareness
of the negative impact of technology on the environment and ultimately our collective
living condition. Publications such as Forrester’s “World Dynamics” [80] and Meadows
and colleagues’ “Limits to Growth” [135] also enhanced the view of technology (and the
economic growth it enabled) as the factor responsible for our deteriorating habitat. Thus the
contemporary environmental movement saw technology as a major source of environmental
degradation and a continuous cause for unintended and unwanted side effects.
Interestingly, one of the major objections to the LTG world models is the conceptual-
ization of technology. As Foray and Gru¨bler [79] assert, more technology in the future does
not necessarily imply more of today’s technology or simply more technological “hardware”.
Moreover, the temporal scale over which we consume our resources is not determined by
their geological abundance, but is determined through technological, social and economical
factors which are all subject to a process of continuous change. Technology enables us to
positively influence the environment by 1): increasing efficiency in production, 2): aug-
menting our natural resources by unearthing new reservoirs, and 3): enabling new trends
in material and resource use. For example, through technology we have been able to reduce
vehicle emissions by manufacturing more efficient automobiles. Greenhouse gas emissions
have been reduced by adopting new technologies such as fuel cells & single-gas turbines and
by shifting from coal and petroleum to renewable energy sources. Geographical Information
Systems (GIS) technology has enabled the remote detection of sources for environmental
deterioration. Genetically engineered micro-organisms are now used to treat toxic chemi-
cals in waste material. Precision agriculture and the revolution in information technology
has greatly enhanced the farmer’s capability to effectively monitor, treat and make better
decisions about crop production. It has eventually been realized now that feasible solutions
to our environmental problems call for more proficiency in technology and not less [20].
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Ironically, technology has demonstrated a capacity to both inflict and remedy damage to
the environment [91] and as such can be perceived as a “double edged sword”.
The potential of technology in redeeming the environment is not limited to the three
roles mentioned above. An increased emphasis is now being placed on the fact that systemic
changes in the economical system are required. For example, the “circular economy” [175]
promotes a regenerative economy in which consumer goods are designed to be of such
nature that after the end of their useful life cycle, certain components could be restored and
made to re-enter the biosphere instead of being wasted. This is in contrast to the current
make-dispose-waste linear model of the economy. Such a thing is now possible due to the
availability of new materials and sophisticated manufacturing techniques.
Although the effectiveness of technological solutions to environmental problems may
seem promising at first, the practical world is full of examples of unintended consequences
and, as such, caution must be practiced at all times. As Moriarty and Honnery assert
[140], technical advances are sometimes responsible in reinforcing the same effects that they
were brought about to mitigate. For example, increasing forested area in an attempt to
reduce global warming, risks reducing the Earth’s capacity to reflect part of the incident
solar energy back into space [110]. Thus the Earth would absorb more solar energy, partly
offsetting the intended reduction in global warming. An apparent technical solution to one
problem may also produce unwanted effects in another domain. For instance, the increased
production of biofuels is forecasted to compete with existing agricultural goods which can
result in a rise in food prices. Indeed the use of corn to produce ethanol has occasionally
caused the global price of corn to spike in the past [140].
The unintended consequences of forestation and bioenergy are similar to those of the
Four-Pest campaign and the American wildfire policy we saw in Section 2.4. This reinforces
the notion that any intervention, including those technological in nature, in coupled human
and natural systems must not be made without fully understanding the system in context
of the issue at hand. Such an understanding requires a systems perspective. Due to the
potential impact of technology in environmental problems, the engineering community is
now showing an increased interest in CHANS. It is thus natural to extend their traditional
way of approaching systems (which, up until recently, have been mostly technical in nature)
to such settings. Here we are referring to Cybernetics, an old paradigm of Systems Theory
that has shaped the foundations of communication & control.
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3.2 Cybernetics and Concepts Defining Feedback Control
Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow [167] present a classification of system behavior in an
essay published in 1943. Behavior is defined as “any change of an entity with respect to
its surroundings”. Interestingly, the authors use the term behavioristic study to describe
the method of study which is akin to the synthetic method. The behavioristic approach
is contrasted with functional analysis, which as the term suggests is akin to what we have
dubbed simply analysis. Behavior can be classified as active or passive. Active behavior
is one where the system is the source of output energy generated as a consequence of its
operation. In passive behavior either no output energy is produced to begin with, or en-
ergy flows from the system input(s) directly to its output(s). Active behavior is further
divided into purposeful and non-purposeful behavior, where purpose denotes the existence
of a specific objective or goal for the system. Purposeful behavior is categorized as either
feedback (teleological) or non-feedback (non-teleological) with feedback including both neg-
ative and positive feedback. Rosenblueth et. al. state that all purposeful behavior can be
considered as requiring negative feedback. Feedback may be extrapolative (or predictive)
so that when a falcon dives towards a rabbit, its aim is not towards where the rabbit is at
the time the dive is executed but where the rabbit is conjectured to be when the falcon will
reach it. Feedback may also be non-extrapolative (or non-predictive) just as the amoeba
is able to move towards light but is not able to track a moving source. Thus purposeful
feedback behavior can be further divided into predictive and non-predictive behavior. The
order of predictive behavior denotes the complexity of prediction, for instance, the falcon
needed only to predict the path of the rabbit (hence first order prediction), whereas an
archer hunting the same rabbit would have to predict both the paths of the rabbit and the
arrow (thus second order prediction). The classification of behavior just described above is
depicted in Figure 3-1.
The postulate that all purposeful behavior requires feedback lays the foundation of Nor-
bert Wiener’s Cybernetics. Weiner introduced the term in his acclaimed book [206] in 1948,
a couple of years before Bertalanffy published his paper on General Systems Theory [198].
The cybernetics movement has roots that are quite distinct from those of systems theory.
While Bertalanffy’s ideas stemmed from biology, cybernetics took inspiration from technol-
ogy, using the feedback circuit as its basic model. However there exists a significant overlap
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Figure 3-1: A classification of behavior (reproduced from [167]).
in the interests of both movements. Both challenge the purely analytical methodology of
the pre-systems era and stress the importance of viewing systems from a holistic angle.
Although both were developed in parallel, cybernetics became a part of systems science
shortly after its inception. On a related note, systems thinking has given rise to a number
of traditions each of which are now established theories in their own right. Early examples
include Operations Research, Systems Dynamics, Organizational Learning and Cybernetics
(refer to [194] for further details). More recent developments include (but are not limited
to) Control and Communication Theory, Signals and Systems, Multi-agent systems and
Network Science. All the above can be thought of as different traditions of systems theory,
each having its own (often overlapping) language, methodology and outlook on the systems
perspective.
Cybernetics stems from the Greek kubeman which means “to steer”. Indeed one of the
earliest examples of control technology is the steering mechanism of a ship’s rudder. In
his published works [206, 205] Wiener formalized the concept of cybernetics by abstracting
the principles of feedback, control and communication from machines to systems in gen-
eral. These systems include living organisms, society, organizations and of course machines.
Through his discourse, Weiner was able to show that the concepts of feedback control and
communication were applicable to all the above mentioned systems. Thus cybernetics was
able to unify seemingly disparate disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, sociology
and engineering, all of which were (and continue to be) subject to an increasing amount of
specialization.
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Figure 3-2: The feedback control loop.
Cybernetics is concerned with the study of all systems which exhibit purposeful (or
teleological) behavior. The purpose of the system is specified through some objective or
goal that must be reached. This objective is usually translated to a certain state of the
system output(s) with the desired state being called the reference. The output of the system
is then compared with the reference in order to apply a corrective action depending on how
far the system is in reaching its goal. Thus the basic ingredients of a purposeful system are
1. The goal-setter which determines the system objective and translates it into a desired
state for the system output. This corresponds to the “goals” block of the feedback
loop in Figure 3-2.
2. The receptor which receives information on the output of the system and forwards
it for comparison with the desired output. This corresponds to the “sense” block in
Figure 3-2.
3. The comparator which compares the desired output specified by the goal-setter with
the output as received from the receptor and formulates a difference or error. This
corresponds to the “compare” block in Figure 3-2.
4. The control unit which decides a corrective action to be taken in order to reduce
the error. This corresponds to “decide” block in Figure 3-2.
5. The effector which implements the action determined by the control unit. This
corresponds to the “actuate” block of Figure 3-2.
32
In graphical representations of the feedback loop, the “compare” and “goals” blocks are
sometimes omitted (like Figure 3-3). However their presence is always understood.
This type of corrective behavior can be seen, as Wiener posits, in every purposeful
system. A person driving a car will continuously read the deviation of the car from the
center of the road and apply the necessary corrective action through the steering wheel
in order to keep the car in the center. Two people engaged in conversation also exhibit
the same behavior. The conversation has a purpose and if one of the individuals deviates
from that purpose, someone applies a corrective action by steering the conversation in the
required direction. Living organisms exhibit this behavior in the process of homeostasis,
which maintains the parameters of the body within a nominal range of values. Needless to
say, the principles of cybernetics are at play all around us.
The concepts of cybernetics, as a paradigm of Systems Analysis, has had a profound
influence in the development of both control and communication [86]. Over the passage
of time, although the term cybernetics has gone out of fashion, it continues to live on
in the sense that the discourse in many diverse fields are still being broken down into
systems, information, feedback and networks. As Asaro [7] puts it, “... cybernetics is
alive and well. Of course, nobody calls it cybernetics anymore, they simply call it control
theory or information theory.” However, as Asaro himself also notes, the original ideology of
cybernetics is much broad and is limited not just to machines. As technology has advanced,
the proliferation of humans in control applications continues to grow. In what follows we
look at how control theorists have incorporated humans, society and the environment in
their cybernetic formalism of systems. The umbrella term for such settings is called Human
In The Loop (HITL) control. The discourse is presented to build towards how CPR systems
may be perceived from the cybernetic approach.
3.3 Human-in-the-loop Control
The involvement of human beings in control systems can be broadly categorized into the
following levels [156]
1. Human machine symbiosis: Symbiosis is a state of two different organisms living
together in a close interactive manner. Examples of such systems include prosthetics,
exoskeletons, neurostimulators, etc.
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2. Human as operators or decision makers: These systems include those in which
regular intervention of a human operator may be expected e.g., self-driving vehicles,
remote control applications, auto-pilot systems. They also include systems in which
humans are involved in the high level decision making or goal setting such as town
municipalities, supply chains and resource management.
3. Humans as agents in multi-agent systems: Such systems include automated
transportation and pedestrian management, semi autonomous manufacturing, human
vs machine games and so on.
4. Humans as the objects of control: These systems include home comfort systems,
networks of opinion formation and social media to name just a few.
Resource management systems are special in the sense that they involve human beings
at two levels of involvement. Firstly, the humans are the objects of control as it is their
consumption which must be regulated. Secondly, humans are involved in the decision
making process of any control that may be subsequently applied. This may include setting
discount rates, devising effective means to implement the control, engaging in philosophical
exercises of formulating social welfare and so on.
While economists, ecologists and sociologists have all been working on coupled human
natural systems for a significant time now, the engineering community (in particular the
control faction) have recently gained interest in these systems through the increasing inte-
gration of technology in society and the opportunities that it offers. A small outline of the
journey is given below.
3.3.1 Cyber-Physical Systems and the Internet of Things
Cyber Physical Systems (or CPSs for short) pertain to the application of computing systems
to the control of physical processes. The overall behavior of the system is then determined
by both the computing element and the physical element. Early applications of engineered
systems for the control of intricate physical processes may be traced back to the steam engine
governor and the industrial revolution initiated by it. In recent decades the advancement in
computing and communication technologies have given rise to the Information Technology
(IT) revolution. This has resulted in a proliferation of computing elements and the world
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wide web at the core of control design for complex physical processes. The term Cyber-
Physical Systems, coined by Helen Gill [21] in 2006 at the National Science Foundation, thus
lies at the interface between control, communication and computing technology. Kim and
Kumar [113] identify multiple pathways leading to this area of interest via multiple scientific
communities which has also led to the birth of closely related terms such as Ubiquitous
Computing, Wireless Sensor Networks and the Internet of Things. The root of the term
CPS is, widely and befittingly, considered to be Wiener’s Cybernetics [117].
The Internet of Things (or IoT for short) relates to the extension of the internet and its
integration in the physical realm [137]. The notion of IoT was conceived by the computer
science community and envisions a world of “smarts” i.e., smart transport, smart phones,
smart infrastructure1 and smart cities [169]. The IoT concept shares many similarities with
CPS and both terms are often used as synonyms [36]. Both envision a strong coupling
of computation, intelligence and the environment in the form of a large scale distributed
computing system of systems. However both have evolved from different communities, and
as such, there exist subtle differences between the philosophy of both. The IoT focuses
more on virtual problems such as architecture, security, protocols, openness and privacy
[187]. CPS however places more focus on control, automation and the underlying physical
process, often formulated as a closed loop control system. While IoT consists of the internet
at its core technology, CPS consists of intelligent embedded systems in general. Thus IoT
may be viewed as an enabling technology for CPS. The IoT has also be portrayed as a CPS
connected to the internet [106].
The application of CPS based technologies are numerous, ranging from robotics, factory
automation and smart grids, to medical systems, citizen actuation and environmental con-
trol. Such diverse and convoluted applications pose many challenges for research in theories
for analysis and design, integration of cross-disciplinary works, developing technologies for
control actuation and sensing, meeting real-time computing requirements and abstracting
the complexities of physical systems to name just a few [21, 113, 117, 162].
1see Elsevier’s special issue on smart infrastructures [161]
35
3.3.2 Cyber Physical Social Systems: Addressing the social component
in CPSs
Cyber-Physical Social Systems (or CPSS) brings together the cyber, physical and social
components of a controlled process. The social dimension of CPSSs is rather broad and
encompasses not only human societies per se, but also mental capabilities and human knowl-
edge. Thus one realizes that all CPSs include a social dimension in one form or another.
Robots do not operate in their own world, but in the physical world where interaction
with humans is no longer a possibility but a necessity. Auto pilot systems and self-driving
vehicles rely on high level inputs from a human operator. Even highly automated control
systems which may seem to operate without any human intervention are frequently effected
by human behavior, either in the form of disturbances, or high level decision making and
goal setting. The goal of CPSSs is to effectively add and address this human component
in CPSs [201]. The fundamental difference then between a CPS and a CPSS is that in the
latter humans are modeled as fundamental units of the system and not objects that exist
outside the system boundaries. While CPS and IoT make connections across the physical
space and the cyber space, CPSSs connect the physical and cyber spaces with the social
space. This space not only includes humans in their physical form, but also includes their
cognitive behavior, social interactions and collective institutions 2. It has been argued that
since acknowledging human behavior is a key component of CPS design, a CPS should
infact be more accurately referred to as a CPSS [55].
3.3.3 The Imperative to Understand Human Behavior
As social applications of control and automation increase with the advancement of technol-
ogy, we are faced with many new challenges and research opportunities. Stankovic et. al.
[187, 142] identify the following CPS challenges for human in the loop control of CPSs
1. Challenge 1: Gaining an understanding of the complete spectrum of human-in-
the-loop control systems.
2. Challenge 2: Extending system identification techniques to adequately capture
human behavior.
2A parallel concept is the extension of IoT to the Internet of Everything (IoE) which goes beyond just
“things” to incorporate humans and society in what is envisioned to be a global sensing and actuating utility
connected to the internet [208].
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3. Challenge 3: Incorporating human behavior models into the formal methodology
of feedback control.
The common aspect in all three challenges listed above is a focus on understanding
human behavior in the formalism of control. Once it is understood that a system of con-
cern is HITL, the first challenge is to model the involvement of human beings. As stated
previously, it is absolutely essential that the social elements are modeled not as external
disturbances or noise but as primary components of the system. Using the formalisms that
exist separately in the social, technical and computational domains is not sufficient to deal
with these systems as each model highlights only certain aspects relevant to that domain
and ignores others. Such an approach to CPS design may prove to be fatal for verifying
the overall correctness and safety of design at the system level [21]. Thus an integrative
approach is required which combines the research from social sciences to engineering in a
formalism that is coherent with the language of feedback control.
3.4 The Cybernetics of Natural Resource Systems
In Chapter 2, we discussed the development of systems analysis and its application to the
field of natural resource management. Despite the aforementioned advancements however,
NRM has yet to benefit from the full potential of the cybernetic perspective. Accordingly
there have been attempts to draw attention to the application of the cybernetics philosophy
to environmental problems [101, 31], but they have largely gone unnoticed. Cybernetics fo-
cuses on the key question of how systems regulate themselves, how they evolve and adapt
to disturbances and the underlying structure and mechanisms that govern their dynamics.
Moreover, the framework is mathematically intensive and, as such, permits rigorous de-
ductions and confirmation (or refusal) of theory. The focus of the cybernetic approach on
regulating system outputs and states to desired values uncovers profound insights on the
required system structure and behavior in order to yield the desired results. Needless to
say, NRM can benefit greatly from the cybernetics perspective especially due to a growing
interest in the field shown by the control and automation community.
The second aspect of the relevance of cybernetics to natural resource management lies
with the controls community itself. The involvement of human beings in control and au-
tomation systems is growing rapidly with new applications being realized everyday. Such
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applications have been made possible through the advancement of technology. New and
improved sensors, actuators and the evolution of design techniques has transformed the
concept of smart cities and IoE from mere aspirations to a reality within reach. Many
researchers have pointed out that the missing link in the way forward is the seamless in-
tegration of human behavior with the technical aspects of system design [116]. One of the
most important factors responsible for the existent gap between the social sciences and
control and automation is the dearth of mathematical models describing social dynamics
[160]. While significant progress is being made in control of opinion formation and related
problems [83], much ground has yet to be covered in control and automation for natural
resource management. Caragliu et. al. [51] define a smart city as one where “investments
in human and social capital and traditional (transport) and modern (ICT) communication
infrastructure fuel sustainable economic growth and a high quality of life, with a wise man-
agement of natural resources, through participatory governance”. Thus a smart city cannot
be realized without effective management of its natural resource base. Natural resources are
coupled human-natural systems and in order to integrate them effectively in the formalism
of feedback control, we must first translate their dynamics in a form that is amenable to to
the cybernetic way of thinking.
3.4.1 Imagineering the Cybernetic Picture
Cybernetics concerns itself with systems as regulators that actively compensating for any
disturbances that might occur. As such, while applying cybernetics to any system, we must
address the following questions: What is the goal or objective of the system in context
of the analysis? What factors and decisions influence these goals? What information is
required by the analyst (or observer) and decision makers? What technologies are needed
to implement the system? In the following, we address the above and similar questions in
the context of NRM. A synopsis is given by Figure 3-3.
Defining System Goals
The research enclosed in this dissertation strives towards uncovering favorable conditions
for sustainable development. This relates to the setting of goals for the system and although
the “goals” block is not shown explicitly in Figure 3-3, it is a crucial part in the overall
control implementation. Here we adopt the following definition of sustainability, contained
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in the well known report of the Brundtland Commission titled “Our Common Future” [47]
“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”
The above definition requires further specification of two elements. First we must specify
what is meant by needs. In the context of NRM we interpret needs as consumption from
the natural resource stock. Second we interpret the ability to meet ones needs as the
availability of the resource stock for consumption. In the mathematical language which we
employ to frame the system model, this implies a steady-state with finite resource stock
and consumption level (see [195, 30] for similar examples).
Factors and Decisions Influencing Achievement of the Goals
The sustainability of natural resources is threatened by the overexploitation of its stocks
through phenomena similar to the TOC. Since sustainability of the stock implies an ex-
ploitation that is at most equal to the resource regeneration, it is effected both by resource
and consumption dynamics. Resource dynamics for renewable resources are specified by
environmental parameters such as carrying capacity and growth rate [155]. Dynamics of
human consumption are specified by the cognitive decision-making process of resource use
[141]. It is important to realize that there exist a plethora of variables and parameters that
effect consumption patterns in the real world. However it is not possible to represent all
influencing factors and keep the analysis tractable at the same time. Therefore one must
select only those factors which are most relevant to the underlying study. This pertains
to understanding of the physical process in context of the problem at hand (and therefore
the social and environmental factors are depicted alongside the social-ecological system in
Figure 3-3). Moreover, as discussed previously in Section 2.4 for CHANS, it is important
to not only consider the ecological and social components separately, but also to consider
the various interactions between them.
Mathematical Models of Human Behavior
As stated previously perhaps the factor most responsible for the gap between research in
social sciences and engineering is the lack of mathematical models of human behavior. De-
pending on the type of analysis, human behavior may be incorporated in objective functions
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Figure 3-3: The cybernetic perspective of NRM. The boldly outlined blocks repre-
sent the basic components of the feedback control loop. The other blocks list the
relevant factors and possible realizations for the different components as discussed
in the text.
in optimal control problems [1] or in the system dynamics themselves [2]. Depending on the
scale of the problem, the model may be a block model (representing tightly knit communi-
ties as a single entity) [82] or an agent-based model where the dynamics of each individual
consumer are represented explicitly [166]. Note that obtaining mathematical models of hu-
man behaviors is not easy, in fact, this is exactly one of the challenges for HITL control of
CPSs we saw in Section 3.3.3. Nonetheless, a mathematical model (whether conceptual or
data driven) is essential for the rigorous framework of control.
It is important to note here, a common misconception about modeling i.e., the goal of
modeling is always prediction. This is a tendency that is commonly found in both technical
and social disciplines; if a model has been made, then it is eventually going to be used
to make projections, or at least be “calibrated” or “validated” using some data. Epstein
treats these enduring misconceptions in his acclaimed lecture [73] quite judiciously. Aside
from prediction, he lists 16 different uses to build a model. Any model can in principle be
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used for prediction, but it is important to recognize the limitations of the model and the
resulting influence it has on the validity of the predictions. We do not advocate the use
of our model (see Chapter 4) to predict resource consumption patterns in actual scenarios,
as this is not the intent with which the model is created. Indeed there exist many models
that have been created for this exact purpose (for instance, see the discussion in [38, 46]).
We hope to demonstrate in the material that follows, the use of our model as a potential
tool to illuminate core dynamics of the system, highlight trade-offs in decision making, and
most importantly, take a step towards incorporating CHANS dynamics effectively in control
processes. The findings of the model might be also be used to guide the collection of data
and even discipline policy dialog for natural resource management.
Identifying the Mechanisms of Control
There exist many forms of control for NRM. While some are relatively straight-forward to
identify, others may not be so due to the complex nature of social dynamics and its intricate
coupling with the environment. Examples include devising social institutions of collective
behavior [148], manipulating dissemination of information to alter consumption patterns
[188], government interventions in local markets [78], and influencing the social network
so that consumers are connected in some desirable way [34]. There also exists long-term
measures such as educating the masses to nurture a certain type of mindset [6] and more
coercive methods such as enforcing quotas, steering prices or imposing taxes [97]. The main
challenge of course is to incorporate these controls in models of human behavior. Control
mechanisms fall in the “actuate” block of Figure 3-3 which also lists the aforementioned
mechanisms of control.
Measurements and System Identification
In order to evaluate performance, we must have some representation of the current state
of the system. This is achieved by the observation of relevant outputs of the process being
controlled. Thus the “decide” block (Figure 3-3) is preceded by a “sense” block in the overall
feedback loop of the control system. Measurement and sensing technologies for physical
quantities such as resource stocks and individual consumption have matured well beyond
their infancy. So much so that we are now living in a world of “smarts” [35]. Portable hand-
held devices such as smart phones contain dozens of sensors which include the capability to
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log and keep track of behavioral patterns of each individual. Smart meters record and send
data of resource stock and flows from extremely remote locations with time resolutions that
far exceed the time scales of environmental processes [184]. The bottleneck in sensing and
system identification for NRM then lies in the parameters concerning human psychology
such as environmental awareness and social orientations [142]. While sociologists are able to
estimate such psychological data in controlled experiments [168], we are still much behind
in devising system identification techniques for such parameters in real world CPSSs.
Evaluating System Performance
Evaluating system performance is critical for regulation and control. While obtaining bench-
marks for machines is relatively straight forward, it is not the case for NRM. Evaluating
how well a society is doing requires intense philosophical and moral dialogue, for example,
in establishing notions of social welfare and selecting discount rates for future generations
[179]. Such issues are heavily debated in the economics literature [28, 155] and must be
addressed before any type of social control is envisioned. In the overall control system this
step may be seen as part of the decide process as shown in Figure 3-3, which implicitly
includes the “compare” block from Figure 3-2.
3.5 Cybernetics and Society: A Word of Caution
In his original text [206], Norbert Weiner advises caution in the use of the cybernetics
philosophy for social systems. His major concern is the non-isolation of the observer from
the system. While in machines, the observer is external and is able to investigate the system
without disturbing it, it is not so in the case of social systems where the observer is part
of the system she analyzes (for instance, any attempt to investigate the stock exchange has
the potential to upset the stock exchange itself). Thus the principles governing the control
and communication of machines (subsequently called first-order cybernetics) are different
from those of society (subsequently called second-order cybernetics). Weiner further goes
on to state that this approach of investigations in the social sciences can never furnish us
with a quantity of verifiable, significant information which can even be compared with what
we have learned to expect in the natural sciences.
Although philosophical advancements in second-order cybernetics have gained signifi-
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cant ground [199], the cybernetics of social systems (also called socio-cybernetics[125]) is
far from yielding the rigorous theory of control and communication that has spawned from
its first order antecedent. Heylighen and Joslyn [100] go as far to state that “the emphasis
on the irreducible complexity of the various system-observer interactions and on the subjec-
tivity of modeling has led many to abandon formal approaches and mathematical modeling
altogether, limiting themselves to philosophical or literary discourses”.
In the material of the following chapters, a model for natural resource consumption is
derived from psychological roots and formulated as a dynamical system. Keeping in mind
Wiener’s cautionary remark, the formulation of the model and the analysis that follows
has been done by placing a focus on qualitative results. Accordingly, an emphasis has
been placed on the relationship between variables and uncovering sustainable trends in the
system. The association of numerics with social and psychological parameters has been
kept to a minimum, and where possible, avoided altogether. We hope that the research
enclosed in this dissertation will serve as a small step and an inspiration towards a fully
mathematical framework for NRM in the cybernetic context.
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Part II
Modeling the Dynamics of
Resource Based Systems
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Chapter 4
A Psychologically Relevant
Mathematical Model of Consumer
Behavior
In Chapter 3, we discussed the relevance of cybernetics to natural resource systems and
how it may provide a common ground for engineers to analyze and study the various so-
cietal and environmental applications of their technologies. Conant and Ashby [62] argue
that a mathematical model of any system is essential in order to achieve any purposeful
behavior on its part. Whether the model is conceptual or data-driven (see [176] for an
advanced application of empirical models), it is always understood to exist at the core of
any regulating mechanism. In this chapter, we introduce a mathematical model of resource
consumption, derived conceptually from social psychological research on consumer behav-
ior. After discussing the first principles used to derive the model, we present the model in
mathematical form, followed by a reduction in dimensionality for the sake of ease in analysis
and interpretations carried out in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
4.1 Modeling Paradigms in Socio-ecological Systems
Understanding and taking into account consumer behavior in socio-ecological systems is
of prime importance for designing an effective solution to phenomena, which are usually
referred to as The Tragedy of the Commons [97]. Social psychologists have carried out
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a wealth of research to identify factors driving the decision processes of individuals. For
instance, Festinger [75] hypothesizes, that human beings are continuously driven to evalu-
ate their decisions, and, in the absence of any objective non-social means, they do so by
comparison with decisions of other individuals. Thus, if a consumer is uncertain about the
state of a resource, she may make her decision based on the information gathered from other
consumers. Simon postulates [182], that individuals seldom optimize their outcomes over
different available alternatives, mainly due to their limited cognitive resources, and instead
act according to automated habitual behavior. This implies, that although a consumer
might be aware of the consequences of over-utilization of a natural resource, she may still
do so according to habit, as long as the outcome is satisfying to her for the time-being
(assuming that there is enough of the resource to permit her over-utilization).
These theoretical propositions have been supplemented by various laboratory and field
experiments of common-pool resource settings. Samuelson et al. [170] conduct an exper-
iment to observe how consumers respond to information on the overall consumption of
the resource. They find that individual consumptions tend to increase over time, however
there is little or no increase in consumption when the resource is being overused. Rutte et
al. [168] demonstrate, through an experiment, that consumer behavior is determined by
whether the society or the environment is held responsible for the scarcity or abundance
of resource. They conclude that when the environment is held responsible, consumers give
ecological information more preference than social information, for evaluation of their con-
sumption levels. Conversely, when the society is held responsible, social information is given
more preference than ecological information. Brucks and Mosler [45] conduct an experiment
to find what type of information is important to consumers while making decisions on con-
sumption. They observe, among other findings, that when the resource availability is low,
the importance of the information regarding the situation of the resource increases, while
the importance of the information regarding consumption of other individuals decreases.
Building on the aforementioned psychological research, scientists have proposed various
computational models that simulate consumer behavior during resource crises. Much of
these models have been developed under the umbrella of multi-agent simulations, or agent-
based modeling (these terms are often used interchangeably), in which several heteroge-
neous individuals (agents) are programmed according to some psychological rules. Such a
framework can be used to identify key behavioral elements that shape large-scale societal
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transitions. Deadman [69] presents one of the first agent-based models of the tragedy of
the commons. Since then, various computational agent-based models of resource dilemmas
have been developed see, for instance, [104, 76, 105]. These models differ in the principles
used to simulate the behavior of individual agents, as each group of authors, depending
upon the posed research question, attempts to incorporate different psychological findings
into the behavior rules of agents. Bosquet and Le Page [40] give an extensive review of the
development of this field and early applications to ecosystem management.
Despite the power of computational agent-based models to reveal collective phenomena
from individual interactions, they lack rigor, generality and elegance that is provided by
mathematical models. Notable achievements on the latter front include, for example, An-
derson [3] who describes the coupled dynamics of a regenerating commons and the physical
capital, as a system of a few ordinary differential equations, and uses calculus to show that
the model exhibits Hardins conclusions (Hardin 1968) explicitly. Anderies [2] applies bi-
furcation analysis to two separate models of resource exploitation: (1) the slash-and-burn
agricultural system of the Tsembaga tribesmen of New Guinea, and (2) the exploitation
of palm forests on Easter Island by the Polynesians. The analysis is used to study the
long-term behavior of both systems under different management/ behavioral regimes. The
study suggests that successful institutional designs are highly site-specific and that a careful
understanding of the geometry of the system is necessary for successful resource governance.
Roopnarine [166] suggests simple differential equation models which separately illuminate
three different aspects of the tragedy of the commons: (1) the compulsion of individual users
to act based on the action of other users, (2) the opportunities and limitations imposed by
the networked nature of consumers, and (3) mutualisms as solutions to tragedies. Thus,
these mathematical models are able to demonstrate and explain a certain phenomenon
in a clear and tractable fashion, where a major focus is usually placed on the dynam-
ics of consumption. Although no objective function or decision variables are explicitly
included in their formulation, they typically assume some notion of rationality prevalent
in the consumers. However, the theoretical findings provided by social psychologists are
seldom incorporated in these models.
The commons dilemma has also been studied extensively in the framework of game
theory. In her seminal work, Ostrom states that all institutional arrangements that can
be used to avert the commons dilemma are expressible as games in extensive form, and
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presents several such examples [148, 152]. While she expresses institutionalization for re-
source governance as a non-cooperative game, a large number of analysts have also used
cooperative game theory to study environmental resource issues (see, for example, [154]).
Ostroms research has stimulated a vast amount of work, concerning use of the game theo-
retic framework for modelling strategic interactions between consumers of a natural resource
(see for instance [124, 61, 70]). Similar to system dynamic models, game-theoretic models
also assume a notion of rationality, which is made explicit by including objective functions
and decision variables in the problem formulation. However, most game-theoretic mod-
els, either seek an optimal strategy of resource extraction, or seek to design models that
yield strategies similar to those observed in real-world scenarios, rather than focusing on
strategies that accurately depict the cognitive process of the consumers decision making.
We argue, that in order to increase the relevance of such models to real-world scenarios,
it is necessary to incorporate the cognitive principles that govern consumer behaviour, as
revealed by the psychological research.
In this chapter, we present a dynamic model of natural resource consumption, taking
into account the psychology of consumer behavior in an open-access setting. We depart
from the computational model by Mosler and Brucks [141] and put forward a stylized
version that is based on the same psychological principles employed in the original model.
Essential psychological variables have been maintained in our model, which include the
scarcity thresholds as perceived by consumers, the extent to which the consumers hold
nature (or society) responsible for the state of the resource, and the social value of the
consumers. While the original model assumes unlimited growth of the resource, we assume
standard logistic growth, which is more realistic. The logistic growth model and its variants
are commonly used to model many renewable resources that saturate at a certain carrying
capacity. Thus the resources which lie in the scope of our study include (but are not limited
to) fisheries [89], forests [74], vegetation [33], foliage [203], saffron [190], and so on. We do
not, in this study, incorporate the effects of uncertainty in our model. Thus we assume,
that perfect information is available to each consumer, regarding the resource quantity and
the consumption of other individuals present in the system. While this is a strong and
restrictive assumption, incorporating uncertainty is beyond the scope of this paper, as it
would considerably increase the complexity of the model, and must be dealt with separately.
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4.2 The Mathematical Model
Our starting point is the computational consumer behavior model of Mosler and Brucks
[141], which we stylize by formalizing it into a mathematical form. The resource is sup-
posed to regenerate according to the classical logistic growth model [155]. To begin with,
we consider a society of n individual consumers, each of whom have open-access to the
resource which they consume by exerting some effort. The dynamics of the consumers’ ef-
fort are modeled based on our understanding of the cognitive process depending on certain
psychological characteristics each consumer. These characteristics depict: (1) the environ-
mentalism of the consumer (the perceived benchmark quantity that the consumer uses to
evaluate whether the resource is in abundance or in scarcity), (2) the social values of the
consumer (how cooperative is the consumer), and (3) causal attributions of the consumer
(to what extent does the consumer attribute the current condition of the resource to nature-
induced reasons, as compared to society-induced reasons). The model is specified through
the dynamics of the resource (the ecological sub-model) and those of the individual con-
sumption efforts for each consumer (the social sub-model). We describe each sub-model in
turn as follows.
4.2.1 The Ecological Sub-model
Consider a society with n consumers, each having open-access to a single renewable resource.
We assume that the resource quantity R(τ), available for consumption by the society at time
τ , has an associated growth function, which is logistic in nature. We further assume, that
in the absence of consumption, R(τ) increases over time at an intrinsic (positive, constant)
growth rate r and saturates at the given carrying capacity Rmax . The individual consumers,
each identified by their respective index i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, exert effort ei(τ) 1 to consume the
resource. The resource growth is, therefore, given by
dR(τ)
dτ
= rR(τ)
(
1− R(τ)
Rmax
)
−
n∑
i=1
ei(τ)R(τ), (4.1)
where each individual’s harvest of the resource equals ei(τ)R(τ). Note that Equation (4.1)
is equivalent to the standard Gordon-Schaefer model [89], with the catch coefficient set to
unity.
1see [155] for interpretations of the word “effort” in this context
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Following [155], we use a general notion of “efforts”: “all the different dimensions of
harvesting activity can be aggregated into one magnitude called effort”. For example, in
fisheries, factors which define efforts may include “the number of boats deployed and their
efficiency, the number of days when fishing is undertaken and so on”. While positive efforts
refer to the extraction of a resource, negative efforts can be, for instance, growing trees
or breeding fish, and also beyond these namely, any effort exerted for the sustenance
of the resource. In fisheries, the latter can be related to the restriction of fishing gear,
closed area management, awareness programs and so on [207]; in forest management it
can be related to the restoration of soil fertility, preservation of remnant vegetation, and
promoting community forest enterprises [58, 42]. One can imagine similar realizations for
other renewable resources.
An important implication of the aggregate consumption effort being negative, is that the
resource may grow over the natural carrying capacity, i.e., R(τ) may take on values greater
than Rmax, which in the context of the model means that the resource grows beyond the
carrying capacity. However even then there is still a limit to how much beyond the natural
carrying capacity the resource quantity can be stretched. In the case of forests, for example,
using fertilizers and planting trees can act as negative extraction efforts leading to the forest
biomass growing over the natural carrying capacity. However, the limited amount of light
coming onto the Earth, competition for light between trees and simply the space constraint
will not allow the biomass to grow unboundedly and thus there will be some limit to it;
similar examples can be envisioned for other resources as well.
4.2.2 The Social Sub-model
Here we define the dynamics of the effort ei(τ) over time. We assume that the change
in consumption of each individual, is based on their weighing of two different factors, one
pertaining to information about the resource quantity (the ecological factor), and second
pertaining to information about the use of others (the social factor) [45]. Which factor gains
precedence over the other in the cognitive process of harvesting decisions depends on the
individual characteristics of each consumer, depicted here through multiple psychological
variables. The final change in consumption is the sum of the ecological and social impacts,
where we define the impact as the product of the corresponding factor and its weight. Thus
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the change in effort is given by
dei(τ)
dτ
= ecological weighti × ecological factori + social weighti × social factori.
In what follows, we specify the ecological & social factors, and the psychological variables
that determine the relative weighing of these factors to determine the change in effort ei(τ).
The final equation is given by (4.2).
Rutte et al. conclude from their study [168] that consumers harvest more from the re-
source in abundance than in scarcity. They further observe that harvests for each individual
tend to increase over time, except when the resource is scarce, in which case it decreases.
We implement this effect in our model by comparing the current resource stock with a
perceived-by-the-consumer “scarcity threshold”, denoted as Ri ∈ R. Thus we define the
ecological factor for i as the difference R(τ)−Ri. A positive ecological factor represents an
abundant state of the resource, whereas a negative factor represents a scarce state. A scarce
resource in the perception of individual i results in a decrease in consumption, whereas an
abundant resource results in an increase. Note that that abundance or scarcity represent
only the beliefs of the consumers and may or may not depict the objective state of the
resource, making it possible for Ri to lie outside the interval [0,Rmax]. A negative value
of Ri simply implies that i considers the resource to always be in abundance no matter
how low the actual stock is. Increasingly negative values amplify this effect via the factor
R(τ)−Ri (a similar argument holds for Ri > Rmax). While Mosler and Brucks [141] assume
the scarcity threshold to be constant for the entire population, we generalize by allowing it
to be different for each consumer (thereby ascribing more influence of the heterogeneity of
consumers). Indeed, consumers with different characteristics (age, sex, social class, political
orientation, etc.) also tend to have different levels of environmental concern [119].
In the same study, Rutte et al. [168] show that consumer behavior differs, depending on
the extent, to which they attribute scarcity of the resource to nature-induced reasons relative
to society-induced reasons. For example in the case of a forest, nature-induced reasons may
include less rainfall, volcanic eruption, and so on. Society-induced reasons may include
extensive overuse by the consumers, pollution, and other practices that are harmful to the
forest. We represent this attribution of i as ai ≥ 0; where ai = 0 represents a consumer,
who associates the scarcity of the resource entirely with society, with increasing values
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of ai representing increasing association of the resource scarcity to nature. As suggested
by the aforementioned study, the consumers that attribute the condition of the resource
more to nature, tend to give ecological information more importance. Thus we define the
ecological weight to be equal to the attribution ai. The ecological impact is therefore given
by ai(R(τ)−Ri), which means that a consumer, who attributes the condition of the resource
more to nature (thus having a high value of ai) will manifest a higher ecological impact,
than a consumer, who attributes the condition of the resource to society (having a low value
of ai).
In his theory of social comparison processes, Festinger [75] postulates that people are
less attracted to situations, where others are very divergent from them, than to situations,
where others are close to them regarding both abilities and opinions. Therefore, we define
the social factor by the term
∑n
j=1ωij(ej − ei) which represents the difference in i’s con-
sumption w.r.t all the other connected agents2. Here ωij > 0 is the directed tie-strength
between i and j; it represents the influence that j has on i’s consumption. Furthermore
ωii = 0 and
∑
j ωij = 1 ∀ i.. Thus the social factor is a measure of equality, with a low
magnitude representing a society with equal consumption (dictating a lesser change in con-
sumption) and a high magnitude representing unequal consumption (dictating a greater
change in consumption). Furthermore, a negative social factor represents a higher con-
sumption of the target individual relative to the other consumers (dictating a decrease in
the target individual’s consumption) and a positive social factor represents a relatively lower
consumption of the target individual (dictating an increase in consumption).
The social value of consumer i is represented by si ≥ 0. Here si = 0 represents an
extremely non-cooperative individual, with increasing values of si representing an increas-
ingly cooperative individual. A consumer with higher social value will weigh equality more
heavily than a consumer with lower social value. The influence of the social value of con-
sumer i, represented by si ≥ 0, is based on the assumption that cooperative individuals are
more concerned with maximizing equality and respond with anger to violations in equality
regardless of the effect on their own outcomes [196]. Thus the social impact is given by the
product si
(∑n
j=1ωij(ej − ei)
)
.
Thus in our assumed society of n consumers, the following equation gives the change
in effort of i as a function of her individual characteristics, the current stock level and the
2Henceforth, the terms individuals, consumers and agents are used interchangeably.
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effort of the other consumers.
dei(τ)
dτ
= ai (R(τ)− Ri) + si
n∑
j=1
ωij (ej(τ)− ei(τ)) , (4.2)
where i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. The first term on the right hand side of (4.2) represents the weighted
ecological factor, where (R(τ)− Ri) is the difference between the perceived optimum and
actual level of the stock, which is weighed by the attribution ai. The second term on the
right hand side of (4.2) represents the weighted social factor, where
∑n
j=1ωij(ej − ei) is
the difference in effort between the consumers, which is weighed by the social value si.
4.2.3 The Coupled Socio-ecological System
Together (4.1) and (4.2) describe the overall dynamics of the considered socio-ecological
system of the consuming population harvesting an open-access resource. In what follows,
we undertake some additional transformations, after which the model is able to capture the
first principles more accurately, and the new variables have clearer interpretations in terms
of the underlying theory. The transformations also reduce the overall dimensionality of the
parameter space.
Let x(τ) be the quantity of the resource relative to the carrying capacity Rmax of the
environment and yi(τ) be i’s effort relative to the intrinsic growth rate r: x(τ) =
R(τ)
Rmax
and
yi(τ) =
ei(τ)
r
. Define ρi =
Ri
Rmax
as i’s scarcity threshold level relative to Rmax. Next define
t = rτ as the new, non-dimensional time scale. We can now express the system as follows
x˙ = (1− x)x− x
n∑
i=1
yi,
y˙i = bi
(
αi(x− ρi)− νi
n∑
j=1
ωij (yi − yj)
)
,
(4.3)
where bi =
(aiRmax + rsi)
r2
, αi =
aiRmax
(aiRmax + rsi)
, νi =
rsi
(aiRmax + rsi)
and the over-dot
represents the derivative with respect to time t. Although the original weights ai and si
have different dimensions and thus are incomparable, the new weights αi and νi become
dimensionless and can be compared. Furthermore, αi+νi = 1, which means that αi and νi
are complements of each other. This reflects the bipolarity in social and physical dimensions
as described by the theory underlying the original model [141]. Thus αi can be interpreted
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as the relevance that i assigns to ecological information and νi can be interpreted as the
relevance that i assigns to social information. The state variables x, yi and parameters ρi, bi
also become dimensionless. Henceforth, we call αi and νi the ecological and social relevance
of i respectively, and ρi the environmentalism of i, where ρi ≤ 0 represents an extremely
non-environmental individual and increasing values of ρi correspond to increasing levels of
environmental concern. Here bi can be interpreted as the overall susceptibility [82] of i to
change in her consumption. All subsequent analysis in this dissertation will be carried out
on model (4.3).
4.3 Discussion
Leon Festinger’s theory on Social Comparison Processes [75] provides the rationale for
Social-Ecological Relevance (SER), which is the core theoretical concept of the model in
[141]. SER is one-dimensional and so the preference given to social factors is the comple-
ment of that given to ecological factors, which represents the bipolarity between social and
physical dimensions. The model that we put forward here also captures this concept as αi
and νi can be interpreted as the relative preferences given to the ecological and social fac-
tors respectively and as they are the complements of each other they depict the bipolarity
inherent in the underlying social comparison process.
It is important to note that there also exist some limitations in the model as presented
here. First, the psychological parameters of the system have been assumed to be constant
over time. Although in some cases a society may exhibit unvarying characteristics [82] for
short enough time span, it is understood that in general, societies in the real-world are in
a constant state of change. In Chapter 9, we study the dynamics of the environmentalism
under the theory of learning in games. Furthermore, the assumption of perfect access of
each consumer group, to information on the consumption of the other groups, is obviously
restrictive of a true representation of reality. Future work can be directed towards relaxing
this assumption, and observing the implications it may have, on the conclusions drawn
from the model we put forward here. In the subsequent chapters, we explore the potential
applications of the model via different mathematical frameworks in the context of NRM.
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Chapter 5
Exploiting Community Structure
to Create Block-models of
Resource Consumption
Previously in Chapter 4, we introduced a mathematical model of human decision making
in a coupled resource-consumer setting. Here we present a mechanism whereby groups of
similar consumers can be aggregated into a single unit provided that certain conditions of
homogeneity hold withing the network. Such block models are studied comprehensively for
similar processes in sociology [37], as they not only simplify the analysis but also utilize the
community structure of the network to present a concise description of the society. After
outlining the conditions on the structure of the population that allows us to make these
simplifications, we consider societies where those conditions may not be fulfilled. For such
cases, we explore an approximate block model that exibits deviations from the true model
in the transient, but converges to the exact behavor in the steady state.
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5.1 Obtaining Simplified Models of Aggregate Consumption
The coupled dynamics of the resource and individual consumptions is given by Equation
(4.3) which has been reproduced below.
x˙ = (1− x)x− x
n∑
i=1
yi,
y˙i = bi
(
αi(x− ρi)− νi
n∑
j=1
ωij (yi − yj)
)
,
(5.1)
where i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} with n being the total number of consumers. Recall from Chapter 4
that αi ∈ (0, 1) and νi = 1 − αi are the weights that i gives to the ecological and social
factors respectively. Furthermore ωij ≥ 0 is the social influence that node j exerts on node
i (see Figure 5-1), with the constraint that
∑n
j=1ωij = 1 and ωii = 0. The n equations for
Figure 5-1: The consumption of i is influenced by j through ωij . The
overall effect is given by bi νiωij where νi is the weight that i gives to
social factors in the decision making process.
the individual consumption rates are given as follows
y˙1 = b1
α1(x− ρ1)− ν1 n∑
j=1
ω1j (y1 − yj)

y˙2 = b2
α2(x− ρ2)− ν2 n∑
j=1
ω2j (y2 − yj)

...
y˙n = bn
αn(x− ρn)− νn n∑
j=1
ωnj (yn − yj)

(5.2)
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The summation term can be expanded as
y˙1 = b1
α1(x− ρ1)− n∑
j=1
ω1j ν1 y1 +ω11 ν1 y1 +ω12 ν1 y2 + · · ·+ω1n ν1 yn

y˙2 = b2
α2(x− ρ2)− n∑
j=1
ω2j ν2 y2 +ω21 ν2 y1 +ω22 ν2 y2 + · · ·+ω2n ν2 yn

...
y˙n = bn
αn(x− ρn)− n∑
j=1
ωnj νn yn +ωn1 νn y1 +ωn2 ν2 yn + · · ·+ωnn νn yn

(5.3)
Summing up all equations we get
n∑
i=1
y˙i =
n∑
i=1
biαi(x− ρi)−
n∑
j=1
ω1j b1ν1 y1 −
n∑
j=1
ω2j b2ν2 y2 − · · · −
n∑
j=1
ωnj bnνn yn
+
n∑
j=1
ωj1 bjνj y1 +
n∑
j=1
ωj2 bjνj y2 + · · ·+
n∑
j=1
ωjn bjνj yn
(5.4)
the summations containing the same consumption rate term can be collected as
n∑
i=1
y˙i =
n∑
i=1
biαi(x− ρi)−
n∑
j=1
(
ω1j b1ν1 −ωj1 bjνj
)
y1
−
n∑
j=1
(
ω2j b2ν2 −ωj2 bjνj
)
y2 − · · · − · · ·
n∑
j=1
(
ωnj bnνn −ωjn bjνj
)
yn
(5.5)
and can be written in a more compact manner by summing the terms on the R.H.S over a
second index as
n∑
i=1
y˙i =
n∑
i=1
biαi(x− ρi) +
n∑
i=1
( n∑
j=1
(
ωji bjνj −ωij biνi
))
yi (5.6)
In order to transform this equation into one for
∑
yi, the following condition must hold
true
n∑
j=1
(
ωji bjνj −ωij biνi
)
= c; ∀ i (5.7)
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5.1.1 Influence and Leadership in the Consumer Network
In order to understand the condition in (5.7) better, let us analyze the individual terms in
the L.H.S of the condition
n∑
j=1
ωji bj νj −
n∑
j=1
ωij bi νi (5.8)
To develop some intuition about the individual terms, recall from Figure 5-1 that the
effective weight of the edge directed from i to j in the consumption network is ωji bj νj . If
this is so then the first term in (5.8) can be viewed as the aggregate social influence that i has
on all other members of the network. Let us call this the out-influence of i. Similarly, the
second term in (5.8) can be viewed as the aggregate influence on i from all other members
of the network. Let us call this the in − influence of i. The net-influence of i is then
simply her out-influence minus her in-influence and can be viewed as representing i’s role
in the network as either a leader (positive net-influence), a follower (negative net-influence)
or neutral (zero net-influence). Thus (5.7) states that for all nodes present in the network,
their respective net-influence is constant. We now show that condition (5.7) can hold only
Figure 5-2: Graphical depiction of net-influence.
for c = 0.
Lemma 1. The following condition
n∑
j=1
(
ωij biνi−ωji bjνj
)
= c, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},
can hold only for c = 0.
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Proof. Assuming that the condition holds true, we can expand the expression as follows
n∑
j=1
ωij biνi −
n∑
j=1
ωji bjνj = c.
Summing over all i
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ωij biνi −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ωji bjνj = nc.
Switching the index variables for the second term on the L.H.S
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ωij biνi −
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
ωij biνi = nc,
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
ωij −ωij
)
biνi = nc⇒ c = 0,
which concludes the proof.
Thus in order for condition (5.7) to hold i.e., for a network with constant net-influence,
there can exist no leaders or followers in the networks. We call such networks as self-directed
networks. With this stipulation in hand, we are now able to define our first canonical
network.
5.1.2 The Canonical Networks
Previously, the network of the consuming population has been seen at an individual level.
Now, we explore the structural effects of the network at two additional levels of abstraction.
The homogeneous consumer network allows the abstraction of individual consumptions by
viewing the society as a whole. Needless to say, this abstraction comes with a loss of in-
formation (in the form of individual consumptions) and additional constraints (explored in
the following) that the network must satisfy. The semi-homogeneous and symmetric semi-
homogeneous consumer networks abstract the individual consumptions at the group level,
where it is assumed that the society consists of homogeneous communities with certain
regularities prevailing in the influences across groups. In what follows, we define the ho-
mogeneous, semi-homogeneous and symmetric semi-homogeneous consumer networks and
examine the regularities enforced by each on the structure of the consuming population.
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Together, we call these three constructs collectively as the canonical consumer networks.
The Homogeneous Consumer Network
We understand a homogeneous network as one in which (5.7) holds, along with some other
requirements stated below. Note that due to Lemma 1, condition (5.7) can hold only for
c = 0 (i.e., a self-directed network). The homogeneous network is then given by the following
definition.
Definition 1. Homogeneous consumer network: A consuming population is said to
comprise a homogeneous consumer network if the following conditions hold
1. All agents have uniform attribution ai and social value orientation si i.e., there exist
B,A and V such that,
biαi =
aiRmax
r2
= B A ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, and
biνi =
si
r
= B V ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
2. All agents have uniform environmentalism i.e., there exists P such that,
ρi = P ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
3. There are no leaders or followers in the network i.e.,
n∑
j=1
(
ωji bjνj −ωij biνi
)
= 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Moving forward from (5.6) and using Definition 1, the consumption dynamics of the
homogeneous network can simply be represented as
x˙ = (1− x)x− xY,
Y˙ = nB A (x− P),
(5.9)
where Y =
∑n
i=1 yi represents the aggregate consumption of the network. Thus the system
is now represented by a two-dimensional system which gives a macro-level view of the
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society as one single unit. It is important to realize here that due to this aggregation, we
lose information on the individual consumptions.
The Semi-homogeneous Consumer Network
We now assume that the network has m non-overlapping consumer groups with populations
given by nk, k ∈ {1 . . .m} respectively, and n =
∑m
k=1 nk. The groups are classified on
basis of their social and ecological relevances, and their environmentalisms. For clarity of
notation, let us define the set Nk = {k1, k2, . . . , knk} to contain the indices of all consumers
belonging to group k. Further more let N = {1, . . . ,n} be the set containing the indices
of the whole network such that N1 ∪ N2 ∪ · · · ∪ Nm = N. Now consider the nk equations
representing the consumption of Group k.
y˙k1 = bk1
αk1(x− ρk1)− νk1 ∑
j∈N
ωk1j
(
yk1 − yj
)
y˙k2 = bk2
αk2(x− ρk2)− νk2 ∑
j∈N
ωk2j
(
yk2 − yj
)
...
y˙knk
= bknk
αknk (x− ρknk )− νknk ∑
j∈N
ωknk j
(
yknk
− yj
)
(5.10)
Note that we have not yet asserted the homogeneity of the group and have maintained the
parameters in their original form for now. The summation term of each equation can now
be expanded as
y˙k1 = bk1
(
αk1(x− ρk1)−
∑
j∈N
ωk1j νk1 yk1 +ωk11 νk1 y1
+ωk12 νk1 y2 + · · ·+ωk1n νk1 yn
)
y˙k2 = bk2
(
αk2(x− ρk2)−
∑
j∈N
ωk2j νk2 yk2 +ωk21 νk2 y1
+ωk22 νk2 y2 + · · ·+ωk2n νk2 yn
)
...
y˙knk
= bknk
(
αknk (x− ρknk )−
∑
j∈N
ωknk j νknk yknk +ωknk1 νknk y1
+ωknk2 νknk y2 + · · ·+ωknkn νknk yn
)
(5.11)
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summing up all equations we get
∑
i∈Nk
y˙i =
∑
i∈Nk
biαi(x− ρi)
−
∑
j∈N
ωk1j bk1 νk1 yk1 −
∑
j∈N
ωk2j bk2 νk2 yk2 − · · · −
∑
j∈N
ωknk j bknkνknk yknk
+
∑
j∈Nk
ωj1 bjνj y1 +
∑
j∈Nk
ωj2 bjνj y2 + · · ·+
∑
j∈Nk
ωjn bjνj yn
(5.12)
the summations containing the same consumption rate term can be collected as
∑
i∈Nk
y˙i =
∑
i∈Nk
biαi(x− ρi)
−
( ∑
j∈Nk
(
ωk1j bk1νk1 −ωjk1 bjνj
)
+
∑
j∈N\Nk
ωk1j bk1νk1
)
yk1
−
( ∑
j∈Nk
(
ωk2j bk2νk2 −ωjk2 bjνj
)
+
∑
j∈N\Nk
ωk2j bk2νk2
)
yk2
...
−
( ∑
j∈Nk
(
ωknk j bknkνknk −ωjknk bjνj
)
+
∑
j∈N\Nk
ωknk j bknkνknk
)
yknk
+
∑
i∈N\Nk
( ∑
j∈Nk
ωji bjνj
)
yi
(5.13)
combining the terms containing the consumption rates of Group k over a second index we
get
∑
i∈Nk
y˙i =
∑
i∈Nk
biαi(x− ρi)
−
∑
i∈Nk
( ∑
j∈Nk
(
ωij biνi −ωji bjνj
)
+
∑
j∈N\Nk
ωij biνi
)
yi
+
∑
i∈N\Nk
( ∑
j∈Nk
ωji bjνj
)
yi
(5.14)
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Repeating the procedure for all the groups, we get
∑
i∈N1
y˙i =
∑
i∈N1
biαi(x− ρi)
−
∑
i∈N1
( ∑
j∈N1
(
ωij biνi −ωji bjνj
)
+
∑
j∈N\N1
ωij biνi
)
yi
+
∑
i∈N\N1
( ∑
j∈N1
ωji bjνj
)
yi
...
...∑
i∈Nm
y˙i =
∑
i∈Nm
biαi(x− ρi)
−
∑
i∈Nm
( ∑
j∈Nm
(
ωij biνi −ωji bjνj
)
+
∑
j∈N\Nm
ωij biνi
)
yi
+
∑
i∈N\Nm
( ∑
j∈Nm
ωji bjνj
)
yi
(5.15)
Expanding the last summation in each equation with respect to each group, we get the
following system
Y˙1 =
∑
i∈N1
biαi(x− ρi)
−
∑
i∈N1
( ∑
j∈N1
(
ωij biνi −ωji bjνj
)
+
∑
j∈N\N1
ωij biνi
)
yi
+
∑
i∈N2
( ∑
j∈N1
ωji bjνj
)
yi + · · ·+
∑
i∈Nm
( ∑
j∈N1
ωji bjνj
)
yi
...
...
Y˙m =
∑
i∈Nm
biαi(x− ρi)
−
∑
i∈Nm
( ∑
j∈Nm
(
ωij biνi −ωji bjνj
)
+
∑
j∈N\Nm
ωij biνi
)
yi
+
∑
i∈N1
( ∑
j∈Nm
ωji bjνj
)
yi + · · ·+
∑
i∈Nm−1
( ∑
j∈Nm
ωji bjνj
)
yi
(5.16)
where Yk =
∑
i∈Nk yi is the aggregate consumption of Group k where k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Note
that the above system, though simplified, is still not expressed purely in-terms of the Yk’s.
It is also easy to see that applying the condition (5.7) alone is not sufficient to achieve this.
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In the following definition, we describe the additional requirements to do so. The resulting
network is called the semi-homogeneous consumer network.
Definition 2. Semi-homogeneous consumer network: A consuming population is said
to comprise a semi-homogeneous consumer network if the following conditions hold
1. There exist m groups in the network, each of which individually fulfill the conditions
for the homogeneous consumer network according to Definition 1.
2. The total in-influence of one group on another group should be uniformly distributed
across all nodes of the influenced group i.e., for all i ∈ Ns, there exists d−sr such that
∑
j∈Nr
biνiωij = BsVs
∑
j∈Nr
ωij = BsVsd
−
sr, (5.17)
where Bs and Vs represent the common sensitivity and social relevance of Group s
respectively.
3. The total out-influence of one group from another group should be uniformly dis-
tributed across all nodes of the influencing group i.e., for all j ∈ Nr, there exists d+sr
such that,
∑
i∈Ns
biνiωij = BsVs
∑
i∈Ns
ωij = BsVsd
+
sr. (5.18)
Moving forward from Equation (5.16) and using Definition 2, the consumption dynamics
of the semi-homogeneous network are expressible as
Y˙1 =
n1B1A1(x− P1)− B1V1
(
n2d
−
12 + · · ·+ nmd−1m
)
Y1
+ n1B1V1d
+
12Y2 + · · ·+ n1B1V1d+1mYm,
...
...
Y˙m =
nmBmAm(x− Pm)− BmVm
(
n1d
−
m1 + · · ·+ nm−1d−m(m−1)
)
Ym
+ nmBmVmd
+
m1Y1 + · · ·+ nmBmVmd+m(m−1)Ym−1,
where Bk,Ak,Vk and Pk represent the psychological characteristics of Group k. Note
that although the system dynamics are expressed completely in-terms of the Yk’s, they still
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(a) Pictorial representation of (5.17) for
a general network.
(b) Pictorial representation of (5.18) for
a general network.
Figure 5-3: Conditions on cross-influence between groups in the semi-homogeneous network
do not appear as a scaled version of (5.1). The next canonical network includes a further
simplification that enables this.
The Symmetric Semi-Homogeneous Network
Definition 3. Symmetric semi-homogeneous
consumer network: A consuming population is said to comprise a symmetric semi-
homogeneous consumer network if the following conditions hold
1. There exist m homogeneous groups in the network. Together the m sub-groups fulfill
the conditions for the semi-homogeneous consumer network as specified by Definition
2.
2. The size of all connected subgroups are equal, the resulting implication being that the
aggregated out-influences and in-influences as defined by (5.17) and (5.18) are equal
for each pair of sub-groups, i.e.,
d−sr = d
+
sr = Wsr for all s, r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (5.19)
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The coupled dynamics for the resource and consumption can now be expressed for the
symmetric semi-homogeneous network as follows
x˙ = (1− x)x− x
m∑
i=1
Yi,
Y˙i = niBi Ai (x− Pi)− BiVi
m∑
j=1
Wij(Yi − Yj),
(5.20)
where i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Note that the homogeneous consumer network given by (5.9) is a
special case of the symmetric semi-homogeneous network with m = 1. The utility of the
block model (5.20) is that it presents a picture of the society at a community level which can
aid in informed decision making at the macro-level. The block model includes the effects of
community sizes and the linkages between them, similar to a regular network except that
the nodes are not individual consumers but groups of consumers with similar characteristics.
Obtaining (5.20) in the same form as the original model (5.9) shows that the block model
and aggregation scheme are scalable, and also carries forward the interpretation of system
variables and parameters.
5.1.3 Bonding and Bridging in the Symmetric Semi-
homogeneous Network
Here we discuss interpretations of the lumped social ties Wij in the symmetric semi-
homogeneous consumer network defined by (5.20). From the definition of Wij we have
that
∑
j Wij = 1, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, however Wii ≥ 0 ∀ i, as opposed to ωii which is
zero by definition. Wii is defined by
Wii = 1−
m∑
j=1
j 6=i
Wij =
∑
s∈Ni
ωrs , for any r ∈ Ni.
Thus Wij gives the tie-strength between members of group i, which represents the bonding
capital of the group. Conversely Wij , i 6= j represents the bridging capital between the
groups. Both these quantities are complementary i.e., a group that has strong bonding
will have weak bridging and vice versa which also agrees with observations of real-world
communities (see [72]).
It is also interesting to note that the aggregated model (5.20) allows the possibility
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of isolated nodes in the network, which did not exist in the original model. Such a node
represents a group that has no bridging capital and maximum bonding capital.
5.2 Aggregation Mechanisms for Non-Canonical Consumer
Networks
Here we look at aggregation mechanisms for populations that do not satisfy the requirements
for the canonical networks presented in Section 5.1.2. We first consider communities that
have no leaders or followers as given by condition (iii) of Definition 1. We call the underlying
network for such populations a self-directed network. We show for such networks, that one
can construct a block-model without any inaccuracies by intelligently selecting the values
for the lumped parameters. We then consider aggregation when accurate information about
the consumer characteristics may not be available in a self-directed network.
5.2.1 An Aggregation Mechanism for Self-directed Networks
Assume a self-directed network, i.e., a population of n consumers in which there are no
leaders or followers. Thus the following condition holds
n∑
j=1
(
ωji bjνj −ωij biνi
)
= 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. (5.21)
Note that no assumptions have been made yet on the ecological weights αi and the
environmentalisms ρi. In what follows, we show that the aggregate consumption dynamics
for such a network can be described similar to (5.9) if the choices for the aggregate environ-
mentalism and ecological weight are made appropriately. If (5.21) holds, then the aggregate
consumption evolves as
Y˙ =
n∑
i=1
biαi(x− ρi) =
n∑
i=1
biαix−
n∑
i=1
biαiρi,
= n
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
biαi
)(
x−
n∑
i=1
biαi∑n
j=1 bjαj
ρi
)
,
= n BˆAˆ
(
x− Pˆ ),
67
where the lumped parameters Bˆ, Aˆ and Pˆ have been chosen such that
BˆAˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
biαi; Pˆ =
n∑
i=1
biαi∑n
j=1 bjαj
ρi. (5.22)
Thus Bˆ and Aˆ are chosen such that the lumped product BˆAˆ is the average of the individ-
ual products biαi and the lumped environmentalism Pˆ is chosen as a convex combination
of the individual environmentalisms ρi. It is easy to see that this combination is equal to
the equilibrium value of the resource and so Pˆ = x¯, where x¯ = limt→∞ x(t) (if the limit ex-
ists). Given this aggregation mechanism, the coupled resource and aggregate consumption
dynamics are expressible as
x˙ = (1− x)x− xY, Y˙ = n Bˆ Aˆ (x− Pˆ), (5.23)
where Bˆ, Aˆ and Pˆ are chosen in accordance to (5.22).
5.2.2 Aggregation for Self-directed Populations with
Unknown Characteristics
Consider a self-directed consumer network whose dynamics are given by (5.23). If infor-
mation of the population characteristics are not available, one may aggregate the system
as
˙˜x = (1− x˜)x˜− x˜Y˜ , ˙˜Y = n B˜ A˜ (x− P˜), (5.24)
where B˜, A˜ and P˜ are chosen at the aggregator’s discretion. One can then define an error
vector e = [ex eY ]
T such that ex = x − x˜ and eY = Y − Y˜ . From (5.24) and (5.23), the
steady state error is expressible as follows
e¯x = x¯− P˜, e¯Y = (1− x¯)− (1− P˜),
which shows that if P˜ is chosen to be equal to x¯, then the steady state error is zero regardless
of the choice of B˜ and A˜. Figure 5-4 shows the behavior of this approximation scheme when
the initial conditions are known perfectly. It can be seen that the error exists only during
the transient.
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Figure 5-4: Trajectories of original and approximated aggregated systems when P˜ = x¯, for
two different initial conditions. Here n = 100, bi = 1 ∀ i, ωij = 1/n ∀ i 6= j, αi ∼ U(0, 1)
and ρi ∼ U(0, 1).
This suggests that for systems at steady state for which information on the resource is
readily available, one may aggregate such that P˜ = x¯ and choose any estimate for parameters
B˜ and A˜. In the event of any disturbances, it is then guaranteed that the error in aggregation
will exist only during the transient.
5.3 Discussion
In this chapter we have studied the structural effects of the resource consumption model
under an aggregation mechanism via homogeneous communities present in the population.
The aggregation yields a concise representation of extremely complex networks, which not
only makes the analysis tractable, but can also aid in informed decision making at the
macro-level. While such block models are frequently employed in practice, in most cases
the condition of homogeneity within groups is more of an approximation than ground reality.
We have also studied an approximate aggregation scheme for such cases. Building on such
techniques, it may be possible to quantify the error of such approximations so that an
appropriate level of confidence may be attached to the resulting decisions. The analysis of
this chapter has also revealed that the lumped parameter model is simply a scaled version
of the original model. This allows us to view the agents in the network generically as groups
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of consumers since a single individual is simply a group with one member.
The question on how different individual actions can be aggregated to obtain social
dynamics at the societal level is still an open one, particularly in the context of natural
resource governance. The problem however, has attracted the attention of the economics
community for quite a while now. One of the first mathematical treatments on the sub-
ject is widely attributed to Henri Theil, who published his book “Linear Aggregation of
Economic Relations” in 1954 [189]. There he considers the relationship between macro
and micro variables, where the micro variables are expressed via certain “observation” vari-
ables through a linear relationship. Theil then goes on to determine the implied linear
relationship between the macro variables i.e., the sums of the observations and the micro
variables. He also considers the errors that may result from aggregation (also see some
related publications [94, 138]). A detailed account of the aggregation problem in economics
which includes recent developments is given by Green in [92], where a distinction is made
between aggregation in the context of production functions, economic relations and welfare
maximization. A widely acclaimed result in the latter is given by Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem [132] where Arrow shows that it is impossible to convert individual utilities into
a single objective function that simultaneously “satisfies” all individuals. In this chapter,
we have studied the aggregation problem for our model of natural resource consumption
with a special focus on the underlying social network, an aspect that has not received much
attention in the work mentioned above. The work can thus be viewed as a small step to-
wards bridging mathematical network models [34] (that typically use only a small number of
nodes) and agent based models [2](that lack tractability) in the domain of natural resource
governance.
With this, we conclude the modeling exercise of Part II of this dissertation. Part III
explores the potential of the model through the application of various mathematical frame-
works. As we will see, the exercise yields stimulating insights regarding the system with
interesting implications and guidelines for policy making in NRM problems.
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Part III
Cybernetic Insights, Applications
and Extensions
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Chapter 6
Understanding Open-loop System
Behavior
The preceding chapters have led to a mathematical model of our assumed social-ecological
system. Once such a model is obtained, there exist various methods to analyze system
performance [81, 109]. In designing an effective control for the system, it is important to
have a basic understanding of the process before the application of any feedback mechanism.
This not only gives an indication of the required complexity of the control, but also provides
a common basis for performance comparison of various control mechanisms. In this chapter,
we undertake a time-domain analysis of the system at two different levels of abstraction:
the single agent network and the dual agent network (the n-agent network is the focus of
Chapter 10). Where applicable, we discuss various social and environmental implications
of the results that the undertaken analysis yields.
6.1 The Single-Agent/Homogeneous Network
Here we consider the single agent consumer network. The single agent may be thought of
as a society with a single consumer, or a homogeneous society (see Chapter 5) lumped into
a single node. We reproduce the coupled resource and consumption dynamics as follows
x˙ = (1− x)x− xy,
y˙ = bα (x− ρ).
(6.1)
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Here we have dropped the indexed notation for y1 and have simply used y instead since
there is only one equation for the social sub-system.
6.1.1 Fixed-point Analysis
Natural resources have been essential inputs to economic development, which is considered
necessary to overcome world poverty. It has been argued for decades now that “develop-
ment” cannot imply infinite economic growth, as it has obvious restrictions due to the finite
limits of the environment, which houses our economic system [155, 135]. Many influential
economists have championed the concept of a steady-state economy, where the question
is not that of how to achieve maximum growth, but of how to realize the most attractive
equilibrium. In the past, there has been extensive debate on the viability and usefulness
for the practice of the concept of the steady-state economy. Some recent studies suggest to
interpret the economy’s steady-state as an “unattainable-goal” [111] and to view its analysis
as an efficient tool, which is useful to guide the design of the long-term policy for real-world
economies. This gives special importance to examining the steady states of mathematical
models of economic growth and resource consumption, for providing long-term strategies
especially in the context of sustainability. In this spirit, we analyze the equilibrium of (6.1),
which is found out to be unique and given as
x¯ = ρ,
y¯ = 1− ρ.
(6.2)
Note that according to the definition of the model in Chapter 4, ρ ∈ R. However, from the
form of the resource dynamics (see Equation 6.1), it can be easily seen that for a positive
initial resource stock, the stock remains non-negative for all time i.e., if x(0) ≥ 0, then
x(t) ≥ 0 ∀ t. Thus, the equilibrium (x¯, y¯) exists only if ρ ≥ 0, otherwise no equilibrium
exists. In the analysis that follows we assume that this condition holds.
From Equation 6.2 we further note that the resource stock at equilibrium simply equals
the environmentalism ρ. Thus, the higher the environmentalism, the higher the equilibrium
stock level. However from 6.2, we also see that higher environmentalism reduces y¯ to the
point that if ρ > 1 then y¯ < 0. This means that if the environmentalism is beyond the
natural carrying capacity, the stock level will settle at that value, however it will be at the
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(a) A stable node. Here b = 0.1, ρ = 0.5
and α = 0.5.
1
0
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y
(b) A stable spiral. Here b = 1, ρ = 0.5
and α = 0.5.
1
0
1
x
y
(c) A stable degenerate node. Here b =
0.5, ρ = 0.5 and α = 0.25.
Figure 6-1: The nature of the fixed point (x¯, y¯), as the system parameters are
varied.
cost of a negative aggregate consumption effort for the society. In order for the society to
harvest a positive resource stock at steady state, it is then necessary that ρ ∈ (0, 1).
6.1.2 Local Behavior
The linearized system around (x¯, y¯) is given by the matrix
 −ρ −ρ
bα 0
 ,
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whose eigenvalues are given by
λ1,2 = −ρ
2
±
√
ρ2 − 4bαρ
2
.
As ρ > 0, the eigenvalues have negative real part which implies that (x¯, y¯) is locally stable.
The discriminant of the characteristic equation determines how the system approaches the
steady state. This categorizes the behavior of the system into three cases (see [41, Chapter
9])
• Case 1): The eigenvalues are real and distinct. In this case ρ > 4bα and the equilib-
rium is a stable node.
• Case 2): The eigenvalues are complex conjugates. In this case ρ < 4bα and the
equilibrium is a stable spiral.
• Case 3): The eigenvalues are real and repeated. In this case ρ = 4bα and the
linearized system has a single independent eigenvector [−2 1]T . In this case, the
equilibrium is a stable degenerate node.
This suggests that oscillatory system behavior emerges in the case of low environmental
concern and high levels of sensitivity & preference to ecological information. The same may
be observed from Figure 6-2.
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b = 18
ρ < 4bα ρ > 4bα
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b = 16
Figure 6-2: Regions in the parameter space depecting the nature of the
equilibrium for system (6.1). The darkly shaded area represents the oscil-
latory region whereas the lightly shaded area represents the nodal region.
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6.1.3 Global Behavior
Above, we studied the local stability of the equilibrium which implies that there exists at
least some region of the phase space, such that if the system is initiated from any point in
this region the dynamics asymptotically approach the equilibrium. This region exists as a
non-empty neighborhood of the equilibrium. Since there is only a single fixed point of system
(6.1), it is possible for this region to cover the entire two-dimensional space. However, since
the system is non-linear, there exists the possibility of limit cycles [41, Chapter 9], which
can be determined through a global stability analysis.
Introduce new variable z = lnx. System (6.1) is then transformed as follows
z˙ = 1− ez − y, y˙ = bα(ez − ρ).
This system has a unique equilibrium which is given by
z¯ = ln ρ, y¯ = 1− ρ.
Introducing further new variables p = z− z¯ and q = y− y¯ to bring the equilibrium point to
the origin, we obtain the following system
p˙ = ρ(1− ep)− q,
q˙ = −bαρ(1− ep).
(6.3)
Theorem 1. The system (6.3) is globally stable with all solutions tending to zero.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem we construct a Lyapunov function of the following
form
V = (ez − z − 1) + Pq2,
which is positive for positive P everywhere except the origin. Thus if V˙ is shown to be
negative outside the origin for some positive P,, it would imply global stability of (6.3).
Differentiating V along the vector field of system (6.3) we get
V˙ = ez z˙ − z˙ + 2Pqq˙.
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Choose P =
1
2bαρ
. Note that as ρ has been restricted to be positive, P > 0 so it does not
violate the status of V as a Lyapunov function candidate. Substituting this and (6.3) in
the above equation gives us
V˙ = −ρ(ez − 1)2.
Now note that the derivative V˙ < 0 outside the q-axis, and on this axis the vector field of
(6.3) has value (−q, 0), which is not tangent to the axis. This implies that the system is
globally stable, which completes the proof.
6.2 The Dual-Agent/Semi-Homogeneous Network
We now consider consumer network with two agents. The agents may represent individ-
ual consumers or groups of consumers with homogeneous characteristics as described in
Chapter 5. The consumption dynamics for the two-agent society are given by
x˙ = (1− x)x− (y1 + y2)x,
y˙1 = b1
(
(1− ν1)(x− ρ1)− ν1 (y1 − y2)
)
,
y˙2 = b2
(
(1− ν2)(x− ρ2)− ν2 (y2 − y1)
)
,
(6.4)
where bi and νi have been redefined during the non-dimensionalization process to include
ωij . Thus bi =
(niaiRmax + rsiωij)
r2
and νi =
rsiωij
(niaiRmax + rsiωij)
.
6.2.1 Fixed-point Analysis
By solving the system given by x˙ = y˙1 = y˙2 = 0 (Equation 6.4) we find that the system has
a unique equilibrium which is given by
x¯ =
α1ν2ρ1 + α2ν1ρ2
α2ν1 + α1ν2
,
y¯1 =
(1− ρ1)α1ν2 + (1− ρ2)α2ν1 − (ρ1 − ρ2)α1α2
2 (α2ν1 + α1ν2)
,
y¯2 =
(1− ρ1)α1ν2 + (1− ρ2)α2ν1 − (ρ2 − ρ1)α1α2
2 (α2ν1 + α1ν2)
.
(6.5)
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Note here that x¯ is a convex combination of the ρi’s. If the point representing this combi-
nation has a negative value, then due to (6.4), x¯ is not reachable if x(0) > 0, and so, no
equilibrium exists. Thus, similar to our argument for the single-agent case in the previous
section, we will restrict our attention to the case ρ1, ρ2 ∈ (0, 1). This results in x¯ turning
out to lie between 0 and 1 for all admissible parameter values, which ensures a non-negative
resource stock that does not exceed the natural carrying capacity at steady state. The
efforts y¯i can be either both positive, or have different signs, the interpretation of which has
been discussed in Chapter 4. If equilibrium (6.5) is stable, the society converges to a stable
resource stock and stable consumption rate regardless of the initial state of the system.
Before proceeding with the analysis, let us point out that there are two degenerate cases
of the equilibrium (6.5). First, if both groups have extremely low social value, i.e., if ν1 =
ν2 = 0, then an infinite number of equilibria exist if the groups are equally environmental
(ρ1 = ρ2), otherwise no equilibrium exists. Second, if both groups have extremely high
social value, i.e., if ν1 = ν2 = 1, then infinite equilibria exist for all values of ρ1 and ρ2. We
ignore these pathological cases in the subsequent analyses.
Comparative Statics
While the dependence of the equilibrium on the various system parameters was relatively
straightforward for the single-agent network, such is not the case for the two-agent network.
Here we inspect for system (6.4), how the magnitudes of the steady-state resource quantity
x¯ and the steady-state consumption efforts y¯1 and y¯2 change in response to changes in the
parameters ρ1, ρ2, ν1, and ν2. We do this by conducting a comparative statics analysis
[155], which is undertaken by obtaining the first-order partial derivatives of each of the three
equations in (6.5), and determining whether or not an unambiguous sign can be attached to
each partial derivative. Table 6.1 shows the results for the analysis. A plus sign means that
the derivative is positive, a minus sign means that the derivative is negative, “0” means
that the derivative is zero and a “?” means that no sign can be assigned unambiguously to
the derivative.
From Table 6.1, we see that an increase (decrease) in the levels of environmentalism
ρ1 and ρ2, always increases (decreases) the steady-state resource stock x¯. Thus higher
environmentalism results in a larger resource stock at steady-state. In contrast, an increase
in the environmentalism ρi of individual i, decreases the steady-state consumption y¯i of
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Table 6.1: Comparative statics results for system (6.4)
ν1 ν2 ρ1 ρ2
x¯ 0 0 + +
y¯1 0 0 - ?
y¯2 0 0 ? -
ρ1 = ρ2
ν1 ν2 ρ1 ρ2
x¯ - + + +
y¯1 + ? - ?
y¯2 ? - ? -
ρ1 > ρ2
ν1 ν2 ρ1 ρ2
x¯ + - + +
y¯1 - ? - ?
y¯2 ? + ? -
ρ1 < ρ2
i, which means that environmental individuals consume less at steady-state (the same can
be seen in Figure 6-3a). It can also be noted that the effect of ρi on y¯j , where i 6= j, is
ambiguous and not much can be said by simply observing the first-order partial derivatives.
The effect of the social relevances ν1 and ν2 on the steady state varies according to the
relative magnitudes of the environmentalisms ρ1 and ρ2. When both groups are equally
environmental ρ1 = ρ2 then the social values do not affect the steady-state. When this is
not the case, the social value of the relatively environmental (non-environmental) group has
a negative (positive) effect on the steady-state resource stock. Furthermore, the social value
of the relatively environmental (non-environmental) group has a positive (negative) effect
on the group’s own steady-state consumption effort (the same can be observed in Figure
6-3b). We see that the effects of the parameters on the relationship between the steady-
state consumption efforts are not entirely revealed by this exercise, and require additional
analysis to uncover, which is done in the next section.
The Free-riding Phenomenon
Ostrom’s work [148] reports several real-world examples of free-riding in open-access re-
source settings, which is a major cause of concern for the successful governance of such
resources. The free-riding phenomenon refers to situations where certain individuals (the
self-reliants) sacrifice their consumption for the sustenance of the resource, while simulta-
neously, other individuals (the free-riders) continue to enjoy the benefits of consumption,
which would not have been possible without the sacrifice of the self-reliants in the first place.
Thus the free-riders enjoy a “free lunch” that is being served in-directly by the self-reliants.
System (6.4) captures this through two possible types of equilibrium. We label these two
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(a) Change in the stock and consumption as
the environmentalisms ρ1 and ρ2 are varied.
It can be seen that due to group 2’s higher
ecological relevance, the resource follows ρ2
more closely. It can also be seen that the rel-
atively environmental group 1 consumes less
than the non-environmental group 2.
(b) Change in stock and consumption as
the social relevances ν1 and ν2 are varied.
It can be seen that when the social rele-
vances are identical, the resource converges
at the average of the set-points with the non-
environmental group enjoying a higher con-
sumption. However when one of the group’s
social-relevance is relatively lower, the re-
source converges at the environmentalism of
that group.
Figure 6-3: Change in steady state stock and consumption efforts in the two-
community model, as the population characteristics are varied. The nominal values
selected for this simulation are b1 = b2 = 1, ν1 = 0.75, ν2 = 0.25, ρ1 = 0.75,
ρ2 = 0.25 and x(0) = 0.5 and y1(0) = y2(0) = 0.
types as the “self-reliant” equilibrium and the “free-riding” equilibrium. The self-reliant
equilibrium represents both consumer groups harvesting at a positive rate (both y¯1 and y¯2
of (6.5) are positive). The free-riding equilibrium represents one of the groups harvesting
at a positive rate and the other harvesting at a negative rate (one of y¯1 and y¯2 is positive,
while the other negative). Thus one of the groups exerts effort into increasing the resource
quantity, while the other free-rides and enjoys a positive consumption. An exhaustive simu-
lation of the equilibrium consumption values in the parameter space is shown in Figure 6-4.
We see that free-riding is excluded only when both groups have the same environmentalism
level ρi. When groups are different in what concerns their environmentalism, the equilib-
rium is self-reliant if the group corresponding to the higher level of environmentalism has
a social relevance beyond a certain level. This level can be interpreted as the reluctance
of the relatively environmental group to subsidize the consumption of the relatively non-
environmental group. The reluctance increases with increasing levels of social relevance,
and indirectly with the level of cooperativeness of the environmental group. Thus the more
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Figure 6-4: Positivity of the equilibrium (6.5) in the ν1, ν2 plane for
different values of ρ1 and ρ2. The plots are symmetric in ρ1 and ρ2and
so the missing plots are simply a reflection of the existing plots about the
symmetric axis. The free-riding equilibrium corresponds to y¯1 < 0 < y¯2.
cooperative a group becomes (consequently possessing a higher social relevance) the more
reluctant it is to subsidize the non-environmental group. This is consistent with the pos-
tulate that cooperative individuals promote equality, and favor outcomes which maximize
joint benefits (contrasted with altruistic individuals, who willingly sacrifice their own ben-
efit in order to maximize the benefit of others). Interestingly, it has been observed that
cooperative individuals are also likely to have high levels of environmentalism and vice-versa
[67, 87], which in the context of our model implies that it is really the social relevance of
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the groups that determines whether they end up in a self-reliant or free-riding equilibrium.
6.2.2 Local Behavior
The local stability of the equilibrium point of system (6.4) can be found by examining the
eigenvalues of the linearized system about that point. The Jacobian matrix is given by

1− 2x− y1 − y2 −x −x
b1α1 −b1ν1 b1ν1
b2α2 b2ν2 −b2ν2
 .
Evaluation at the equilibrium (x¯, y¯1, y¯2) results in
−α1ν2ρ1+α2ν1ρ2α2ν1+α1ν2 −
α1ν2ρ1+α2ν1ρ2
α2ν1+α1ν2
−α1ν2ρ1+α2ν1ρ2α2ν1+α1ν2
b1α1 −b1ν1 b1ν1
b2α2 b2ν2 −b2ν2
 ,
whose eigenvalues are given by the roots of the following characteristic polynomial
p(λ) =λ3 +
1
α2ν1 + α1ν2
(
(b1ν1 + b2ν2)(α2ν1 + α1ν2) + α2ν1ρ2 + α1ν2ρ1
)
λ2
+
α2ν1ρ2 + α1ν2ρ1
α2ν1 + α1ν2
(
b1 + b2
)
λ + 2b1b2(α2ν1ρ2 + α1ν2ρ1).
(6.6)
the final expressions for the roots of this polynomial are not simple enough to work with
analytically. It can be noted however that all the coefficients of p(λ) are positive, which is a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for all roots to be negative and hence the linearized
system to be stable. Whether or not the equilibrium is indeed stable can be checked by
Routh’s Stability Criterion [81], which for cubic polynomials of the form ax3 + bx2 + cx+ d
is given by bc > ad. For p(λ), this inequality is given as
α2ν1ρ2 + α1ν2ρ1
(α2ν1 + α1ν2)2
(b1 + b2)
(
(b1ν1 + b2ν2)(α2ν1 + α1ν2) + α2ν1ρ2 + α1ν2ρ1
)
> 2b1b2(α2ν1ρ2 + α1ν2ρ1),
82
real and positivecomplex conjugate
0
1
1
ν2
ν1
Figure 6-5: Evaluation of the roots of q(·).
which is simplified to
b1 + b2
(α2ν1 + α1ν2)2
(
(b1ν1 + b2ν2)(α2ν1 + α1ν2) + α2ν1ρ2 + α1ν2ρ1
)
− 2b1b2 > 0.
(6.7)
It can be checked that (6.7) does not hold for all b1,b2, ρ1, ρ2,ν1,ν2. An example of one such
point in the parameter space is b1 = 0.2, b2 = 0.1, ρ1 = 0.001, ρ2 = 0.1,ν1 = 0.01,ν2 = 0.9.
On the other hand, the following inequality
(b1 + b2)(b1ν1 + b2ν2)
(α2ν1 + α1ν2)
> 2b1b2, (6.8)
clearly offers a sufficient condition for (6.7) to hold. It can be simplified to
q(b) = ν1b
2 +
(
ν1(2ν2 − 1) + ν2(2ν1 − 1)
)
b+ ν2 > 0, (6.9)
where b = b1/b2. Note that the right hand side of (6.9) is a quadratic polynomial in b > 0.
As νi > 0, the graph of q(·) points upwards and the roots are either complex conjugates or
both real and positive. In what follows we examine the implications of each case in detail.
1. Case 1: q(·) has complex conjugate roots i.e., the discriminant is negative.
(
ν1(2ν2 − 1) + ν2(2ν1 − 1)
)2 − 4ν1ν2 < 0. (6.10)
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In this case (6.9) will always hold as the graph of the quadratic polynomial will lie
above the horizontal axis.
2. Case 2: q(·) has both roots real and positive. This happens if
(
ν1(2ν2 − 1) + ν2(2ν1 − 1)
)2 − 4ν1ν2 ≥ 0, (6.11)
and
−ν1(2ν2 − 1)− ν2(2ν1 − 1) > 0 (6.12)
In this case (6.9) does not hold for those b which lie between the roots of q(·).
Thus (6.10) is a sufficient condition for local stability. However if (6.10) does not hold, then
the system is stable if (6.11) and (6.12) hold true and b does not lie between the roots of
q(·). The region in the parameter space where these inequalities hold true are shown in
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Figure 6-6: Here we evaluate the local stability of (6.4), through in-
equality (6.7), as the parameters are varied. The nominal values for the
parameters are b1 = 0.2, b2 = 0.1, and ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.1. The plots ob-
tained by interchanging the indices of the groups are symmetric to the
ones displayed above and thus are not shown here.
84
Figure 6-5.
Figure 6-6 shows a numerical simulation in the space ν1,ν2 ∈ (0, 1) to determine when
condition (6.7) holds. We see that stability is guaranteed in a major portion of the (ν1,ν2)
space regardless of the values of the rest of the parameters. Also note that for small values
of ρ1, ρ2, (6.7) may be approximated by (6.8).
6.2.3 Global Behavior
Here we consider the global stability properties of the fixed point (6.5) for system (6.4).
We do this by transforming the system to an appropriate form and prove the validity of a
Lyapunov function candidate. We proceed as follows.
Introduce new variables z˜ = lnx, u˜ = y1 + y2 and w˜ = y1 − y2. System (6.4) is then
transformed as follows
˙˜z = 1− ez˜ − u˜,
˙˜u = A(ez˜ − 1) + D + bw˜,
˙˜w = a(ez˜ − 1)− d− Bw˜,
where A = b1(1−ν1)+b2(1−ν2), a = b1(1−ν1)−b2(1−ν2), B = b1ν1 +b2ν2, b = −b1ν1 +b2ν2,
D = b1(1−ν1)(1− ρ1) + b2(1−ν2)(1− ρ2) and d = −b1(1−ν1)(1− ρ1) + b2(1−ν2)(1− ρ2). It
is easy to verify the following relations between the parameters which we will make use of
later on
|a| < A, |b| < B, and |d| < D. (6.13)
Now, introduce the new variable uˆ = u˜+ bB w˜. The system is then expressible as
˙˜z = 1− ez˜ − uˆ+ b
B
w˜,
˙ˆu =
(
A +
ba
B
)
(ez˜ − 1) +
(
D− db
B
)
,
˙˜w = a(ez˜ − 1)− d− Bw˜.
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This system has a unique equilibrium which is given by
z¯ = ln
(
1− DB− bd
AB + ba
)
, w¯ =
1
B
(
−aDB− bd
AB + ba
− d
)
,
u¯ =
DB− bd
AB + ba
+
b
B
w¯.
Introducing further new variables z = z˜ − z¯, u = uˆ − u¯ and w = w˜ − w¯ to bring the
equilibrium point to the origin, we obtain the following system
z˙ = ez¯(1−ez)−u+ b
B
w,
u˙ =
(
A+
ba
B
)
ez¯(ez−1),
w˙ = aez¯(ez − 1)− Bw.
(6.14)
Theorem 2. The system (6.14) is globally stable with all solutions tending to zero if the
following condition holds true
B2 > ab.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem we construct a Lyapunov function of the following
form
V = (ez − z − 1) + Pu2 + Qw2,
which is positive for positive P, Q everywhere except the origin. Thus if V˙ is shown to be
negative outside the origin for some positive P, Q, it would imply global stability of (6.14).
Differentiating V along the vector field of system (6.14) we get
V˙ = ez z˙ − z˙ + 2Puu˙+ 2Qww˙.
Choose P = e−z¯/(2 (A + ba/B)). Due to (6.13), P > 0 so it does not violate the status of V
as a Lyapunov function candidate. Substituting this and (6.14) in the above equation gives
us
V˙ = −ez¯(ez − 1)2+w(ez − 1)
(
b
B
+ 2Qaez¯
)
−2QBw2.
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Completing squares, we get
V˙ =−
(
ez¯/2(ez − 1)− we
−z¯/2
2
(
b
B
+ 2Qaez¯
))2
−
(
2QB− e
−z¯
4
(
b
B
+ 2Qaez¯
)2)
w2.
Now the condition 2QB − e
−z¯
4
(
b
B
+ 2Qaez¯
)2
> 0 gives the derivative V˙ < 0 outside the
u-axis, and on this axis the vector field of (6.14) has value (−u, 0, 0), which is not tangent
to the axis. Hence we get the desired global stability if this condition takes place, i.e., the
above inequality is true for some positive Q, B. This condition can be expressed as
p
(
ez¯Q
)
:= 4a2
(
ez¯Q
)2
+
(
−8B+4ab
B
)(
ez¯Q
)
+
b2
B2
< 0.
Now, if a = 0, the inequality holds for any B > 0 by choosing Q to be sufficiently large.
However if a 6= 0 then due to 4a2 > 0 and b2/B2 ≥ 0, the inequality holds true for some
positive Q, B only if the vertex of the respective parabola belongs to the fourth quadrant,
i.e.,
− 1
8a2
(
−8B + 4ab
B
)
> 0, and − ∆
16a2
< 0,
where ∆ is the discriminant of p (ez¯Q). This translates to the following two conditions: 1)
−2B2 + ab < 0, and 2) B2 − ab > 0, or simply
B2 > ab, (6.15)
which completes the proof.
Substituting the values of a, b and B in condition (6.15) gives us the following
(b1ν1+b2ν2)
2 >
(
b1(1−ν1)−b2(1−ν2)
)
(−b1ν1+b2ν2).
After some simplification and realization that b1, b2, ν1 and ν2 are all positive numbers, a
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(a) Starting from inside the limit cycle. Here
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Here x(0) = 0.1, y1(0) = 1 and y2(0) = 0.3.
Figure 6-7: The limit cycle of system (6.4). Here b1 = 0.2, b2 = 0.1, ν1 = 0.01,
ν2 = 0.9, ρ1 = 0.001 and, ρ2 = 0.1. The red marked points indicate the fixed
point and the initial point for the respective simulations.
sufficient condition for the above condition to hold is
(b1 − b2)(b1ν1 − b2ν2) + 4b1ν1b2ν2 > 0. (6.16)
Figure 6-7 depicts an instance in the parameter space where the system (6.4) is unstable.
Indeed, we see the existence of a stable limit cycle in this case.
6.3 Discussion
This chapter presented a time-domain analysis of the social ecological system introduced in
Chapters 4 and 5. We studied first, the single-agent network as an instance of the homoge-
neous consumer network. We saw how the level of environmentalism determined a trade-off
between the levels of resource stock and consumption at steady state and the role of various
parameters influenced the manner in which the system approached the steady state. In
Chapter 7 we will continue with the same model by examining the optimal consumption
paths under a defined notion of optimality. We then, in this chapter, studied the two agent
network, as an instance of the symmetric semi-homogeneous network with two consumer
groups. We saw that the analysis was mathematically more involved than the single agent
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case. The addition of another agent in the single agent network brought about the phe-
nomenon of free-riding, something which was not possible in the single agent case. We saw
how free-riding could be discouraged and also examined the local and global behavior of
the system. We return to this network in Chapter 8 where we analyze strategic interactions
between the two agents in a game-theoretic context. As indicated by the analysis in this
chapter, the analysis for the n-agent network is mathematically more involved, and has been
deferred to Chapter 10 as a possible extension.
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Chapter 7
Optimal Consumption for a
Homogeneous Society
In this chapter we return to the most basic block model, namely the homogeneous consumer
network of Chapter 5 with the consuming society aggregated as one single agent. The time-
domain behavior of the open-loop system has already been studied in Chapter 6. We now
turn our attention to the “best” consumption pattern on behalf of the consumers. We
do this by framing the system as an optimal growth model for a single resource based
economy. More precisely, the system is formulated as an infinite-horizon optimal control
problem with unbounded set of control constraints and non-concave Hamiltonian. We then
characterize the optimal paths for all possible parameter values and initial states by applying
the appropriate version of the Pontryagin maximum principle. Our main finding is that
only two qualitatively different types of behavior of sustainable optimal paths are possible
depending on whether the social discount rate is greater than a specific threshold or not. An
analysis of these behaviors yields a general criterion for sustainable and strongly sustainable
optimal growth (w.r.t. the corresponding notions of sustainability defined herein).
7.1 Considerations for Studying Optimal Behavior
Following the first analysis conducted by Ramsey [163], the mathematical problem of inter-
temporal resource allocation1 has attracted a significant amount of attention over the past
decades, and has driven the evolution of first exogenous, and then endogenous growth the-
1The problem of distributing the resource fairly among the present and all future generations
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ory (see [1, 25]). Employed growth models are typically identified by the production of
economic output, the dynamics of the inputs of production, and the comparative mecha-
nism of alternate consumption paths. Our framework considers a renewable resource, whose
reproduction is logistic in nature, as the only input to production. The relationship of the
resource with the output of the economy is explained through a Cobb-Douglas type produc-
tion function with an exogenously driven knowledge stock. Alternate consumption paths
are compared via a discounted utilitarian approach. The question that we concern ourselves
with for our chosen framework, is the following: what are the conditions of sustainability
for optimal development?
In the context of sustainability, the discounted utilitarian approach may propose un-
desirable solutions in certain scenarios. For instance, discounted utilitarianism has been
reported to force consumption asymptotically to zero even when sustainable paths with
non-decreasing consumption are feasible [18]. The Brundtland Commission defines sustain-
able development as development that meets the needs of the present, without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs [47]. In this spirit, we employ the
notion of sustainable development, as a consumption path ensuring a non decreasing welfare
for all future generations. This notion of sustainability is natural, and has also been used
by various authors in their work. For instance, Valente [195] evaluates this notion of sus-
tainability for an exponentially growing natural resource, and derives a condition necessary
for sustainable consumption. We extend this model by allowing the resource to grow at
a declining rate (the logistic growth model). We build on the work presented previously
in [127] which proves the existence of an optimal path only in the case when the resource
growth rate is higher than the social discount rate and admissible controls are uniformly
bounded.
Our model is formulated as an infinite-horizon optimal control problem with logarith-
mic instantaneous utility. The problem involves unbounded controls and the non-concave
Hamiltonian. These preclude direct application of the standard existence results and Ar-
row’s sufficient conditions for optimality. We transform the original problem to an equivalent
one with simplified dynamics and prove the general existence result. Then we apply a re-
cently developed version of the maximum principle [12, 17, 13] to our problem and describe
the optimal paths for all possible parameter values and initial states in the problem. Our
analysis of the Hamiltonian phase space reveals that there are only two qualitatively differ-
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ent types of behavior of the sustainable optimal paths in the model. In the first case the
instantaneous utility is a non-decreasing function in the long run along the optimal path (we
call such paths sustainable). The second case corresponds to the situation when the optimal
path is sustainable and in addition the resource stock is asymptotically nonvanishing (we
call such paths strongly sustainable). We show that a strongly sustainable equilibrium is
attainable only when the resource growth rate is higher than the social discount rate. When
this condition is violated, we see that the optimal resource exploitation rate asymptotically
follows the Hotelling rule of optimal depletion of an exhaustible resource [102]. In this case
optimal consumption is sustainable only if the the depletion of the resource is compensated
by appropriate growth of the knowledge stock and/or decrease of the output elasticity of
the resource.
7.2 Formulating the Consumption Problem in an Optimal
Control Setting
Here we depart from the lumped parameter model of Section 5.1.2 where the aggregate
consumption effort of the society is contained in the single variable y(t). Thus there exists
only a single agent where the agent may represent a single consumer, or a homogeneous
community in the sense defined in Chapter 5. In this chapter we will frequently refer to
this agent as “society” with the understanding that the case of the single consumer is also
captured by this term (a single consumer is simply a society with one member). Maintaining
the previous notation, the normalized (w.r.t the carrying capacity) level of the resource stock
at time t is given by x(t) > 0 and is governed by the standard model of logistic growth. The
society consumes the resource by exerting some effort, the normalized (w.r.t the resource
growth rate) level of which is represented by y(t) > 02. The dynamics of the resource stock
are then given by the following equation:
x˙(t) = x(t) (1− x(t))− y(t)x(t), y(t) ∈ (0,∞). (7.1)
The initial stock of the resource is x(0) = x0 > 0.
2Note that while in the original model given by (4.3) the efforts yi(t) may take on negative values, here we
restrict y(t) to be non-negative. This is because in the context of sustainable growth, we are only interested in
cases where society collectively consumes positive quantities of the resource (although individual consumers
may consume negative quantities).
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We assume that the economy is a single resource economy whose output is represented
by P (t) > 0 at instant t ≥ 0. The output is related to the resource by a Cobb-Douglas type
production function (see Appendix B) as follows
P (t) = S(t)
(
y(t)x(t)
)β
, β ∈ (0, 1]. (7.2)
Here S(t) > 0 represents an exogenously driven knowledge stock at time t ≥ 0. We assume
S˙(t) ≤ µS(t), where µ ≥ 0 is a constant, and S(0) = S0 > 0. Furthermore, it is assumed that
the whole output P (t) produced at each instant t ≥ 0 is consumed. The total discounted
value of the growth of the production function P (.) along (x(.), y(.)) is given by
J˜(x(.), y(.)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
P˙ (t)
P (t)
dt = − lnP (0) + δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δt lnP (t) dt,
where δ > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Thus maximizing the total discounted value of
the growth of output P (t) is equivalent to maximizing the following objective function
J ′(x(.), y(.)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δt lnP (t) dt,
=
∫ ∞
0
e−δt lnS(t) dt+ β
∫ ∞
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt,
Neglecting constant term
∫∞
0 e
−δt lnS(t) dt and scalar multiplier β, our final objective is
thus set up as
J(x(·), y(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] .
7.2.1 The Optimal Control Problem
The above exposition leads to the following optimal control problem (P1):
J(x(·), y(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt→ max, (7.3)
x˙(t) = x(t) (1− x(t))− y(t)x(t), x(0) = x0, (7.4)
y(t) ∈ (0,∞), (7.5)
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Now, by an admissible control in problem (P1) we mean a Lebesgue measurable locally
bounded function y : [0,∞) 7→ R1 which satisfies the control constraint (7.5) for all t ≥ 0. By
definition, the corresponding to y(·) admissible trajectory is a (locally) absolutely continuous
function x(·) : [0,∞) 7→ R1 which is a Caratheodory solution (see [77]) to the Cauchy
problem (7.4) on the whole infinite time interval [0,∞). Due to the local boundedness
of the admissible control y(·) such admissible trajectory x(·) always exists and is unique
(see [77, Section 7]). A pair (x(·), y(·)) where y(·) is an admissible control and x(·) is the
corresponding admissible trajectory is called an admissible pair in problem (P1).
7.2.2 Establishing the Notion of Optimality
Due to (7.4) for any admissible trajectory x(·) the following property holds:
x(t) ≤ xmax = max{x0, 1}, t ≥ 0. (7.6)
The integral in (7.3) is understood in improper sense, i.e.
J(x(·), y(·)) = lim
T→∞
∫ T
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt (7.7)
if the limit exists. Now, in order to establish a notion of optimality, we must first prove that
the limit in the above expression exists. For this, we will require the following intermediate
result.
Lemma 2. There is a decreasing function ω : [0,∞) 7→ (0,∞) such that ω(t) → +0 as
t→∞ and for any admissible pair (x(·), y(·)) the following inequality holds:
∫ T ′
T
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt < ω(T ), 0 ≤ T < T ′. (7.8)
Proof. Indeed, due to inequality lnx < x, x > 0, for arbitrary 0 ≤ T < T ′ we have
∫ T ′
T
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt <
∫ T ′
T
e−δty(t)x(t) dt.
Hence, substituting expression of x(t)y(t) from (7.4) in the inequality above we get
∫ T ′
T
e−δt [lnx(t)) + ln y(t)] dt <
∫ T ′
T
e−δt [x(t) (1− x(t))− x˙(t)] dt.
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This implies
∫ T ′
T
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt <
∫ T ′
T
e−δt [x(t)− x˙(t)] dt,
≤ xmax
∫ T ′
T
e−δt dt−
∫ T ′
T
e−δtx˙(t) dt,
=
xmax
δ
(
e−δT − e−δT ′
)
− e−δtx(t)
∣∣∣∣T ′
T
− δ
∫ T ′
T
e−δtx(t) dt,
<
xmax
δ
e−δT + e−δTxmax =
(1 + δ)xmax
δ
e−δT = ω(T ),
which completes the proof.
Now, let us show that for any admissible pair (x(·), y(·)) the limit in (7.7) exists.
Lemma 3. For any admissible pair (x(·), y(·)) the limit in (7.7) exists and is either finite
or equals −∞.
Proof. Let (x(·), y(·)) be an arbitrary admissible pair. For any T > 0 define JT (x(·), y(·))
as follows:
JT (x(·), y(·)) =
∫ T
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t))] dt.
Let {ζi}∞i=1 be a sequence of positive numbers such that ζi →∞ as i→∞ and
lim
i→∞
Jζi(x(·), y(·)) = lim sup
T→∞
∫ T
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt.
Due to Lemma 2 we have the following estimate
lim
i→∞
Jζi(x(·), y(·)) ≤ ω(0). (7.9)
Analogously, let {τi}∞i=1 be a sequence of positive numbers such that τi →∞ as i→∞ and
lim
i→∞
Jτi(x(·), y(·)) = lim inf
T→∞
∫ T
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt.
Without loss of generality one can assume that τi < ζi, i = 1, 2, . . . . Then we have
Jζi(x(·), y(·)) = Jτi(x(·), y(·)) +
∫ ζi
τi
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt, i = 1, 2, . . . .
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Due to Lemma 2 this implies
Jζi(x(·), y(·)) < Jτi(x(·), y(·)) + ω(τi), i = 1, 2, . . . .
Since ω(τi)→ 0 as i→∞ taking the limit in the last inequality as i→∞ we get
lim sup
T→∞
∫ T
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t))] dt ≤ lim inf
T→∞
∫ T
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t))] dt.
As far as the opposite inequality
lim inf
T→∞
∫ T
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t))] dt ≤ lim sup
T→∞
∫ T
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t))] dt
is always true, the limit (7.7) exists, and due to (7.9) this limit is either finite or −∞.
Due to (7.9) for any admissible pair (x(·), y(·)) the value sup(x(·),y(·)) J(x(·), y(·)) is finite.
This allows us to understand the optimality of an admissible pair (x∗(·), y∗(·)) in the strong
sense [52]. By definition, an admissible pair (x∗(·), y∗(·)) is strongly optimal (or, for brevity,
simply optimal) in the problem (P1) if the functional (7.3) takes the maximal possible value
on this pair , i.e.
J(x∗(·), y∗(·)) = sup
(x(·),y(·))
J(x(·), y(·)) <∞.
Notice, that the set of control constraints in problem (P1) (see (7.5)) is nonclosed and
unbounded. Due to this circumstance the standard existence theorems (see e.g. [22, 56])
are not applicable to problem (P1) directly. Moreover, the situation is complicated here
by the fact that the Hamiltonian of problem (P1) is non-concave in the state variable x.
These preclude the usage of Arrow’s sufficient conditions for optimality (see [52]).
Our analysis below is based on application of the recently developed normal form version
of the Pontryagin maximum principle [159] for infinite-horizon optimal control problems
with adjoint variable specified explicitly via the Cauchy type formula (see [12, 17, 13]).
However, such approach assumes that the optimal control exists. So, the proof of the
existence of an optimal admissible pair (x∗(·), y∗(·)) in problem (P1) and establishing of
the corresponding version of the maximum principle will be our primary goal in the next
section.
96
7.3 Reduction to a Problem with Linear Dynamics
Let us transform problem (P1) into a more appropriate equivalent form.
Due to (7.4) along any admissible pair (x(·), y(·)) we have
d
dt
[
e−δt lnx(t)
]
a.e.
= −δe−δt lnx(t) + e−δt − e−δt (x(t) + y(t)) , t > 0.
Integrating this equality on arbitrary time interval [0, T ], T > 0, we obtain
∫ T
0
e−δt lnx(t) dt =
lnx0 − e−δT lnx(T )
δ
+
1
δ2
(
1− e−δT
)
−
∫ T
0
e−δt
(
1
δ
x(t) +
y(t)
δ
)
dt.
Hence, for any admissible pair (x(·), y(·)) and arbitrary T > 0 we have
∫ T
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt =
lnx0 − e−δT lnx(T )
δ
+
1
δ2
(
1− e−δT
)
− 1
δ
∫ T
0
e−δtx(t) dt +
∫ T
0
e−δt
(
ln y(t)− y(t)
δ
)
dt. (7.10)
Here due to estimate (7.9) limits of the both sides in (7.10) as T →∞ exist and equal either
a finite number or −∞ simultaneously, and due to (7.6) either (i) limT→∞ e−δT lnx(T ) = 0
or (ii) lim infT→∞ e−δT lnx(T ) < 0. In the case (i) passing to the limit in (7.10) as T →∞
we get
∫ ∞
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt =
lnx0
δ
+
1
δ2
− 1
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δtx(t) dt +
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
ln y(t)− y(t)
δ
)
dt, (7.11)
where both sides in (7.11) are equal to a finite number or −∞ simultaneously.
In the case (ii) condition lim infT→∞ e−δT lnx(T ) < 0 implies∫ ∞
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt = lim
T→∞
∫ T
0
e−δt [lnx(t) + ln y(t)] dt = −∞
(see [10] for details). Hence, in the case (ii) (7.11) also holds as −∞ = −∞.
Neglecting now the constant terms in the right-hand side of (7.11) we obtain the fol-
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lowing optimal control problem (P˜1) which is equivalent to (P1):
J˜(x(·), y(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
[
ln y(t)− y(t)
δ
− 1
δ
x(t)
]
dt→ max, (7.12)
x˙(t) = x(t) (1− x(t))− y(t)x(t), x(0) = x0, (7.13)
y(t) ∈ (0,∞). (7.14)
Further, the function y 7→ ln y − y/δ is increasing on (0, δ] and it reaches the global
maximum at point y∗ = δ. Hence, any optimal control y∗(·) in (P˜1) (if such exists) must
satisfy the inequality y∗(t) ≥ δ for almost all t ≥ 0. Hence the control constraint (7.14) in
(P˜1) (and also the control constraint (7.5) in (P1)) can be replaced by the control constraint
y(t) ∈ [δ,∞). Thus we arrive to the following (equivalent) problem (P2):
J(x(·), y(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δt [ln y(t) + lnx(t)] dt→ max, (7.15)
x˙(t) = x(t) (1− x(t))− y(t)x(t), x(0) = x0, (7.16)
y(t) ∈ [δ,∞). (7.17)
Here the class of admissible controls in problem (P2) consists of all locally bounded functions
y(·) satisfying the control constraint (7.17) for all t ≥ 0.
To simplify dynamics in (P2) let us introduce the new state variable z(·): z(t) = 1/x(t),
t ≥ 0. As can be verified directly, in terms of the state variable z(·) problem (P2) can be
rewritten as the following (equivalent) problem (P3):
J(z(·), y(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δt [ln y(t)− ln z(t)] dt→ max, (7.18)
z˙(t) = [y(t)− 1] z(t) + 1, z(0) = z0 = 1
x0
, (7.19)
y(t) ∈ [δ,∞). (7.20)
The class of admissible controls y(·) in (P3) consists of all measurable locally bounded
functions y : [0,∞) 7→ [δ,∞).
Notice, that due to linearity of (7.19) for arbitrary admissible control y(·) the corre-
98
sponding trajectory x(·) can be expressed via the Cauchy formula (see [99]):
z(t) = z0e
∫ t
0 y(ξ) dξ−t + e
∫ t
0 y(ξ) dξ−t
∫ t
0
e−
∫ s
0 y(ξ) dξ+s ds, t ≥ 0. (7.21)
Since the problems (P1), (P2) and (P3) are equivalent we will focus our analysis below on
problem (P3) with simplified dynamics (see (7.19)) and the closed set of control constraints
(see (7.20)).
7.4 Existence of an Optimal Control and the Maximum Prin-
ciple
The constructed problem (P3) is a particular case of the following autonomous infinite-
horizon optimal control problem (P4) with exponential discounting:
J(z(·), y(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δtg(z(t), y(t)) dt→ max, (7.22)
z˙(t) = f(z(t), y(t)), z(0) = z0, (7.23)
y(t) ∈ U. (7.24)
Here U is a nonempty closed subset of Rm, z0 ∈ G is an initial state, G is an open convex
subset of Rn, δ > 0 is the discount rate, and f : G × U 7→ Rn and g : G × U 7→ Rm
are given functions. The class of admissible controls in (P4) consists of all measurable
locally bounded functions y : [0,∞) 7→ U . The optimality of admissible pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) is
understood in the strong sense [52].
7.4.1 Proving the Existence of an Optimal Pair
Problems of type (P4) were intensively studied in last decades (see [14, 15, 16, 8, 9, 11,
12, 17, 13]). Here we will employ the existence result and the variant of the Pontryagin
maximum principle for problem (P4) developed in [15, 16] and [12, 17, 13] respectively.
We will need to verify validity of the following conditions (see [15, 16, 8, 12, 17, 13]).
(A1) The functions f(·, ·) and g(·, ·) together with their partial derivatives fz(·, ·) and gz(·, ·)
are continuous and locally bounded on G× U .
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(A2) There exists a number c > 0 and a nonnegative integrable function λ : [0,∞) 7→ R1
such that for every ζ ∈ G with ‖ζ − z0‖ < c equation (7.23) with y(·) = y∗(·) and initial
condition z(0) = ζ (instead of z(0) = z0) has a solution z(ζ; ·) on [0,∞) in G, and
max
θ∈[z(ζ;t),z∗(t)]
∣∣∣e−δt〈gz(θ, y∗(t)), z(ζ; t)− z∗(t)〉∣∣∣ a.e.≤ ‖ζ − z0‖λ(t).
Here [z(ζ; t), z∗(t)] denotes the line segment with vertices z(ζ; t) and z∗(t).
(A3) There is a positive function ω(·) decreasing on [0,∞) such that ω(t)→ +0 as t→∞
and for any admissible pair (z(·), y(·)) the following estimate holds:
∫ T ′
T
e−δtg(z(t), y(t)) dt ≤ ω(T ), 0 ≤ T ≤ T ′.
Obviously, condition (A1) is satisfied because f(z, y) = [y − 1] z+1, g(z, y) = ln y− ln z,
fz(z, y) = y − 1 and gz(z, y) = −1/z, z > 0, y ∈ [δ,∞), in (P3).
Let us show that (A2) also holds for any admissible pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) in (P3). Set
c = z0/2 and define the nonnegative integrable function λ : [0,∞) 7→ R1 as follows: λ(t) =
2e−δt/z0, t ≥ 0. Then, as it can be seen directly, for any real ζ: |ζ − z0| < c, the Cauchy
problem (7.19) with y(·) = y∗(·) and the initial condition z(0) = ζ (instead of z(0) = z0)
has a solution z(ζ; ·) on [0,∞) and
max
θ∈[z(ζ;t),z∗(t)]
∣∣∣e−δtgz(θ, y∗(t)) (z(ζ; t)− z∗(t)) ∣∣∣ a.e.≤ |ζ − z0|λ(t).
Hence, for any admissible pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) condition (A2) is also satisfied.
Validity of (A3) for any admissible pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) follows from (7.9) directly.
For an admissible pair (z(·), y(·)) consider the following linear system:
q˙(t) = − [fz(z(t), y(t))]∗ q(t) = [−y(t) + 1] q(t). (7.25)
The normalized fundamental solution Q(·) to equation (7.25) is defined as follows:
Q(t) = e−
∫ t
0 y(ξ) dξ+t, t ≥ 0. (7.26)
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Due to (7.21) and (7.26) for any admissible pair (z(·), y(·)) we have
∣∣∣e−δtQ−1(t)gz(z(t), y(t))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ e−δte
∫ t
0 y(ξ) dξ−t
z0e
∫ t
0 y(ξ) dξ−t + e
∫ t
0 y(ξ) dξ−t
∫ t
0 e
− ∫ s0 y(ξ) dξ+s ds
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ e−δtz0 , t ≥ 0.
Hence, for any T > 0 the function ψT : [0, T ] 7→ R1 defined as
ψT (t) = Q(t)
∫ T
t
e−δsQ−1(s)gz(z(s), y(s)) ds
= −e−
∫ t
0 y(ξ) dξ+t
∫ T
t
e
∫ s
0 y(ξ) dξ−se−δs
z(s)
ds, t ∈ [0, T ], (7.27)
is absolutely continuous, and the function ψ : [0,∞) 7→ R1 defined as
ψ(t) = Q(t)
∫ ∞
t
e−δsQ−1(s)gz(z(s), y(s)) ds
= −e−
∫ t
0 y(ξ) dξ+t
∫ ∞
t
e
∫ s
0 y(ξ) dξ−se−δs
z(s)
ds, t ≥ 0, (7.28)
is locally absolutely continuous.
Define the normal form Hamilton-Pontryagin functionH : [0,∞)×(0,∞)×[δ,∞)×R1 7→
R1 and the normal-form Hamiltonian H : [0,∞) × (0,∞) × R1 7→ R1 for problem (P3) in
the standard way:
H(t, z, y, ψ) = ψf(z, y) + e−δtg(z, y) = ψ[(y − 1)z + 1] + e−δt[ln y − ln z],
H(t, z, ψ) = sup
y≥δ
H(t, z, y, ψ),
t ∈ [0,∞), z ∈ (0,∞), y ∈ [δ,∞), ψ ∈ R1.
Theorem 3. There is an optimal admissible control y∗(·) in problem (P3). Moreover, for
any optimal admissible pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) we have
y∗(t)
a.e.≤
(
1 +
1
z∗(t)
)
(1 + δ), t ≥ 0. (7.29)
Proof. Let us show that there is a continuous function M : [0,∞) 7→ R1, M(t) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
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and a function φ : [0,∞) 7→ R1, φ(t) > 0, t ≥ 0, limt→∞ (φ(t)/t) = 0, such that for any
admissible pair (z(·), y(·)), satisfying on a set M ⊂ [0,∞), measM > 0, to inequality
y(t) > M(t), for all t ∈M we have
inf
T :T−φ(T )≥t
{
sup
y∈[δ,M(t)]
H(t, z(t), y, ψT (t))−H(t, z(t), y(t), ψT (t))
}
> 0, (7.30)
where the function ψT (·) is defined on [0, T ], T > 0, by equality (7.27).
Let (z(·), y(·)) be an arbitrary admissible pair in (P3). Then due to (7.21) and (7.26),
for any T > 0 and arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ] we get (see (7.27))
− z(t)ψT (t) =
[
z0 +
∫ t
0
e−
∫ s
0 y(ξ) dξ+s ds
] ∫ T
t
e−δs
z0 +
∫ s
0 e
− ∫ τ0 y(ξ) dξ+τ dτ ds
≥ z0
∫ T
t
e−δs
z0 +
∫ s
0 e
τ dτ
ds ≥ z0e
−(1+δ)t
(z0 + 1)(1 + δ)
[
1− e−(1+δ)(T−t)
]
. (7.31)
For a φ > 0 define the function Mφ : [0,∞) 7→ R1 by equality
Mφ(t) =
(z0 + 1)(1 + δ)
z0
[
1− e−(1+δ)φ]et + 1φ, t ≥ 0. (7.32)
Then for any T : T − φ > t and arbitrary (z(·), y(·)) the function y 7→ H(t, z(t), y, ψT (t))
reaches its maximal value on [δ,∞) at the point (see (7.31))
yT (t) = − e
−δt
z(t)ψT (t)
≤ (z0 + 1)(1 + δ)
z0
[
1− e−(1+δ)(T−t)]et ≤Mφ(t)− 1φ. (7.33)
Now, set φ(t) ≡ φ and M(t) ≡ Mφ(t), t ≥ 0. Let (z(·), y(·)) be an admissible pair such
that inequality y(t) > Mφ(t) holds on a set M ⊂ [0,∞), measM > 0. For arbitrary t ∈M
define the function Φ: [t+ φ,∞) 7→ R1 as follows
Φ(T ) = sup
y∈[δ,M(t)]
H(t, z(t), y, ψT (t))−H(t, z(t), y(t), ψT (t))
= ψT (t)yT (t)z(t) + e
−δt ln yT (t)−
[
ψT (t)y(t)z(t) + e
−δt ln y(t)
]
, T ≥ t+ φ.
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Due to (7.33) we have
Φ(T ) = −e−δt + e−δt [−δt− ln(−ψT (t))− ln z(t)]
−
[
ψT (t)y(t)z(t) + e
−δt ln y(t)
]
, T ≥ t + φ.
Hence, due to (7.27) and (7.33) for a.e. T ≥ t+ φ we get
d
dT
Φ(T ) = − e
−δt
ψT (t)
d
dT
[ψT (t)]− y(t)z(t) d
dT
[ψT (t)]
= z(t)
d
dT
[ψT (t)]
[
e−δt
−ψT (t)z(t) − y(t)
]
= z(t)
d
dT
[ψT (t)] (yT (t)− y(t)) > 0.
Hence,
inf
T>0: t≤T−φ
{
sup
y∈[δ,M(t)]
H(t, z(t), y, ψT (t))−H(t, z(t), y(t), ψT (t))
}
= inf
T>0: t≤T−φ
Φ(T ) = Φ(t + φ) > 0.
Thus, for any t ∈M inequality (7.30) is proved.
Since the instantaneous utility in (7.18) is concave in y, the system (7.19) is affine in y,
the set U is closed (see (7.20)), conditions (A1) and (A3) are satisfied, and since (A2) also
holds for any admissible pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) in (P3), all conditions of the existence result in
[16] are fulfilled (see also [15, Theorem 1]). Hence, there is an optimal admissible control
y∗(·) in (P3) and, moreover, y∗(t)
a.e.≤ Mφ(t), t ≥ 0. Passing to a limit in this inequality as
φ→∞ we get (see (7.32))
y∗(t)
a.e.≤
(
1 +
1
z0
)
(1 + δ)et, t ≥ 0. (7.34)
Further, it is easy to see that for any τ > 0 the pair (z˜∗(·), y˜∗(·)) defined as z˜∗(t) =
z∗(t+ τ), y˜∗(t) = y∗(t+ τ), t ≥ 0, is an optimal admissible pair in the problem (P3) taken
with initial condition z(0) = z∗(τ). Hence, using the same arguments as above we get the
following inequality for (z˜∗(·), y˜∗(·)) (see (7.34)):
y˜∗(t)
a.e.≤
(
1 +
1
z˜∗(0)
)
(1 + δ)et, t ≥ 0.
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Hence, for arbitrary fixed τ > 0 we have
y∗(t) = y˜∗(t− τ)
a.e.≤
(
1 +
1
z∗(τ)
)
(1 + δ)et−τ , t ≥ τ.
Due to arbitrariness of τ > 0 this implies (7.29).
7.4.2 Application of the Maximum Principle
Theorem 4. Let (z∗(·), y∗(·)) be an optimal admissible pair in problem (P3). Then the
function ψ : [0,∞) 7→ R1 defined for pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) by formula (7.28) is (locally) abso-
lutely continuous and satisfies the conditions of the normal form maximum principle, i.e.
ψ(·) is a solution of the adjoint system
ψ˙(t) = −Hz (z∗(t), y∗(t), ψ(t)) , (7.35)
and the maximum condition holds:
H(z∗(t), y∗(t), ψ(t)) a.e.= H(z∗(t), ψ(t)). (7.36)
Proof. As it already have been shown above condition (A1) is satisfied and (A2) holds
for any admissible pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) in (P3). Hence, due to the variant of the maximum
principle developed in [12, 17, 13] the function ψ : [0,∞) 7→ R1 defined for pair (z∗(·), y∗(·))
by formula (7.28) satisfies the conditions (7.35) and (7.36).
Notice, that the Cauchy type formula (7.28) implies (see (7.21) and (7.26))
ψ(t) = −e−
∫ t
0 y∗(ξ) dξ+t
∫ ∞
t
e−δτe
∫ τ
0 y∗(ξ) dξ−τ
e
∫ τ
0 y∗(ξ) dξ−τ
[
z0 +
∫ τ
0 e
− ∫ θ0 y∗(ξ) dξ+θ dθ] dτ
> − e
− ∫ t0 y∗(ξ) dξ+t
z0 +
∫ t
0 e
− ∫ θ0 y∗(ξ) dξ+θ dθ
∫ ∞
t
e−δτ dτ = − e
−δt
δz∗(t)
, t ≥ 0. (7.37)
Thus, due to (7.28)the following condition holds:
0 < −ψ(t)z∗(t) < e
−δt
δ
, t ≥ 0. (7.38)
Note also, that due to [14, Corollary to Theorem 3] formula (7.28) implies the following
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stationarity condition for the Hamiltonian (see [11, 136])):
H(t, z∗(t), ψ(t)) = δ
∫ ∞
t
e−δsg(z∗(s), y∗(s)) ds, t ≥ 0. (7.39)
It can be shown directly that if an admissible pair (not necessary optimal) (z(·), y(·))
together with an adjoint variable ψ(·) satisfies the core conditions (7.35) and (7.36) of the
maximum principle and limt→∞H(t, z(t), ψ(t)) = 0 then condition (7.39) holds for the triple
(z(·), y(·), ψ(·)) as well (see [11, Section 3]).
Further, due to the maximum condition (7.36) for a.e. t ≥ 0 we have
y∗(t) = arg maxy∈[δ,∞)
[
ψ(t)z∗(t)y + e−δt ln y
]
.
This implies (see (7.38))
y∗(t)
a.e.
= − e
−δt
ψ(t)z∗(t)
> δ, t ∈ [0,∞). (7.40)
7.4.3 The Hamiltonian System
Substituting the formula (7.40) for y∗(·) in (7.19) and in (7.35) due to Theorem 4 we get
that any optimal trajectory z∗(·) together with the corresponding adjoint variable ψ(·) must
satisfy to the Hamiltonian system of the maximum principle:
z˙(t) = −z(t)− e
−δt
ψ(t)
+ 1,
ψ˙(t) = ψ(t) +
2e−δt
z(t)
.
(7.41)
Moreover, estimate (7.38) and condition (7.39) must hold as well. In the terms of the
current value adjoint variable λ(·), λ(t) = eδtψ(t), t ≥ 0, one can rewrite system (7.41) as
follows:
z˙(t) = −z(t)− 1
λ(t)
+ 1,
λ˙(t) = (δ+ 1)λ(t) +
2
z(t)
.
(7.42)
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In terms of variable λ(·) estimate (7.38) takes the following form:
0 < −λ(t)z∗(t) < 1
δ
, t ≥ 0. (7.43)
Accordingly, the optimal control y∗(·) can be expressed as follows (see (7.40)):
y∗(t)
a.e.
= − 1
λ(t)z∗(t)
, t ≥ 0. (7.44)
Define the normal form current value Hamiltonian M : (0,∞) × R1 7→ R1 for problem
(P3) in the standard way (see [11, Section 3]):
M(z, λ) = eδtH(t, z, ψ), z ∈ (0,∞), λ ∈ R1. (7.45)
Then in the current value terms the stationarity condition (7.39) takes the form
M(z∗(t), λ(t)) = δeδt
∫ ∞
t
e−δsg(z∗(s), y∗(s)) ds, t ≥ 0. (7.46)
In the next section we will analyze the system (7.42) coupled with the estimate (7.43)
and the stationarity condition (7.46). We will show that there are only two qualitatively
different types of behavior of the optimal paths that are possible. If δ < 1 then the
optimal path asymptotically approaches an optimal nonvanishing steady state while the
corresponding optimal control tends to (1 + δ)/2 as t→∞. If δ ≥ 1 then the optimal path
z∗(·) goes to infinity, while the corresponding optimal control y∗(·) tends to δ as t → ∞,
i.e. asymptotically it follows the Hotelling rule of optimal depletion of an exhaustible
resource [102].
7.5 Analysis of the Hamiltonian system
Due to Theorem 4 it is sufficient to analyze the behavior of system (7.42) only in the open
set Γ = { (z, λ) : z > 0, λ < 0} in the phase plane R2.
Let us introduce functions v1 : (1,∞) 7→ (−∞, 0) and v2 : (0,∞) 7→ (−∞, 0) as follows
v1(z) =
1
1− z , z ∈ (1,∞) , v2(z) = −
2
(δ+ 1)z
, z ∈ (0,∞).
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Due to (7.42) the curves γ1 = {(z, λ) : λ = v1(z), z ∈ (1,∞)} and γ2 = {(z, λ) : λ =
v2(z), z ∈ (0,∞)} are the nullclines at which the derivatives of variables z(·) and λ(·)
vanish respectively.
Two qualitatively different cases are possible: (i) δ < 1 and (ii) δ ≥ 1.
7.5.1 The Sustainable Case
Here we consider the case where δ < 1. In this case the nullclines γ1 and γ2 have a unique
intersection point (zˆ, λˆ) which is a unique equilibrium of system (7.42) in Γ:
zˆ =
2
1− δ , λˆ =
δ− 1
δ+ 1
. (7.47)
The corresponding equilibrium control yˆ(·) is
yˆ(t) ≡ yˆ = δ+ 1
2
, t ≥ 0. (7.48)
The eigenvalues of the system linearized around the equilibrium are given by
σ1,2 =
δ
2
± 1
2
√
2− δ2,
which are real and distinct with opposite signs when δ < 1. Hence, by the Grobman-
Hartman theorem in a neighborhood Ω of the equilibrium state (zˆ, λˆ) the system (7.42) is
of saddle type (see [99, Chapter 9]).
The nullclines γ1 and γ2 divide the set Γ in four open regions:
Γ−,− =
{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: λ < v1(z), 1 < z ≤ zˆ
}⋃{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: λ < v2(z), zˆ < z <∞
}
,
Γ+,− =
{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: λ < v2(z), 0 < z ≤ 1
}⋃{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: v1(z) < λ < v2(z), 1 < z < zˆ
}
,
Γ+,+ =
{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: v2(z) < λ < 0, 0 < z ≤ zˆ
}⋃{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: v1(z) < λ < 0, zˆ < z <∞
}
,
Γ−,+ =
{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: v2(z) < λ < v1(z), z > zˆ
}
.
Any solution (z(·), λ(·)) of (7.42) in Γ has definite signs of derivatives of its (z, λ)-coordinates
in the sets Γ−.−, Γ−.+, Γ+,+, and Γ−,+. These signs are indicated by the corresponding
subscripts.
The behavior of the flows is shown in Figure 7-1 through the phase portrait.
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Figure 7-1: Phase portrait of (7.42) around
(zˆ, λˆ), where δ = 0.01
For any initial state (ξ, β) ∈ Γ there is a unique solution (zξ,β(·), λξ,β(·)) of the sys-
tem (7.42) satisfying initial conditions z(0) = ξ, λ(0) = β, and due to the standard ex-
tension result this solution is defined on some maximal time interval [0, Tξ,β) in Γ where
0 < Tξ,β ≤ ∞ (see [99, Chapter 2]).
Let us consider behaviors of solutions (zξ,β(·), λξ,β(·)) of system (7.42) in Γ for all possible
initial states (ξ, β) ∈ Γ as t→ Tξ,β . The standard analysis of system (7.42) shows that only
three types of behavior of solutions (zξ,β(·), λξ,β(·)) of (7.42) in Γ as t→ Tξ,β are possible:
1) (zξ,β(t), λξ,β(t)) ∈ Γ−,− or (zξ,β(t), λξ,β(t)) ∈ Γ+,− for all sufficiently large times t. In
this case Tξ,β =∞ and limt→∞ λξ,β(t) = −∞ while limt→∞ zξ,β(t) = 1. Due to Theorem 4
such asymptotic behavior does not correspond to an optimal path because it contradicts
the necessary condition (7.43).
2) (zξ,β(t), λξ,β(t)) ∈ Γ+,+ for all sufficiently large times t. In this case limt→Tξ,β zξ,β(t) =
∞ and limt→Tξ,β λξ,β(t) = 0. If (zξ,β(·), λξ,β(·)) corresponds to an optimal pair (z∗(·), y∗(·))
in (P3) then due to Theorem 4 z∗(·) ≡ zξ,β(·), Tξ,β =∞, limt→∞ z∗(t) =∞,
and limt→∞ λξ,β(t) = 0. Set λ∗(·) ≡ λξ,β(·) in this case and define the function φ∗(·) by
equality φ∗(t) = λ∗(t)z∗(t), t ∈ [0,∞).
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By direct differentiation for a.e. t ∈ [0,∞) we get (see (7.42))
φ˙∗(t)
a.e.
= (δ+ 1)λ∗(t)z∗(t) + 2− λ(t)z∗(t)− 1 + λ∗(t) = δφ∗(t) + 1 + λ∗(t).
Hence,
φ∗(t) = eδt
[
φ∗(0) +
∫ t
0
e−δs (1 + λ∗(s)) ds
]
, t ∈ [0,∞). (7.49)
Since limt→∞ λ∗(t) = 0 the improper integral
∫∞
0 e
−δs (1 + λ∗(s)) ds converges, and due
to (7.43) we have 0 > φ∗(t) = λ∗(t)z∗(t) > −1/δ for all t > 0. Due to (7.49) this implies
φ∗(0) = −
∫ ∞
0
e−δs (1 + λ∗(s)) ds = −1
δ
−
∫ ∞
0
e−δsλ∗(s) ds.
Substituting this expression for φ∗(0) in (7.49) we get
φ∗(t) = −1
δ
− eδt
∫ ∞
t
e−δsλ∗(s) ds, t ∈ [0,∞).
Due to the L’Hospital rule we have
lim
t→∞ e
δt
∫ ∞
t
e−δsλ∗(s) ds = lim
t→∞
∫∞
t e
−δsλ∗(s) ds
e−δt
= lim
t→∞
λ∗(t)
δ
= 0.
Hence,
lim
t→∞ y∗(t) = limt→∞
−1
λ∗(t)z∗(t)
= lim
t→∞
−1
φ∗(t)
= δ.
But due to the system (7.42) and the inequality δ < 1 this implies limt→∞ z∗(t) ≤ 1 < ∞
that contradicts the equality limt→∞ z∗(t) =∞. So, all these trajectories of (7.42) are the
blow up ones. Thus, there are not any trajectories of (7.42) that correspond to optimal
admissible pairs due to Theorem 4 in the case 2).
3) limt→∞(z(t), λ(t)) = (zˆ, λˆ) as t → ∞. In this case, since the equilibrium (zˆ, λˆ)
is of saddle type, there are only two trajectories of (7.42) which tend to the equilibrium
point (zˆ, λˆ) asymptotically as t → ∞ and lying on the stable manifold of (zˆ, λˆ). One such
trajectory (z1(·), λ1(·)) approaches the point (zˆ, λˆ) from the left from the set Γ+,+ (we
call this trajectory the left equilibrium trajectory), while the second trajectory (z2(·), λ2(·))
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approaches the point (zˆ, λˆ) from the right from the set Γ−,− (we call this trajectory the right
equilibrium trajectory). It is easy to see that both these trajectories are fit to estimate (7.43)
and stationarity condition (7.46). Hence, (z1(·), λ1(·)), (z2(·), λ2(·)) and the stationary
trajectory (zˆ(·), λˆ(·)), zˆ(·) ≡ zˆ, λˆ(·) ≡ λˆ, t ≥ 0, are unique trajectories of (7.42) which can
correspond to the optimal pairs in problem (P3) due to Theorem 4.
Due to Theorem 3 for any initial state z0 > 0 an optimal control y∗(·) in problem
(P3) exists. Hence, for any initial state ξ ∈ (0, zˆ) there is a unique β < 0 such that
the corresponding trajectory (zξ,β(·), λξ,β(·)) coincides (up to a shift in time) with the left
equilibrium trajectory (z1(·), λ1(·)) on time interval [0,∞). Analogously, for any initial
state ξ > zˆ there is a unique β < 0 such that the corresponding trajectory (zξ,β(·), , λξ,β(·))
coincides (up to a shift in time) with the right equilibrium trajectory (z2(·), λ2(·)) on [0,∞).
The corresponding optimal control is defined uniquely by (7.44). Thus, for any initial state
z0 > 0 the corresponding optimal pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) in (P3) is unique, and due to Theorem 4
the corresponding current value adjoint variable λ∗(·) is also unique.
7.5.2 The Unsustainable Case
Now, consider the case when δ ≥ 1. In this case v2(z) > v1(z) for all z > 1 and hence the
nullclines γ1 and γ2 do not intersect in Γ. Accordingly, the system (7.42) does not have an
equilibrium point in Γ.
The nullclines γ1 and γ2 divide the set Γ in three open regions:
Γˆ−,− =
{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: λ < v1(z), z > 1
}
,
Γˆ+,− =
{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: λ < v2(z), 0 < z ≤ 1
}⋃{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: v1(z) < λ < v2(z), z > 1
}
,
Γˆ+,+ =
{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: v2(z) < λ < 0, 0 < z ≤ zˆ
}⋃{
(z, λ) ∈ Γ: v1(z) < λ < 0, zˆ < z <∞
}
.
The behavior of the flows is shown in Figure 7-2 through the phase portrait.
Any solution (z(·), λ(·)) of (7.42) in Γ has the definite signs of derivatives of its (z, λ)
coordinates in each set Γˆ−.−, Γˆ+,+, and Γˆ−,+ as indicated by the subscripts.
The standard analysis of the behaviors of solutions (z(·), λ(·)) of system (7.42) in each
of sets Γˆ−.−, Γˆ+.− and Γ+,+ shows that there are only two types of asymptotic behavior of
solutions (z(·), λ(·)) of (7.42) that are possible:
1) limt→∞ z(t) = 1, limt→∞ λ(t) = −∞. In this case (z(t), λ(t)) ∈ Γˆ−,− for all suffi-
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Figure 7-2: Phase portrait of (7.42) in the case δ = 10 ≥ 1.
ciently large times t ≥ 0. Due to Theorem 4 such asymptotic behavior does not correspond
to an optimal admissible pair because in this case limt→∞ λ(t)x(t) = −∞ that contradicts
condition (7.43). Thus this case can be eliminated from the consideration.
2) limt→∞ z(t) = ∞, limt→∞ λ(t) = 0. In this case (z(t), λ(t)) ∈ Γˆ+,+ for all t ≥ 0.
Since the case 1) can be eliminated from the consideration, we conclude that the case 2) is
the only one that can be realized for an optimal admissible pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) (which exists)
in (P3) due to the maximum principle (Theorem (4)).
Let us consider behavior of trajectory (z∗(·), λ∗(·)) of system (7.42) that corresponds to
the optimal pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) in the set Γˆ+,+ in more details.
As in the subcase (b) of case (i) above, define the function φ∗(·) as follows:
φ∗(t) = λ∗(t)z∗(t), t ∈ [0,∞).
Repeating the calculations presented in the subcase (b) of case (i) we get
φ∗(t) = −1
δ
− eδt
∫ ∞
t
e−δsλ∗(s) ds, t ∈ [0,∞).
111
As in the subcase (b) of case (i) above, due to the L’Hospital rule this implies
lim
t→∞ e
δt
∫ ∞
t
e−δsλ∗(s) ds = lim
t→∞
∫∞
t e
−δsλ∗(s) ds
e−δt
= lim
t→∞
λ∗(t)
δ
= 0.
Hence,
lim
t→∞ y∗(t) = limt→∞
−1
λ∗(t)y∗(t)
= lim
t→∞
−1
φ∗(t)
= δ.
Thus, asymptotically, any optimal admissible control y∗(·) satisfies the Hotelling rule [102]
of optimal depletion of an exhaustible resource in the case δ ≥ 1.
Now let us show that the optimal control y∗(·) is defined uniquely by Theorem 4 in the
case δ ≥ 1.
Define the function v3 : (0,∞) 7→ R1 and the curve γ3 ⊂ Γ as follows:
v3(z) = − 1
δz
, z ∈ (0,∞), γ3 = {(z, λ) : λ = v3(z), z ∈ (0,∞)} .
It is easy to see that v3(z) ≥ v2(z) for all z > 0 and v3(z) > v1(z) for all z > 1 in
the case δ ≥ 1. Hence, the curve γ3 is located not below γ2 and strictly above γ1 in Γˆ+,+
(see Figure 7-2). Notice that if δ = 1 then γ3 coincides with γ2 while if δ > 1 then γ3 lies
strictly above γ2 in Γˆ+,+. It can be demonstrated directly that any trajectory (z(·), λ(·)) of
system (7.42) can intersect curve γ3 only one time and only in the upward direction.
Due to (7.43) a trajectory (z∗(·), λ∗(·)) of system (7.42) that corresponds to the optimal
pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) lies strictly above γ3. Since the system (7.42) is autonomous by virtue of
the theorem on uniqueness of a solution of first-order ordinary differential equation (see [99,
Chapter 3]) trajectories of system (7.42) that lie above γ3 do not intersect the curve γ4 =
{(z, λ) : z = z∗(t), λ = λ∗(t), t ≥ 0} which is the graph of the trajectory (z∗(·), λ∗(·)).
Further, trajectory (z∗(·), λ∗(·)) is defined on infinite time interval [0,∞). This implies
that all trajectories (zz0,β(·), λz0,β(·)), β ∈ (−1/(δz0), λ∗(0)), are also defined on the whole
infinite time interval [0,∞), i.e. Tz0,β = ∞ for all β ∈ (−1/(δz0), λ∗(0)). Thus, we have
proved that there is a nonempty set (a continuum) of trajectories {(zz0,β(·), λz0,β(·))}, β ∈
(−1/(δz0), λ∗(0)), t ∈ [0,∞), of system (7.42) lying strictly between the curves γ3 and γ4.
All these trajectories are defined on the whole infinite time interval [0,∞) and, hence, all of
them correspond to some admissible pairs {(zz0,β(·), yz0,β(·))}. Since these trajectories are
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located above γ3 they satisfy also the estimate (7.43).
Consider the current value HamiltonianM(·, ·) for (z, λ) lying above γ3 in Γˆ+,+ (see (7.45)):
M(z, λ) = sup
y≥δ
{yλz + ln y}+ (1− z)λ− ln z
= −1 − ln(−λz) + (1 − z)λ − ln z, − 1
δz
< λ < 0. (7.50)
For any trajectory (zz0,β(·), λz0,β(·)) of system (7.42) lying above γ3 in Γˆ+,+ we have
zz0,β(t) ≥ e(δ−1)tz0, t ≥ 0.
On the other hand for any trajectory (zz0,β(·), λz0,β(·)) of system (7.42) lying between γ3
and γ4 in Γˆ+,+ we have
1
2(1 + δ)
< −λz0,β(t)zz0,β(t) <
1
δ
if zz0,β(t) > 1.
These imply that for any trajectory (zz0,β(·), λz0,β(·)) of system (7.42) lying between γ3 and
γ4 in Γˆ+,+ and for corresponding adjoint variable ψz0,β(·), ψz0,β(t) = e−δtλz0,β(t), t ≥ 0, we
have
lim
t→∞H(t, zz0,β(t), ψz0,β(t)) = limt→∞
{
e−δtM(zz0,β(t), λz0,β(t))
}
= 0.
Hence, for any such trajectory (zz0,β(·), λz0,β(·)) of system (7.42) we have (see (7.46))
M(zz0,β(t), λz0,β(t)) = δe
δt
∫ ∞
t
e−δsg(zz0,β(t), λz0,β(t)) ds, t ≥ 0.
Let yz0,β(·) be the control corresponding to zz0,β(·), i.e. yz0,β(t) = −1/(zz0,β(t)λz0,β(t)).
Then taking in the last equality t = 0 we get
J(zz0,β(·), yz0,β(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δsg(zz0,β(t), λz0,β(t)) ds =
1
δ
M(zz0,β(0), λz0,β(0)).
For any t ≥ 0 function M(z∗(t), ·) (see (7.50)) increases on {λ : − 1/(δz∗(t)) < λ < 0}.
Hence, M(z∗(t), ·) reaches its maximal value in λ on the set {λ : − 1/(δz) < λ ≤ λ∗(t)} at
the point λ∗(t) that correspond to the optimal path z∗(·). Thus, all trajectories
113
(zz0,β(·), λz0,β(·)) of system (7.42) lying between γ3 and γ4 in Γˆ+,+ do not correspond to
optimal admissible pairs in (P3).
From this we can also conclude that all trajectories (z(·), λ(·)) of system (7.42) lying
above γ4 also do not correspond to optimal admissible pars in (P3). Indeed, if such trajec-
tory (z(·), λ(·)) corresponds to an optimal pair (z(·), y(·)) in (P3) then it must satisfy to
condition (7.46). But in this case we have λ(0) > λ∗(0) and
J(z(·), y(·)) = 1
δ
M(z0, λ(0)) =
1
δ
M(z0, λ∗(0)) = J(z∗(·), λ∗(·)),
that contradicts the fact that function M(z0, ·) increases on {λ : − 1/(δz) < λ < 0}. Thus,
for any initial state z0 there is a unique optimal pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) in (P3) in the case δ ≥ 1.
In the next section we discuss the issue of sustainability of optimal paths for different
values of the parameters in the model.
7.6 Discussion: A Generalized Notion of Sustainability
Following Solow [185] we assume that the knowledge stock S(·) grows exponentially, i.e.
S(t) = S0e
µt, t ≥ 0, where µ ≥ 0 and S0 > 0 are constants.
Similar to Valente [195] we say that an admissible pair (x(·), y(·)) is sustainable in our
model if the corresponding instantaneous utility function t 7→ lnP (t), t ≥ 0, non-decreases
in the long run, i.e.
lim
T→∞
inf
t≥T
d
dt
lnP (t) = lim
T→∞
inf
t≥T
P˙ (t)
P (t)
≥ 0.
Substituting P (t) = S(t) (y(t)x(t))β, S(t) = S0e
µt, t ≥ 0, (see (7.2)) we get the following
characterization of sustainability of an admissible pair (x(·), y(·)):
µ
β
+ lim
T→∞
inf
t≥T
[
y˙(t)
y(t)
+
x˙(t)
x(t)
]
≥ 0. (7.51)
We call an admissible pair (x(·), y(·)) strongly sustainable if it is sustainable and, more-
over, the resource stock x(·) is non-vanishing in the long run, i.e.
lim
T→∞
inf
t≥T
x(t) = x∞ > 0. (7.52)
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Consider case (i) when δ < 1. In this case due to Theorem 5 (see Chapter 9) there is a
unique optimal equilibrium pair in the problem (see (7.47) and (7.48)): uˆ(t) ≡ yˆ = (1+δ)/2,
xˆ(t) ≡ xˆ = (1− δ)/2 > 0, t ≥ 0, and for any initial state x0 the corresponding optimal path
x∗(·) approaches asymptotically to the optimal equilibrium state xˆ while the corresponding
optimal exploitation rate y∗(·) approaches asymptotically to the optimal equilibrium value
yˆ. Hence, both conditions (7.51) and (7.52) are satisfied. Thus the optimal admissible pair
(x∗(·), y∗(·)) is strongly sustainable in this case.
Consider case (ii) when δ ≥ 1. In this case due to Theorem 5 (see Chapter 9) for
any initial state x0 the corresponding optimal control y∗(·) asymptotically satisfies the
Hotelling rule of optimal depletion of an exhaustible resource [102], i.e. limt→∞ y∗(t) =
δ, and limt→∞ y˙∗(t)/y∗(t) = 0. The corresponding optimal path x∗(·) is asymptotically
vanishing, and
lim
t→∞ x˙∗(t)/x∗(t) = limt→∞ (1− y∗(t)− x∗(t)) = 1− δ.
Hence, in the case (ii) the sustainability condition (7.51) takes the following form:
µ
β
≥ δ− 1. (7.53)
It is interesting to point our here that in the case β = 1 condition (7.53) coincides with
Valente’s necessary condition for sustainability in his capital-resource model with a renew-
able resource growing exponentially [195]. This takes place if the resource dynamics are
considered in their original form as given by (4.1) (see the concluding section of [10]) as
opposed to the non-dimensionalized dynamics considered here.
Since in the case (i) the inequality (7.53) holds automatically we conclude that (7.53)
is a necessary and sufficient condition (a criterion) for sustainability of the optimal pair
(x∗(·), y∗(·)) in our model while the stronger inequality
δ < 1
gives a criterion for its strong sustainability.
The criterion (7.53) gives the following guidelines for sustainable optimal growth: 1)
Increase ratio of growth rate of knowledge stock µ to output elasticity β; and 2) Decrease
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social discount δ i.e., plan long term. The sustainability criterion (7.53) gives a relationship
between the state of technology (depicted by β), accumulation of knowledge (depicted by
µ) and foresight of the social planner (depicted by δ). According to the guideline 1) above,
it is the ratio between µ and β that matters and not the individual quantities.
In the next chapter, we return our focus to the two-agent symmetric semi-homogeneous
society. Examining the dual-agent network in the context of optimal control would lead
to the analytically more complex methods of multivariable optimal control [147]. More
importantly, the framework would not allow us to study the interactions between the con-
sumer groups. We instead examine the dual-agent network via game theory which permits
a more accurate representation of decentralized control mechanisms, where every agent op-
timizes her own objective. Moreover, the theory allows us to explicitly study the strategic
interactions between the agents, something that was not present in the single agent model
considered in this chapter.
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Chapter 8
Strategic Interactions in the
Game-theoretic Framework
The tragedy of the commons can be seen as one particular instance of the more general
problem of eliciting cooperation between individuals, when there exists a temptation for
individuals to defect. Hardin [97] was one of the first who proposed to employ centralized
mechanisms to coerce a society in order to achieve collectively optimal outcomes in such
situations. He further asserted that any decentralized mechanism, regulated from within
the society, must necessarily fail in achieving those outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 1,
this assertion was challenged by Ostrom [148], who reported several real-world examples of
successful institutions, conceived and regulated by the communities themselves, and used
a game theoretic framework to conceive a new theory of collective action. Typical game
theoretic formalizations, which have been used to depict tragedies, include the prisoner’s
dilemma, the assurance game and the snowdrift game. These games have been studied in
both discrete and continuous action spaces [71].
In this chapter we return to the dual-agent network whose open-loop characteristics were
studied in Section 6.2. We formulate the system as static-two player game with the pay-offs
defined as the resource harvested at steady state and the strategies defined as the psycho-
logical attributes of the consumers. We then develop a notion of “tragedy” as representing
the difference between the optimal and rational outcomes of the consumption game. The
tragicness is studied for both continuous and discrete strategy spaces and its dependence
on various system parameters is also explored. In the process we highlight various char-
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acteristics of non-tragic societies and draw attention to trends that may overcome tragic
situations.
8.1 The Continuous Consumption Game
Here we formalize the socio-ecological system in (6.4) as a static, one-shot two-player game,
in which two consumer groups (players) have access to a single common good (natural
resource). Each player i ∈ {1, 2} chooses her level of environmentalism ρi and her social
relevance νi (note that αi = 1 − νi and so αi is determined by the choice of νi). Thus
the strategy set for each individual i is given as S˜i = {ρi,νi}. The payoff pii that each
individual receives is equal to the amount of resource x¯y¯i that individual harvests at steady
state, where (x¯, y¯1, y¯2) are given by (6.5). Note that bi does not affect the equilibrium
and thus is not included in the strategy set S˜i. The game is then defined as a 3-tuple
G˜ = 〈I, (S˜i), (pii)〉 where I = {1, 2} denotes the set of players, S˜i = [0, 1] × [0, 1] ; i ∈ I is
the strategy space for i and pii : S˜1 × S˜2 → R; i ∈ I is the payoff function for consumer i.
8.1.1 Deriving the Nash Equilibrium
For the two-player game G˜ defined above, the pay-off functions are given as pi1(ρ1,ν1, ρ2, ρ2) =
x¯y¯1 and pi2(ρ1,ν1, ρ2, ρ2) = x¯y¯2, where
x¯(ρ1,ν1, ρ2, ρ2) =
(1− ν1)ν2
ν1+ν2 − 2ν1ν2ρ1 +
(1− ν2)ν1
ν1 + ν2 − 2ν1ν2ρ2,
y¯1(ρ1,ν1, ρ2, ρ2) =
1
2
− 1− ν1
2 (ν1+ν2−2ν1ν2)ρ1+
(1−ν2) (1−2ν1)
2 (ν1+ν2−2ν1ν2)ρ2,
y¯2(ρ1,ν1, ρ2, ρ2) =
1
2
+
(1−ν1) (1−2ν2)
2 (ν1+ν2−2ν1ν2)ρ1−
1− ν2
2 (ν1+ν2−2ν1ν2)ρ2.
where we have used the formula αi + νi = 1 to replace αi. The “best response” of player i
is the strategy (ρ˜i,ν˜i) that maximizes pii for a fixed strategy of the other player j 6= i. The
best response functions are thus given as
(ρ˜i, ν˜i) = argmax
(ρi,νi)
pii(ρi,νi, ρj , ρj). (8.1)
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Figure 8-1: An example of the payoff function of one player, given the
other player’s strategy. The yellow curve represents the best response.
Here ρ2 = 0.7 and ν2 = 0.9.
By calculating the partial derivatives and putting them to zero, we find that for a fixed
pair (ρj ,νj), pii(·, ·, ρj ,νj) is maximized not at a single point but along the following curve
ρ˜i =
(
(1− νj)(ρj − νj(1− ρj))
2νj
)
1
ν˜i − 1 +
ρj + νj(1− ρj)(2νj − 1)
2νj
; i, j ∈ I; i 6= j
A realization of this curve is shown in Figure 8-1. The Nash equilibrium (ρ#1 ,ν
#
1 , ρ
#
2 ,ν
#
2 ),
consists of all possible outcomes such that the strategy of each player is a best response to
the other player’s strategy. Thus at the Nash equilibrium
(ρ#i ,ν
#
i ) = argmax(ρi,νi) pii(ρi,νi, ρ
#
j , ρ
#
j ) and (ρ
#
j ,ν
#
j ) = argmax(ρj ,νj) pij(ρ
#
i ,ν
#
i , ρj , ρj).
Solving this condition algebraically gives the following description of the Nash equilibria
ρ
#
i =
ν
#
i (3ν
#
j − ν#i − 2ν#i ν#j )
(1− ν#i )(ν#i + ν#j + 2ν#i ν#j )
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (8.2)
which shows that there exist an infinite number of Nash equilibria in this formulation of
the consumption game. For the purpose of the following analysis, we redefine the strategy
set S˜ to include only the environmentalisms (ρ1, ρ2) and treat (ν1, ν2) as given parameters
instead of decision variables.This is because excluding the νi’s from the strategy set results
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Figure 8-2: An example of the social welfare function for ν1 = 0.3 and
ν2 = 0.9. The green curve represents the collective optimal whereas the
yellow point represents the Nash equilibrium.
in exactly the same Nash equilibrium as given above; so treating the νi as exogenous
parameters simplifies the further analysis and does not qualitatively affect the resulting
findings.
Hence we redefine the consumption game as the 3-tuple G = 〈I,Si,pii〉, where I = {1, 2}
denotes the set of players, Si, i ∈ I is the indexed strategy space for group i, and pii :
S1×S2 → R, i ∈ I is the indexed payoff function for i, defined on Si. Each group is free to
choose its level of environmentalism ρi ∈ R. The strategy set for each group i is given as
Si = {ρi}. The payoff pii(ρi, ρj) that each group receives is equal to the amount of resource
x¯y¯i(ρi, ρj) the group i harvests at steady state.
8.1.2 Collective Optimality and the Notion of Tragicness
A property inherent to any representation of the tragedy of the commons is that individually
rational behavior leads to outcomes that are collectively suboptimal. We thus compare
the environmentalism of each group at the Nash equilibrium with one that maximizes the
utilitarian welfare function of total consumption J(ρ1, ρ2) = pi1(ρ1, ρ2) + pi2(ρ1, ρ2). We
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Figure 8-3: An illustration of the definition of the game tragicness.
find that the latter optimum (ρ∗1, ρ∗2) is not unique, and is given by the following curve
2ν2(1− ν1)ρ∗1 + 2ν1(1− ν2)ρ∗2 − ν1(1− ν2)− ν2(1− ν1) = 0, (8.3)
A single realization of this curve is shown in Figure 8-2. with the Nash equilibrium situated
at some distance from it (naturally determined by parameters ν1 and ν2). We call this
distance the tragicness of the consumption game, which, more specifically, is defined here
as the length of the shortest line joining the Nash equilibrium and a point on the optimal
curve (see Figure 8-3). Thus in a non-tragic game, the Nash equilibrium would lie exactly on
the welfare optimal curve (resulting in tragicness equal to zero). All other games in which
the Nash equilibrium does not lie on this curve are classified as tragic games, where the
magnitude of the distance between the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto-optimal solutions
is quantified through their tragicness. The concept of tragicness, which we introduce here,
resembles the “price of anarchy” [114], which is a ratio between the cost of the worst possible
Nash equilibrium and the optimum of a social welfare function as measure of effectiveness of
the system. Another similar concept is the “price of stability” [4], which is a ratio between
the cost of the best possible Nash equilibrium and the optimal solution. Both concepts have
been applied widely in computer network design.
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8.1.3 The Consumption Game and Social-Ecological Relevance
Here we present insights gained by observing how the characteristics of the consumption
game depend on the model parameters and what it entails.
The anti-tragic role of social relevance
Cooperative behavior plays a key role in avoiding tragedies and increasing the steady state
resource stock. In our model, this effect can be observed through Figure 8-4(a)-(c). Figure
8-4(a) shows that the tragicness of the consumption game decreases as we move away
from the origin along any of the ν1 or ν2 axes. Furthermore, the tragicness declines with an
increase in the average (over two groups) level of social relevance. Declining of the tragicness
can indeed be seen as growing of coordination and cooperation (through increasing social
relevance) between two groups. Games that are less tragic correspond to affluence in the
steady state resource stock, which in-turn also allows for a higher resource consumption
at steady state. Thus the same trends can be observed for the steady state resource stock
and total consumption rate in Figure 8-4(b) and (c) respectively. This shows that high
social relevance not only decreases the game’s tragicness, but also favors higher steady
state resource stocks and consumption rates.
In the limit case of ν1 = ν2 = 1, zero tragicness is achieved over the infinitely many
equilibria, and it is interesting to note that in this most affluent case, the maximum resource
stock x¯ = 0.5 and maximum consumption rate x¯(y¯1 + y¯2) = 0.25.
A positive effect of incongruity in social relevance
The effect of incongruity or asymmetry in the social relevances on the game tragicness
can also be observed in Figure 8-4(a). Moving away from the line of zero asymmetry (the
horizontal line corresponding to ν1 = ν2) horizontally in either direction results in a lower
tragicness level. This effect of asymmetry on the tragicness is less pronounced for small
deviations in asymmetry, which can be seen from the decreased slope of the level curves
when they are near the line of zero asymmetry. When the asymmetry is large, this effect is
more significant, which can be seen from the sudden slanting of the level curves when further
away from zero asymmetry. Thus strong incongruity or heterogeneity in social relevance
corresponds to less tragic games.
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(a): Game tragicness (b): Resource quantity x¯
(c): Total Consumption x¯(y¯1 + y¯2) (d): Individual Consumption x¯y¯1
(e): Consumption Equity x¯(y¯1 − y¯2)
Figure 8-4: Plots for different characteristics of the consumption game at Nash
equilibrium, shown as the difference and average level of the social relevances ν1,
ν2 are varied. For completeness the ν1 and ν2 axes have also been shown in each
plot. The gray areas mark regions for which stability is not guaranteed. The plots
for both groups are symmetric to each other, and so the conclusions drawn here
for group 1 also apply to group 2.
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Incongruity has a similar effect on the resource stock and total consumption rates,
which can be seen in Figure 8-4(b) and Figure 8-4(c) respectively. In general, an increase
in incongruity increases both. Note that the discontinuity of the level curves, which was
present in Figure 8-4(a) is also present here at exactly the same points in the parameter
space. However the behavior of the curves is different in the center. They are now concave,
which means that small deviations in asymmetry are detrimental to the resource stock and
the consumed quantity. However, large deviations in asymmetry are beneficial.
Higher social relevance increases individual consumption
In general, higher social relevance increases individual group consumption. Figure 8-4(d)
depicts how individual consumption of a group changes as the social relevances are varied.
The level curves in Figure 8-4(d) show three different behaviors. Near the symmetric line
where ν1 = ν2, the consumption of the focal group increases with respect to the social
relevance of both groups. However, this increase is more pronounced with respect to changes
in its own social relevance, than that of the other group. Variation in the other group’s social
relevance does not affect the group’s consumption, when the social relevance of the other
group is low. Conversely, for low values of its own social relevance, the group’s consumption
is affected only by changes in the social relevance of the other group.
Also note that a group’s individual consumption increases monotonically with the other
group’s social relevance only when its own social relevance is high. When this is not the
case, a mode is encountered in the region where the other group’s social relevance is high
enough (note the plateau in the upper right area of Figure 8-4(d)).
Furthermore, a group with a higher social relevance consumes more, than a group with a
lower social relevance. Figure 8-4(e) depicts the difference in consumption x¯(y¯1− y¯2) which
always stays positive to the right of the symmetric line (ν1 = ν2) and always negative to
the left of this line. Difference in consumption is exactly zero when social relevance for both
consumer groups are the same.
Equity in social relevance induces equity in consumption
Figure 8-4(e) shows the behavior of the equity measure x¯(y¯1 − y¯2) as a function of the
average of the social relevances and their asymmetry. When the social relevances are close
to equal (near the center of the plot), the isoclines are nearly vertical which shows that the
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average quantity of the social relevances does not affect equity in consumption. However,
the equity is affected significantly by the asymmetry in social relevances. This can be traced
by starting in the middle of the plot and observing the difference in consumption as we move
horizontally in either direction. The difference in consumption is increased as we increase
asymmetry until a peak is reached after which it decreases slightly. This shows that equity
in consumption is the highest, when the social relevances are close to each other in value.
8.2 The Discrete Consumption Game
In Section 8.1, we formulated the interactions between two consumer groups as a continuous
game. The utilities were assumed to be the amount of resource each group harvested at
steady state. The variables νi and ρi appeared to be natural choices for the action variables
available to each group. However, we found that the game had an infinite number of rational
outcomes, expressed in terms of the action variables in Equation (8.2). Consequently, we
redefined the strategy set to include only one of the variables (ρi) and the other (νi) to be
retained as an exogenously specified parameter. This led to a single equilibrium specified
in terms of the νi’s (thus essentially infinite in number if νi’s are allowed to vary as before)
which resulted in a less tedious representation of the consumption game.
Here we consider an alternative formulation of the assumed socio-ecological setting as
a two player game with discrete actions spaces. As we will see, the formulation allows us
to retain both psychological variables in the strategy set. After defining a parallel concept
to tragicness in the continuous case, we then examine the dependence of the nature of the
game on different variables.
We assume that the strategy of player i, {ρi,νi} ∈ {{ρH ,νH}, {ρL,νL}} where ρL < ρH
and νL < νH . Hence, strategies are a set of two variables where the cooperate strategy
is represented by {ρH ,νH} and the defect strategy is represented by {ρL,νL}. For a two
player game, the payoff matrix is as given in Table 8.1.
Note that the nature of the game is dependent only on the four parameters ρH , ρL,νH ,νL.
By varying these parameters over their entire range along with the constraints ρL < ρH and
νL < νH , we encounter a variety of games which we classify as either tragic or non-tragic.
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C D
C
x¯y¯1(ρH ,νH , ρH ,νH),
x¯y¯2(ρH ,νH , ρH ,νH)
x¯y¯1(ρH ,νH , ρL,νL),
x¯y¯2(ρH ,νH , ρL,νL)
D
x¯y¯1(ρL,νL, ρH ,νH),
x¯y¯2(ρL,νL, ρH ,νH)
x¯y¯1(ρL,νL, ρL,νL),
x¯y¯2(ρL,νL, ρL,νL)
Table 8.1: Structure of the discrete consumption game. x¯, y¯1 and y¯2 are
given by Equation 6.5.
8.2.1 Tragic and non-tragic games
We define a tragic game as one where at least one nash equilibrium is sub-pareto optimal
(see [155] for the notion of pareto optimality). Three such games are encountered while
varying the parameters and are shown in Figure 8-5. All of these games are commonly
found in literature as models of cooperation [71].
Type 1
C D
C 3,3 1,4
D 4,1 2,2
− prisoner’s dilemma
Type 2
C D
C 4,4 1,3
D 3,1 2,2
− stag-hunt
− trust dilemma
− assurance dilemma
Type 3
C D
C 3,3 2,4
D 4,2 1,1
− chicken
− hawk-dove
− snowdrift
Figure 8-5: The three tragic realizations of the consumption game along
with the labels commonly associated with them. Nash equilibria are
shaded in gray. The values of the payoffs are hypothetical and have
been chosen to illustrate the relative magnitudes of the payoffs for each
outcome.
We define non-tragic games as games that are not tragic. In these games all nash
equilibria are also pareto optimal. All such games encountered in the consumption game
are given in Figure 8-6.
8.2.2 The Influence of Social Attributes on the Game Nature
Figure 8-7 shows the type of the consumption game that arises as the four parameters are
varied. The plot covers only those regions where ρL < ρH , νL < νH and parameter values
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Type 4
C D
C 2,2 1,4
D 4,1 3,3
Type 5
C D
C 1,1 2,4
D 4,2 3,3
Type 6
C D
C 2,2 3,4
D 4,3 1,1
Type 7
C D
C 4,4 2,3
D 3,2 1,1
Type 8
C D
C 1,1 3,4
D 4,3 2,2
Type 9
C D
C 1,1 2,3
D 3,2 4,4
Figure 8-6: Non-tragic realizations of the consumption
game.
for which stability of the equilibrium is guaranteed.
Figure 8-7: Plot depicting the type of game that each realization of the
consumption game belongs to as the parameters are varied.
Figure 8-8 shows the nature of the consumption game evaluated for the four dimensional
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parameter space and classified as either tragic (red) or non-tragic (green).
Figure 8-8: Tragic and non-tragic regions for the consumption game.
Another classification of the games exists depending on whether the rational outcome
for both players to defect, both players to cooperate or one player to defect and one to
cooperate. The distinction between these 3 classes of games is notable in Figure 8-9 which
shows the quantity of the resource at the Nash equilibrium.
By observing the trends in the simulations, the following interpretations can be drawn.
Note that in what follows, we label consumers with high values of ρi as environmentalists
and consumers with high values of νi as pro-socialists.
High degrees of environmentalism can avoid tragedies
From Figure 8-8 it can be seen that if the lower and upper levels of environmentalism (ρL
and ρH respectively) are greater than the maximum quantity of the resource (ρL+ρH > 1)
then tragedies are avoided irrespective of the level of socialism. From Figure 8-7 it can be
seen that in this case the rational outcome consists of at least one player defecting.
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Figure 8-9: Resource quantity at the Nash equilibrium for the discrete
consumption game.
High social ties compensate for low environmentalism in avoiding tragedies
From Figure 8-8 we see that if the upper and lower thresholds of νi are high, then tragedies
are avoided even in the case of low environmentalism. From Figure 8-7, this corresponds to
the Type 7 game where the rational outcome is for both individuals to cooperate.
Low environmentalism and strong social ties promote cooperation
In all plots in Figure 8-7, it can be seen that tragedies are avoided in the lower left re-
gion of the axes where both the upper and lower thresholds of ρi are low (areas with low
environmentalism). This region grows as νL and νH are increased (areas with high social
weights). From Figure 8-7 we see that this corresponds to the Type 7 game which is the only
game with the unique rational outcome of both players cooperating. Thus these conditions
promote cooperation.
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Small values of the lower environmental threshold promotes cooperation in the
presence of strong asymmetry in the social threshold levels.
This again refers to the Type 7 game which corresponds to bottom green region in the plots
of Figure 8-8. We observe that if there is a strong asymmetry between νL and νH (bottom
right plot) then the Type 7 game is realized if the lower threshold ρL is kept small enough.
Note that even though this relates to a condition on ρL, the rational outcome corresponds
to both players assuming the upper environmental threshold ρH .
High environmentalism and strong social ties are beneficial to the resource
This interpretation follows by an examination of Figure 8-9. Based on the trends of the
contours in each plot, three distinct regions are observable. The lower left region corresponds
to those games in which the rational outcome is for both players to cooperate (see Figure 8-
7), or to choose the upper thresholds ρH and νH . Here the resource level remains unchanged
by variation in ρL and νL as these values are not realized by any player in the outcome of
the game. Thus in this region the resource increases by increasing ρH and νH . The upper
right region corresponds to games in which the outcome is for both players to defect and
so the resource quantity increases for higher levels of ρL and νL and remains invariant to
changes in ρH and νH . The third intermediate region corresponds to games in which the
Nash equilibrium corresponds to one player defecting and the other cooperating. In this
region, the resource is increased by increase in both ρH ,νH and ρL,νL.
8.3 Discussion
Opinions on the effect of heterogeneity on successful resource management are highly vari-
able [197, 23, 57] and range from negative to positive to no effect at all. Our model presents
mixed results regarding heterogeneity in general, which suggests that heterogeneity is impor-
tant in different ways across different factors. Note that heterogeneity may be manifested
in either of the parameters ρi and νi, which are both different in nature. Hence, while
our model does not provide a straight-forward verdict on the role of heterogeneity, it does
contribute to the debate by indicating, that heterogeneity may need to be exposed to a clas-
sification, which is deeper than the conventional classification of economic, non-economic
and socio-cultural heterogeneity to correctly establish its correlation with successful resource
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management.
An important limitation of the model already discussed in Chapter 4 is the static nature
of the psychological attributes of the consumers. Individuals in the real world are in a
constant state of change and the human psychology is seldom static. We study the effects
of relaxing this assumption by allow the consumers from the consumption game to vary their
characteristics via the theory of learning in games, an exercise undertaken in the material
of the next chapter.
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Chapter 9
Closing the Feedback Loop
In this chapter we return to the single and dual-agent networks to study the effects of certain
feedback schemes, selected in the context of the analysis conducted in previous chapters. In
Section 9.1, we synthesize an optimal feedback law for the single agent homogeneous network
on the basis of the analysis conducted in Chapter 7. We find that the optimal feedback law is
given as the solution to a non-linear differential equation whose solution is difficult to obtain
analytically. Instead we demonstrate how the control law can be obtained numerically and
present simulations of the optimally controlled process that exhibit the expected behavior.
Later in Section 9.2, we return to the two-player consumption game of Chapter 8. We allow
the players to change their strategy in direction of the best response to the other player’s
current strategy. Such a tactic known commonly as the best response learning scheme, is a
basic variant of fictitious play learning. We find that under the selected learning scheme, the
players not only converge to the Nash equilibrium but do so in a way that avoids free-riding
behavior, a phenomenon that occurred in the open-loop system of Chapter 6.
9.1 The Optimal Feedback Law
Recall the Hamiltonian system of the OCP (P3) in Chapter 7, reproduced below
z˙(t) = −z(t)− 1
λ(t)
+ 1,
λ˙(t) = (δ+ 1)λ(t) +
2
z(t)
.
(9.1)
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In Chapter 7 we categorized the long-term behavior of the solutions of the above system
into two cases: the sustainable case (δ < 1) and the unsustainable case (δ ≥ 1). Consider
first, the sustainable case. Figure 9-1 shows the optimal region in the phase space of the
Hamiltonian system in this scenario. Recall the trajectory (z1(·), λ1(·)) that approaches the
0 1 2
-2
Γ+,+
Γ−,−
Γ−,+
Γ+,−
γ1
γ2
λ
z3 4 5
-1
-3
(zˆ, λˆ)
λ−(z)
λ+(z)
Figure 9-1: The saddle point ((ˆz), λˆ) and regions of the stable manifold
λ−(z) & λ+(z). Here δ = 0.01 < 1
point (zˆ, λˆ) from the left from the set Γ+,+. We called this trajectory the left equilibrium
trajectory, while the second trajectory (z2(·), λ2(·)) which approaches the point (zˆ, λˆ) from
the right from the set Γ−,− was called the the right equilibrium trajectory. These trajectories
are represented as the curves λ−(z) and λ+(z) respectively in the phase space.
Note that to the left of the point (zˆ, λˆ) in the set Γ+,+, the function z1(·) increases.
Therefore, while (z1(·), λ1(·)) lies in Γ+,+, the time can be uniquely expressed in terms of
the first coordinate of the trajectory (z1(·), λ1(·)) as a smooth function t = t1(z), z ∈ (0, zˆ).
Changing the time variable t = t1(z) on interval (0, zˆ), we find that the function λ−(z) =
λ1(t1(z)), z ∈ (0, zˆ), is a solution to the following differential equation on (0, zˆ):
dλ(z)
dz
=
dλ(t1(z))
dt
× dt1(z)
dz
=
λ(z) ((δ+ 1)λ(z)z + 2)
z (−λ(z)z − 1 + λ(z)) (9.2)
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with the boundary condition
lim
z→zˆ−0
λ(z) = λˆ. (9.3)
Obviously, the curve λ− = {(z, λ) : λ = λ−(z), z ∈ (0, zˆ)} corresponds to the region of the
stable manifold of (zˆ, λˆ) where z < zˆ.
Analogously, to the right of the point (zˆ, λˆ) in the set Γ−,−, while (z2(·), λ2(·)) lies in
Γ−,−, the function z2(·) decreases. Hence, the time can be uniquely expressed in terms
of the first coordinate of the trajectory (z2(·), λ2(·)) as a smooth function t = t2(z), z ∈
(zˆ,∞). Changing the time variable t = t2(z) on interval (zˆ,∞), we find that the function
λ+(z) = λ2(t2(z)), z > zˆ, is a solution to the differential equation (9.2) on (zˆ,∞)) with the
boundary condition
lim
z→zˆ+0
λ(z) = λˆ. (9.4)
As above, the curve λ+ = {(z, λ) : λ = λ+(z), z ∈ (zˆ,∞)} corresponds to the region of the
stable manifold of (zˆ, λˆ) where z > zˆ.
Using solutions λ−(·) and λ+(·) of differential equation (9.2) along with (7.44) we can
get an expression for the optimal feedback law as follows
y∗(z) =

− 1λ−(z)z , if z < zˆ,
δ+1
2 , if z = zˆ,
− 1λ+(z)z , if z > zˆ.
An analytical solution to nonlinear differential equation (9.2) is difficult to obtain. How-
ever, it is possible to solve numerically. A graphical depiction of the feedback law in the
original variables obtained by numerically solving the above ODE can be seen in Figure 9-
2a. A representative solution of (P1) incorporating this feedback law is also shown in
Figure 9-2b. The trajectories show convergence of the stock and consumption to a steady
state equilibrium.
Now consider the unsustainable case δ ≥ 1. We already saw in Chapter 7 that there ex-
ists a unique optimal pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) for this case. Figure 9-3 shows the optimal trajectory
134
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
x?(t)
y
?
(x
?
(t
))
(a) The optimal feedback law obtained by nu-
merically solving (9.2).
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(b) Solution with the optimal feedback law.
Here the initial stock x(0) = 0.1.
Figure 9-2: The optimal feedback law and a representative solution for the
case δ = 0.01 < 1.
along with the nullclines and the respective partitions of the phase space.
0 2
-1
Γˆ+,+
Γˆ−,−
Γˆ+,−
γ2
γ1
λ
z
γ3γ4
1
Figure 9-3: Optimal solution for (7.42) in the case δ = 10 ≥ 1. The
optimal pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) corresponds to curve γ4 in the phase space.
Now, since (z∗(·), y∗(·)) is unique, as a consequence the corresponding current value
adjoint variable λ∗(·) is also defined uniquely as the maximal negative solution to equation
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(see (7.42))
λ˙(t) = (δ+ 1)λ(t) +
2
z∗(t)
(9.5)
on the whole infinite time interval [0,∞). Note that the function z∗(·) increases on [0,∞).
Therefore, the time can be uniquely expressed as a smooth function t = t∗(z), z ∈ (0,∞).
Changing the time variable t = t∗(z), we find that the function λ0(z) = λ∗(t∗(z)) is a
solution to the differential equation (9.2) on the infinite interval (0,∞), similar to the case
where δ < 1.
Using solution λ0(·) of differential equation (9.2) along with (7.44) we can get an ex-
pression for the optimal feedback law as follows
y∗(z) = − 1
λ0(z)z
, z > 0.
Thus, to find the optimal feedback, we must determine for an initial state z0 > 0 the
corresponding initial state λ0 < 0 such that solution (z∗(·), λ∗(·)) of system (7.42) with
initial conditions z(0) = z0 and λ(0) = λ0 exists on [0,∞) and λ∗(·) is the maximal negative
function among all such solutions. Note that numerically finding this solution is highly
unstable since any trajectory even infinitesimally below it is not optimal and any trajectory
even infinitesimally above it is not defined on the whole time interval (and so cannot be
optimal as well). We thus do not present a representative solution for this case, as we did
for the sustainable case in Figure 9-2. Obtaining this solution would require an intricate
numerical procedure which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Complementing the analysis of this section with that of Chapter 7, let us summarize
the main findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For any initial state z0 > 0 there is a unique optimal admissible pair (z∗(·), y∗(·))
in problem (P3), and there is a unique adjoint variable ψ(·) that corresponds to (z∗(·), y∗(·))
due to the maximum principle (Theorem 4).
If δ < 1 then there is a unique equilibrium (zˆ, λˆ) (see (7.47)) in the corresponding current
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value Hamiltonian system (7.42) and the optimal synthesis is defined as follows
y∗(x) =

− 1λ−(z)z , if z < zˆ,
1+δ
2 , if z = zˆ,
− 1λ+(z)z , if z > zˆ,
where λ−(·) and λ+(·) are the unique solutions of (9.2) that satisfy the boundary condi-
tions (9.3) and (9.4) respectively. In this case optimal path z∗(·) is either decreasing, or
increasing on [0,∞), or z∗(t) ≡ zˆ, t ≥ 0, depending on the initial state z0. For any optimal
admissible pair (z∗(·), y∗(·)) we have limt→∞ z∗(t) = zˆ and limt→∞ y∗(t) = yˆ (see (7.48)).
If δ ≥ 1 then for any initial state z0 the corresponding optimal path z∗(·) in problem
(P3) is an increasing function, limt→∞ z∗(t) = ∞, and the corresponding optimal control
y∗(·) satisfies asymptotically to the Hotelling rule of optimal depletion of an exhaustible
resource, i.e. limt→∞ y∗(t) = δ. The corresponding current value adjoint variable λ∗(·) is
defined uniquely as the maximal negative solution to equation (9.5) on [0,∞). The optimal
synthesis is defined as
y∗(x) = − 1
λ0(z)z
, z > 0,
where λ0(z) = λ∗(t∗(z)) is the corresponding solution of (9.2).
9.2 Learning and Adaptation
In Chapter 6, Section 6.2 we analyzed the open-loop characteristics of the two-agent society
and observed the steady-state properties of the system. Issues such as stability of the system
and the emergence of free-riding behavior were discussed. For the stable region of the
parameter space, we where able to study the strategic interactions between the two groups
as a two-player game, formulated at steady state. In Chapter 8, we studied both continuous
and discrete time versions of the game. A focus was placed on the nature of the game, more
specifically, the difference in the rational outcome of the game and the collectively optimal
outcome. We captured this notion via the game tragicness, and elaborated the notion for
both continuous and discrete versions of the game. However, during the analysis of the
Nash equilibrium, the issue of how the agents actually reach the Nash equilibrium in the
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consumption game was not discussed. We address this question here through the theory of
learning in games [85] where the players change their strategies dynamically according to a
particular learning scheme.
A frequently studied family of learning dynamics involves players constructing a belief
of each other’s future strategies, based on the past strategies played, and playing a best
response to the predicted strategy. This form of learning dynamics is commonly known as
fictitious play [44] and is perhaps one of the most extensively studied model of learning to
date [43]. In this section we extend the game-theoretic construction to a continuous-time
repeated game and give a simple demonstration of how the agents can approach the Nash
equilibrium by employing basic best response dynamics (an elementary version of fictitious
play). This is done by examining the stability of the basic system coupled with the learning
adjustment process. Note that there exists no single result giving the learning strategy
that always achieves the Nash equilibrium in general two-player games. Rather, rigorous
proofs have been given only for specific combinations of games and learning schemes [130]
(A summary of learning in games from a control-theoretic perspective is given in [129]).
We find that the resulting equilibrium is sustainable in the sense that the consumers do
not exhibit any free-riding behavior, with the notion of free-riding being adopted from
Chapter 6.
9.2.1 Best-response Dynamics
As stated above, after previously defining the consumption game and deriving the Nash
equilibrium in Chapter 8 we consider here how the players are able to achieve that equi-
librium. We do this by allowing the players to adjust their strategies under fictitious play
learning. We employ fictitious play in its most basic form, commonly known as Best-
response Dynamics, the Best-reply Process or Cournot Adjustment. Best-response learning
is generally studied with caution as it is known to encounter several problems when applied
as a model of learning in real-world scenarios [43]. Nonetheless it remains one of the oldest,
most familiar and perhaps one of the most extensively studied models of dynamic learning
[85]. We select it here due to its relative simplicity and its ability to reveal certain dynamic
aspects of system behavior that may recur when more sophisticated models of learning are
applied.
As we will see in what follows, the dynamics of the two-community system under best-
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Figure 9-4: Block diagram for (9.6a) coupled with the learning dynamics of (9.6b). The
learning process is part of the social component of the model and is highlighted by the
shaded area.
response dynamics are such that it indeed results in the actions converging to the Nash
equilibrium. This shows that the equilibrium is reachable by the agents in a distributed
manner, however we must note that we consider only one particular learning scheme and
that the Nash equilibrium may be reachable through schemes other than the one considered
here. Under these dynamics, the system propagates as follows.
x˙ = (1− x)x− (y1 + y2)x,
y˙1 = b1(1− ν1)(x− ρ1)− b1ν1(y1 − y2),
y˙2 = b2(1− ν2)(x− ρ2)− b2ν2(y2 − y1),
(9.6a)
ρ˙1 = BR1(ρ2)− ρ1, ρ˙2 = BR2(ρ1)− ρ2, (9.6b)
where BRi = ρ˜i is given by (8.1)
1. Figure 9-4 depicts the dynamics of the overall system
1Such a formulation of resource-based games while ignoring the transient and focusing on the steady state
is not new (see [151] for similar examples). One must bear in mind however, that the conclusions drawn
under such assumptions are relevant only for large time-scales and thus caution must be practiced while
interpreting the results.
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coupled with the learning process.
Under the dynamics given by (9.6b), the groups’ strategies ρi are updated in direc-
tion of the best-response to each other’s actions. Thus by definition, if an equilibrium
(x¯, y¯1, y¯2, ρ¯1, ρ¯2) of the above system exists it must be the Nash equilibrium, since at steady
state ρ¯1 = BR1(ρ¯2) and ρ¯2 = BR2(ρ¯1). We find upon solving (9.6) for the equilibrium, that
it is given by
x¯=
2ν1ν2
ν1+ν2+2ν1ν2
, y¯1 =
ν1
ν1+ν2+2ν1ν2
,
y¯2 =
ν2
ν1+ν2+2ν1ν2
, ρ¯1 =
ν1(3ν2−ν1−2ν1ν2)
(1−ν1)(ν1+ν2+2ν1ν2) ,
ρ¯2 =
ν2(3ν1−ν2−2ν2ν1)
(1−ν2)(ν2+ν1+2ν2ν1) ,
(9.7)
where ρ¯1 and ρ¯2 indeed constitute the Nash equilibrium as given in (8.2). Note that in
(9.7) both consumptions are positive i.e., y¯1 > 0, y¯2 > 0 which constitutes a self-reliant
equilibrium as per the notion defined in Chapter 6. This is in contrast to the equilibrium
(6.5) of the open-loop system, which permits the qualitatively different steady state y¯i >
0, y¯j < 0 (the free-riding phenomenon). Thus in a society following best-response dynamics,
the consuming groups do not exhibit free-riding behavior as opposed to the open-loop system
(6.4) where the strategies are specified as exogenous parameters.
9.2.2 Convergence to the Nash Equilibrium
In order to find whether the Nash equilibrium is reachable or not, we need to explore the
stability properties of system (9.6). The global stability of (9.6a) has already been discussed
in Chapter 6, Section 6.2 for constant ρi’s. Since the subsystem (9.6b) does not depend
on (9.6a), the stability of the overall system (9.6) can then be deduced by analyzing (9.6b)
separately. More precisely, if ρ1 and ρ2 are guaranteed to reach a fixed point, then they
may be treated as constants in (9.6a) which is known to be globally stable if inequality
(6.16) holds. Thus, once (9.6b) reaches its steady-state, (9.6a) will also converge to its
equilibrium (provided (6.16) holds) regardless of where the system was when the steady-
state was achieved. Since (9.6b) is linear in ρ1 and ρ2, the stability can be deduced by
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analyzing the eigenvalues, which are given as
λ1,2 = −1±
√
(ν1 − ν2)2 + 4ν21ν22
4ν1ν2
. (9.8)
It is obvious from (9.8), that both λ1 and λ2 are real. However, λ1 may be positive which
corresponds to unstable learning dynamics. It can be seen from Figure 9-5a that the learning
dynamics are stable in a major area of the parameter space. Combining this information
with the stability condition for (6.4), the overall criterion for stability of (9.6) constitutes
the following two conditions
(b1 − b2)(b1ν1 − b2ν2) + 4b1ν1b2ν2 > 0, (9.9a)
(ν1 − ν2)2 + 4ν21ν22 − 4ν1ν2 < 0. (9.9b)
This shows that the Nash Equilibrium is reachable via best-response dynamics, if (9.9a)
and (9.9b) hold collectively.
9.2.3 Overcoming Free-riding Behavior
Figures 9-5b and 9-5c illustrate the learning process for two different points in the parameter
space. Due to (9.7), when ν1 = ν2 (Figure 9-5b) then the resource at steady state x¯ equals
ρ¯1 = ρ¯2. However when ν1 6= ν2 (Figure 9-5c), the resource x follows the group with lower
social relevance νi. The case depicted in Figure 9-5c is particularly interesting and merits
additional interpretation. As seen from the long-term behavior of the graphs, and from the
mathematical form of the equilibrium (9.7), higher social-relevance νi implies a lower level
of environmentalism ρi and a higher steady state consumption y¯i. This is in contrast to
what the steady-state of the open-loop system (6.4) predicts i.e., cooperative individuals are
usually associated with higher levels of environmental concern, and also consume less than
non-cooperative individuals on average. Indeed this is what has been observed through
different social-psychological studies as well [128]. The closed-loop system (9.6) however
predicts the behavior of the consumers if they act rationally according to the game defined
by (9.6). This highlights the relevance of game theory to distributed control problems,
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(a) The positivity of
λ1 as given by (9.8).
(b) Learning process for ν1 =
ν2 = 0.5.
(c) Learning process for ν1 =
0.75 and ν2 = 0.25.
Figure 9-5: left: The region of stability for (9.6b). The cross-hairs correspond to points
selected for the subsequent simulations. center: The learning process for identical νi’s.
right: The learning process for different νi’s. In both simulations b1 = b2 = 1, x(0) = 0.5,
y1(0) = y2(0) = 0, ρ1(0) = 0.8 and ρ2(0) = 0.2. Note that since b1 = b2, (9.9a) holds true
for all ν1.ν2.
whereby the selected payoffs and learning scheme may be treated as design principles in the
bigger problem of social control [130, 127] in order to obtain desired behavior. Indeed as
we find here, the selected scheme eliminates the phenomenon of free-riding, which poses a
significant challenge in the effective governance of natural resources [151].
9.3 Discussion
In this chapter we have studied the basic consumer networks under feedback mechanisms
inspired from the analysis conducted in preceding chapters. Firstly, we devised the optimal
feedback law for the single-group network for both sustainable and unsustainable cases. We
also discussed how to obtain it numerically for both cases and demonstrated the results
through a numerical simulation. Secondly, we applied the theory of learning in games to
study the effects of the consumers adapting their characteristics in the two-agent network.
The relevance of the Nash equilibrium has been demonstrated by observing the dynamics of
agents employing best-response learning dynamics. We hope this serves to instigate inquiry
into other complex learning schemes that may also converge to the Nash equilibrium. We
also found that while the consumers may indulge in free-riding in the open-loop system,
the adoption of best-response learning eliminates this phenomenon. These findings may
potentially be used to inform policy making for natural resource management, especially
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since the study is based on one of the few fully justified mathematical models (at least to
our knowledge) of socio-ecological couplings.
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Chapter 10
Moving Towards Generically
Structured Networks
The analysis of Chapters 6 – 9 has focused on the basic single and dual agent consumer
networks. We now consider the full n-agent network as an open problem. Due to the large
dimension and non-linear nature of the system, replicating the analysis of the previous
chapters appears not to be straight forward. Here we present the fixed point calculations for
two structured n-agent populations using an inductive rather than constructive approach.
The exercise highlights the difficulties to be expected for analyzing the behavior of the
generically structured network. In the end, we indicate how the network topology may
influence the system dynamics via the “Laplacian” of the influence network.
10.1 Static Characteristics for Structured Networks
10.1.1 Well-mixed population
Here we assume that the consuming population is well-mixed, i.e., all consumers are con-
nected and exert a uniform influence on each other. Thus the network constitutes a complete
graph and the dynamics are given by
x˙ = (1− x)x−
n∑
i=1
yi x (10.1a)
y˙i = bi
(1− νi)(x− ρi) + νi
n− 1
n∑
j=1
yj − yi
 (10.1b)
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where i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. We represent any possible equilibria by (x¯, y¯1, . . . , y¯n).
First let us note the following assumptions that we will invoke at various points in the
analysis that follows
(A1) Maximally social society - All consumers carry the maximum possible social weight
i.e.,
ν1 = ν2 = · · · = νn = 1
(A2) Minimally social society - All consumers carry the minimum possible social weight
i.e.,
ν1 = ν2 = · · · = νn = 0
(A3) Maximally environmental society - All consumers manifest the maximum possible
level of environmentalism i.e., ρ1 = ρ2 = · · · = ρn = 1
(A4) Minimally environmental society - All consumers manifest the minimum possible
level of environmentalism i.e., ρ1 = ρ2 = · · · = ρn = 0
Before presenting the equilibrium for system (10.1), we require the following intermediate
results
Lemma 4. If (A1) holds, there exist an infinite number of equilibria for system (10.1).
Proof. Substituting the assertion of (A1) in (10.1b) and solving for y˙i = 0 gives the following
linear system
(n− 1)y¯i −
∑
j 6=i
yj = 0
In matrix notation, the row reduced echelon form for this system is given by

1 0 . . . 0 −1
0 1 . . . 0 −1
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 −1
0 0 . . . 0 0


y¯1
y¯2
...
y¯n−1
y¯n

=

0
0
...
0
0

From here, the solution for the consumption efforts is given by y¯1 = y¯2 = . . . y¯n = y¯ where
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y¯ ∈ R. Substituting this result in (10.1a) we see that either x¯ = 0 or x¯ = 1− ny. Note that
due to (10.1a), x¯ = 1 − ny constitutes a valid equilibrium only if y ≤ 1/n. This completes
the proof.
Lemma 5. If (A2) holds, there exist an infinite number of equilibria for system (10.1) only
when ρ1 = ρ2 = · · · = ρn = ρ (where ρ ∈ [0, 1]). Otherwise no equilibrium exists.
Proof. Substituting the assertion of (A2) in (10.1) gives us the following system
x˙ = (1− x)x−
n∑
i=1
yi x
y˙i = bi (x− ρi)
It is easy to see that for the case x¯ = 0, the dynamics for yi are given by y˙i = −biρi.
Thus an equilibrium can exist in this case only if ρi = 0 ∀ i. In fact, the equilibrium would
consist of the single state x¯ = y¯1 = · · · = y¯n = 0. For the case x¯ = 1 −
∑n
i=1 y¯i, we obtain
the following system for the steady state efforts
n∑
i=1
y¯i = 1− ρi
This system is solvable only when ρi = ρ ∀ i. In this case the steady state effort is given
by x¯ = ρ and
∑n
i=1 y¯i = 1− ρ. Otherwise no equilibrium exists.
Thus, if ρ1 = ρ2 = · · · = ρn = ρ, then the steady state constitutes all points where∑n
i=1 y¯i = 1 − ρ with x¯ = ρ. In the event that ρ = 0 there also exists an additional
equilibrium consisting of the single state x¯ = y¯1 = · · · = y¯n = 0. This completes the
proof.
Lemma 6. In the event that none of (A1), (A2) or (A4) hold true, there can exist no
equilibrium for system (10.1) with x¯ = 0.
Proof. Assuming x¯ = 0 and solving (10.1b) for y˙i = 0 leads to the following system of
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equations

−(n− 1) 1 . . . 1
1 −(n− 1) . . . 1
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 . . . −(n− 1)


y¯1
y¯2
...
y¯n
 = (n− 1)

(1−ν1)ρ1
ν1
(1−ν2)ρ2
ν2
...
(1−νn)ρn
νn

It is easy to check that the rank of the coefficient matrix is equal to n− 1. Adding all rows
to the last one, gives us the following equivalent form of the equation

−(n− 1) 1 . . . 1 1
1 −(n− 1) . . . 1 1
...
...
. . .
...
...
1 1 . . . −(n− 1) 1
0 0 . . . 0 0


y¯1
y¯2
...
y¯n−1
y¯n

= (n− 1)

(1−ν1)ρ1
ν1
(1−ν2)ρ2
ν2
...
(1−νn−1)ρn−1
νn−1∑n
i=1
(1−νi)ρi
νi

which means that a solution can exist only if
∑n
i=1
(1−νi)ρi
νi
= 0. Since none of (A1),(A2)
or (A4) are true, (1−νi)ρiνi > 0 ∀ i and so,
∑n
i=1
(1−νi)ρi
νi
6= 0. Thus no equilibrium exists in
this scenario.
Lemma 7. In the event that none of (A1), (A2), (A3) or (A4) hold true, there is a unique
equilibrium for system (10.1) with x¯ = 1−∑ni=1 y¯i. This equilibrium will exist only if there
are at least n− 1 consumers with positive social weight (νi > 0)
Proof. We know from (10.1a) that x˙ = 0 if x +
∑n
i=1 yi = 1. Substituting this in (10.1b)
and solving for y˙ = 0, gives us the following system of equations
(n− 1)y¯i + (n− 1− nνi)
∑
j 6=i
y¯j = (n− 1)(1− νi)(1− ρi)
In matrix form

(n− 1) (n− 1− nν1) . . . (n− 1− nν1)
(n− 1− nν2) (n− 1) . . . (n− 1− nν2)
...
...
. . .
...
(n− 1− nνn) (n− 1− nνn) . . . (n− 1)


y¯1
y¯2
...
y¯n
 = (n− 1)

(1− ν1)(1− ρ1)
(1− ν2)(1− ρ2)
...
(1− νn)(1− ρn)

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Since neither of (A1) nor (A3) hold true, the vector on the RHS does not equate to zero.
Thus for the purpose of this proof, it suffices to show that the coefficient matrix for the
above equation is full rank. We do this by observing the determinant, which is given as
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(n− 1) (n− 1− nν1) . . . (n− 1− nν1)
(n− 1− nν2) (n− 1) . . . (n− 1− nν2)
...
...
. . .
...
(n− 1− nνn) (n− 1− nνn) . . . (n− 1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= n
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

It can be seen that in order for the determinant to be non-zero, there cannot be more than
one consumer with social weight νi equal to zero. In this event, the coefficient matrix above
will always be full rank, and thus a unique equilibrium will always exist for system (10.1).
This concludes the proof.
In light of the new condition obtained by Lemma 7, we define the following assumption
(A5) Sufficiently social society - There exists no more than one consumer in the popu-
lation who carries social weight νi equal to 0.
Corollary 1. If (A5) does not hold true, then there exists no equilibrium for system (10.2)
Proof. The corollary follows directly from Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 .
Now that all the pathological cases have been delineated, we are ready to complete the
specification of the equilibrium for system (10.1).
Lemma 8. In the event that (A5) holds, and none of (A1)-(A4) hold true, the equilibrium
for system (10.1) is given by
x¯ =
∑
i
ρi(νi − 1)∏
j 6=i
νj

n
∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 (10.2a)
y¯i =
1
n
+
ρi(νi − 1)
(1− n)∑
j 6=i
 ∏
k 6=i,j
νk
+ n(n− 2)∏
j 6=i
νj
− (1− n + nνi)∑
j 6=i
ρj(νj − 1) ∏
k 6=i,j
νk

n
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

(10.2b)
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where i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Proof. We begin by substituting the expression given by (10.2) in (10.1a). Since x¯ 6= 0, in
order for x˙ to be zero, it must be true that x¯ +
∑
y¯i = 1. Summing equations (10.2a) and
(10.2b) over all i gives us
x¯ +
n∑
i=1
y¯i
= n
(
1
n
)
+
n∑
i=1
n
∏
j 6=i
νj+(1−n)
∑
j 6=i
 ∏
k 6=i,j
νk
+n(n−2)∏
j 6=i
νj−
∑
j 6=i
(1−n+nνj)
∏
k 6=i,j
νk
n
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 ρi(νi−1)
= 1 +
n∑
i=1
n
∏
j 6=i
νj+n(n−2)
∏
j 6=i
νj−n
∑
j 6=i
∏
k 6=i
νk
+(1−n)∑
j 6=i
 ∏
k 6=i,j
νk
−∑
j 6=i
(1−n)
∏
k 6=i,j
νk
n
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 ρi(νi−1)
= 1 +
n∑
i=1
n(n−1)
∏
j 6=i
νj−n(n−1)
∏
k 6=i
νk+(1−n)
∑
j 6=i
 ∏
k 6=i,j
νk
−(1−n)∑
j 6=i
 ∏
k 6=i,j
νk

n
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 ρi(νi−1)
= 1 +
n∑
i=1
(n(n−1)−n(n−1))
∏
j 6=i
νj+(1−n−(1−n))
∑
j 6=i
 ∏
k 6=i,j
νk

n
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 ρi(νi−1)
= 1 +
n∑
i=1
(0)
∏
j 6=i
νj+(0)
∑
j 6=i
 ∏
k 6=i,j
νk

n
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
ρi(νi−1)
= 1
which shows that x˙ indeed vanishes at the point given by (10.2). Next we need to show
that y˙i also vanishes at (10.2). Since we have just shown that x¯ +
∑
y¯i = 1, we can use this
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relation to simplify (10.1b), prior to substitution of (10.2). We write (10.1b) as follows
y˙i = bi
(1− νi)(x− ρi)− νiyi + νi
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
yj

= bi
(1− νi)(x− ρi)− νi
n− 1yi − νiyi +
νi
n− 1
n∑
j=1
yj

= bi
(1− νi)(x− ρi)− nνi
n− 1yi +
νi
n− 1
n∑
j=1
yj

While evaluating at (10.2), since x¯ +
∑
y¯i = 1, we can substitute
∑n
j=1 y¯i = 1− x¯. Making
this substitution, we get
y˙i|(x¯,y¯i) = bi
(
(1− νi)(x¯− ρi)− nνi
n− 1y¯i +
νi
n− 1(1− x¯)
)
rearranging the terms gives us
y˙i|(x¯,y¯i) = bi
((
1− nνi
n− 1
)
x¯− nνi
n− 1y¯i − (1− νi)ρi +
νi
n− 1
)
now substituting x¯ and y¯i from (10.2)
y˙i|(x¯,y¯i) =
(
1− nνi
n− 1
)∑
j
ρj(νj − 1) ∏
k 6=j
νk

n
∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 −
nνi
n− 1
(
1
n
)
+
ρiνi(νi − 1)
∑
j 6=i
 ∏
k 6=i,j
νk

n
∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

−
ρiνi(νi − 1)
n(n− 2)∏
j 6=i
νj

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 +
νi(1− n + nνi)
∑
j 6=i
ρj(νj − 1) ∏
k 6=i,j
νk

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

− (1− νi)ρi + νi
n− 1
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simplifying
y˙i|(x¯,y¯i) =
(
1− nνi
n− 1
)∑
j
ρj(νj − 1) ∏
k 6=j
νk

n
∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 +
ρi(νi − 1)
∑
j 6=i
∏
k 6=j
νk

n
∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

−
ρi(νi − 1)
n(n− 2)∏
j
νj

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 +
(1− n + nνi)
∑
j 6=i
ρj(νj − 1) ∏
k 6=j
νk

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

− (1− νi)ρi
=
(n− 1− nνi)
∑
j 6=i
ρj(νj − 1) ∏
k 6=j
νk

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 +
(1− n + nνi)
∑
j 6=i
ρj(νj − 1) ∏
k 6=j
νk

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

+
ρi(νi − 1)
∑
j 6=i
∏
k 6=j
νk

n
∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 −
ρi(νi − 1)
n(n− 2)∏
j
νj

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

+
ρi(νi − 1) (n− 1− nνi)
∏
k 6=i
νk
(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 − (1− νi)ρi
=
(n− 1− nνi − (n− 1 + nνi))
∑
j 6=i
ρj(νj − 1) ∏
k 6=j
νk

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 − (1− νi)ρi
+
ρi(νi − 1)
(n− 1)∑
j 6=i
∏
k 6=j
νk
− n(n− 2)∏
j
νj + (n− 1− nνi)
∏
k 6=i
νk

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

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=(0)
∑
j 6=i
ρj(νj − 1) ∏
k 6=j
νk

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
 − (1− νi)ρi
+
ρi(νi − 1)
(n− 1)∑
j 6=i
∏
k 6=j
νk
− n(n− 2)∏
j
νj + (n− 1)
∏
k 6=i
νk − n
∏
j
νj

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

= 0− (1− νi)ρi +
ρi(νi − 1)
(n− 1)∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk
− n(n− 1)∏
j
νj

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

=(νi − 1)ρi −
ρi(νi − 1)(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

(n− 1)
n∏
j
νj −
∑
j
∏
k 6=j
νk

= (νi − 1)ρi − (νi − 1)ρi = 0
Thus both x˙ and y˙i vanish at (10.2), which shows that it is indeed the equilibrium for
system (10.1). This completes the proof.
10.1.2 Star population
Now we assume that the population is structured so that there exists a consumer i∗ that is
connected to every other consumer, and that no other connections exist. Thus the network
constitutes a star graph and the dynamics are given by
x˙ = (1− x)x−
n∑
i=1
yi x (10.3a)
y˙1 = b1
(1− ν1)(x− ρ1) + ν1
n− 1
n∑
j=1
yj − y1
 (10.3b)
y˙i = bi ((1− νi)(x− ρi) + νi(y1 − yi)) i 6= 1 (10.3c)
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where i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, and the indices are ordered so that i∗ = 1. We represent any possible
equilibria by (x¯, y¯1, . . . , y¯n).
Before presenting the equilibrium for system 10.3, we require the following intermediate
results
Lemma 9. If (A1) holds, there exist two equilibria for system (10.3). The first equilibrium
(x¯, y¯1, . . . , y¯n) is given by (1, 0, . . . , 0) and the second equilibrium is given by (0, 0, . . . , 0).
Proof. Substituting the assertion of (A1) in (10.3b) and (10.3c), and solving for y˙i = 0 gives
the following linear system
(n− 1)y¯1 −
n∑
j=2
yj = 0
y¯i − y¯1 = 0 i 6= 1
it is easy to see that y¯1 = . . . y¯n = 0 is the only solution to the above equations. Substituting
this in (10.3a) and solving for x˙ = 0 yields x¯ = 1 or x¯ = 0. Thus (1, 0, . . . , 0) and (0, 0, . . . , 0)
are the two equilibria for this case.
Lemma 10. If (A2) holds, there exist an infinite number of equilibria for system (10.3)
only when ρ1 = ρ2 = · · · = ρn = ρ (where ρ ∈ [0, 1]). Otherwise no equilibrium exists.
Proof. Substituting the assertion of (A2) in (10.3) gives us the following system
x˙ = (1− x)x−
n∑
i=1
yi x
y˙i = bi (x− ρi)
Following the same argument as that presented in proof of Lemma 5, we see that if
ρ1 = ρ2 = · · · = ρn = ρ, then the steady state constitutes all points where
∑n
i=1 y¯i = 1− ρ
with x¯ = ρ. In the event that ρ = 0 there also exists an additional equilibrium consisting
of the single state x¯ = y¯1 = · · · = y¯n = 0. This completes the proof.
Lemma 11. In the event that none of (A1), (A2) or (A4) hold true, there can exist no
equilibrium for system (10.3) with x¯ = 0.
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Proof. Assuming x¯ = 0 and solving (10.3b) & (10.3c) for y˙i = 0 leads to the following
system of equations

−(n− 1) 1 1 . . . 1
−1 1 0 . . . 0
−1 0 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
−1 0 0 . . . 1


y¯1
y¯2
y¯3
...
y¯n

=

−(n−1)(1−ν1)ρ1
ν1
(1−ν2)ρ2
ν2
(1−ν3)ρ3
ν3
...
(1−νn)ρn
νn

It is easy to check that the rank of the coefficient matrix is equal to n− 1. Subtracting all
subsequent rows from the first row, gives the following equivalent form of the equation

0 0 0 . . . 0
−1 1 0 . . . 0
−1 0 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
−1 0 0 . . . 1


y¯1
y¯2
y¯3
...
y¯n

=

−(n−1)(1−ν1)ρ1
ν1
−∑nj=2 (1−νj)ρjνj
(1−ν2)ρ2
ν2
(1−ν3)ρ3
ν3
...
(1−νn)ρn
νn

which means that a solution can exist only if (n−1)(1−ν1)ρ1ν1 +
∑n
j=2
(1−νj)ρj
νj
= 0. Since none
of (A1),(A2) or (A4) are true, (1−νi)ρiνi > 0 ∀ i and so,
(n−1)(1−ν1)ρ1
ν1
+
∑n
j=2
(1−νj)ρj
νj
6= 0.
Thus no equilibrium exists in this scenario.
Lemma 12. If none of (A1),(A2) or (A4) hold true, the equilibrium for system (10.3) is
given by
x¯ =
(n− 1)ρ1(ν1 − 1)
∏
j 6=1
νj +
∑
i
ρi(νi − 1)∏
j 6=i
νj

2(n− 1)
∏
j
νj −
∑
j 6=1
∏
k 6=j
νk
− (n− 1) ∏
k 6=1
νk
(10.4a)
y¯1 =
1
n
+
(n−1)ρ1(ν1−1)
−∑
j 6=1
 ∏
k 6=1,j
νk
+(n−2) ∏
k 6=1
νk
−(1−n+nν1)∑
j 6=1
ρj(νj−1) ∏
k 6=1,j
νk

n
2(n− 1)∏
j
νj −
∑
j 6=1
∏
k 6=j
νk
− (n− 1) ∏
k 6=1
νk

(10.4b)
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y¯i =
1
n
−
(n− 1)(−1 + ν1)
∑
j 6=i
 ∏
k 6=1,k 6=j
νk
− (n− 1) ∏
k 6=1,k 6=i
νk + 2
∏
j 6=1
νk
ρ1
n
2(n− 1)∏
j
νj −
∑
j 6=1
∏
k 6=j
νk
− (n− 1) ∏
k 6=1
νk

+
(−1 + νi)
−n∑
j 6=1
 ∏
k 6=i,j
νk
− (n− 1)2 ∏
k 6=i,1
νk + 2n(n− 2)
∏
k 6=i
νk
ρi
n
2(n− 1)∏
j
νj −
∑
j 6=1
∏
k 6=j
νk
− (n− 1) ∏
k 6=1
νk

−
∑
j 6=i,j 6=1
(−1 + νj)
−n ∏
k 6=i,j
νk − (n− 1)
∏
k 6=1,j
νk + 2n
∏
k 6=j
νk
ρj
n
2(n− 1)∏
j
νj −
∑
j 6=1
∏
k 6=j
νk
− (n− 1) ∏
k 6=1
νk

(10.4c)
where i ∈ {2, . . . ,n} and j, k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Proof. The proof follows by substituting the expressions of x¯, y¯1 and y¯i, i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}
from (10.4) in (10.3). Following the same steps as in Lemma 8, it can be found that the
derivatives x˙, y˙1 and y˙i i ∈ {2, . . . ,n} indeed equate to zero. Since none of (A1),(A2) or
(A4) are true, (10.4a) is the unique equilibrium for system (10.3).
10.2 System Dynamics and the Role of the Laplacian
Consider the original system of the consumer network reproduced as follows from (4.3)
x˙ = (1− x)x− x
n∑
i=1
yi,
y˙i = bi
(
αi(x− ρi)− νi
n∑
j=1
ωij (yi − yj)
)
.
(10.5)
Recall from Chapter 5 that the influence that j has on i’s consumption is given by biνiωij .
Let us represent this influence by γij = biνiωij . The system may now be written as
x˙ = (1− x)x− x
n∑
i=1
yi,
y˙i = biαi(x− ρi)−
n∑
j=1
γij (yi − yj) ,
(10.6)
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-
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+
×
×
~c
-
Figure 10-1: Block diagram showing the coupled resource and consump-
tion dynamics.
where the weights γij directly define the influence network which is different from the
social network that the ωij ’s represent. The consumption dynamics can now be written in
compact form as

y˙1
...
y˙n
 =

b1α1
...
bnαn
x−

d−1 −γ12 . . . −γ1n
−γ21 d−2 . . . −γ2n
...
...
. . .
...
−γn1 −γn2 . . . d−n


y1
...
yn
−

b1α1ρ1
...
bnαnρn
 (10.7)
where d−i =
∑n
j=1 γij is the in-degree of node i in the influence network. We may represent
this system as
~˙y = ~ax− L ~y −~c (10.8)
where the definitions of the matrices can be seen from (10.7). L is the Laplacian matrix
[60]. The coupled resource and consumption dynamics can now be represented as follows
x˙ = f(x, ~y) =
[
1− x− 1T~y]x
~˙y = ~ax− L ~y −~c
(10.9)
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It is worth noting here that the matrix L contains all information about the network topol-
ogy. This is a system in which the network topology (in the form of L) appears explicitly
in the dynamical model. Thus if there exists a relation between the poles of (10.9) and the
eigenvalues of L then it may be translated into a relation between the network topology and
overall behavior of the system. Appendix C gives a short demonstration of how network
structure effects the eigenvalues of the Laplacian.
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Chapter 11
Epilogue
This chapter is intended as a commentary on the work that has been presented in this thesis.
More specifically, the material in this chapter reinforces the arguments of the first part of the
dissertation, in hindsight of the more technical subject matter presented thereafter. After
revisiting the cybernetic ideology and its potential with respect to the control of socio-
ecological systems, we provide a summary of conclusions for the dissertation. We then
explore future avenues to expand the work and also contemplate the prospects offered by a
few systems-theoretic tools developed by the controls faction of the engineering community.
11.1 Revisiting the Cybernetic Picture
Norbert Weiner, through his discourse [206, 205], intended for cybernetics to embrace uni-
versal principles, independent of system domain, that were applicable to both man-made
and living systems [183]. He also succeeded in demonstrating that the cybernetic principles
could be applied fruitfully, at least in theory, to all systems, independent of context. Unfor-
tunately, Weiner’s time came and went, and slowly, the face of cybernetics was lost under
its mainstream descendants of control and communication. Indeed in the present era, as
Thomas Rid puts it [164], the prefix “cyber” is commonly slapped without comprehension,
in front of other terms (as in “cyberspace” or “cyberwar” ) to make them sound more
technologically intensive, more cutting edge, more compelling – and sometimes more ironic.
The principles of cybernetics are now becoming increasingly relevant due to the ever-
growing involvement of human beings in technological applications. While the population
bomb is constantly testing the sustaining boundaries of our planet, mankind has come
158
to realize the intricate relationship between our economic system, the environment and
technology. One cannot be changed independently of the others and so, an integrative
approach is required to seize the holy grail of sustainable development. In this dissertation,
we have argued that the principles of cybernetics may provide the necessary language for
such an approach, at least for the effective governance of our natural resources, an absolute
necessity for sustainability.
Before framing the resource governance problem, it is important to comprehend the
criticality of the issue and to realize that it is possible to address it in a distributed and
scalable manner. This has been our focus in Chapter 1. In Chapters 2 and 3 we discussed
the relevance of the cybernetic approach to natural resource governance from two differ-
ent perspectives. Firstly, scientists already working on global issues in coupled human and
natural systems have employed the systems theoretical approach in various forms with dif-
ferent levels of abstraction and in varying contexts. However there is much potential in
employing the cybernetic tradition which is still largely untapped, especially due to the
prospects that technological solutions now offer regarding various environmental challenges
of global concern. Secondly, engineers have actively been applying the cybernetic principles
in the form of feedback control and communication to a diverse range of applications which
have recently begun to take on more human-centric implementations. The age of “smarts”
is quickly being ushered in, with the dream of smart cities and the internet of everything
seemingly within grasp. We argue that the cybernetic method offers an integrative lan-
guage in which the engineers are able to view complex CHANS through the same lens that
they are so accustomed to view their machines through, and thus account for human and
environmental factors more effectively.
The idea of viewing natural systems as machines is not new. Wescoat for instance,
describes in [204] how the British engineers took inspiration from the steam engine while
laying out the design of the irrigation system in colonial India. However, while the physical
principles of matter and energy have largely guided this “mechanistic” world view [96] in
prior times, the cybernetic world view includes information as a new fundamental pillar,
the relevance of which has grown immensely in recent times. Although we have not talked
explicitly about the role of information in cybernetic systems, its immense significance is
undeniable [139, Part III] and has perhaps already been grasped by the reader. Consider
the control loop depicted in Figure 11-1. Each arrow in the figure represents a flow of infor-
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Figure 11-1: The cybernetic picture revisited. This figure has first appeared in
Chapter 3 and has been reproduced here for the sake of readability.
mation in one sense or another. The sensors send information about the state of the system
to the “controller” or decision maker. Based on the information received from the sensors
and the ultimate objective of the system, the decision maker then sends information about
the correcting action to the actuator. The action of the actuator and the stimulus received
by the sensor also have interpretations as information being conveyed to and received from
the system respectively (see [206, Chapters III, VII] and [63]).
It is also worth noting that the concepts of cybernetics are not new for the ecological and
social sciences communities. In 1979 James Lovelock introduced the Gaia1 hypothesis as a
new perspective of the ecosphere [123]. Gaia is envisioned as a complex entity that includes
all of Earth’s biosphere, atmosphere, oceans and soil. The aggregate of these components
constitutes a complex feedback system whose sole objective is to sustain an environment
that is optimal for life. Although the Gaia hypothesis has been met with much controversy
[177] it has served as a precursor to the more rigorous discipline of geo-cybernetics [172],
that has much overlap with the Earth Systems Analysis framework referred to in Table 2.1,
1The term Gaia is a reference to the Greek Earth Goddess.
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and envisions control strategies at a planetary level.
On the other hand, the cybernetics ideology has also seeped into the social sciences,
giving birth to the discipline of socio-cybernetics [125] that is concerned with the applica-
tion of cybernetic models to the social and human sciences. Anton [5] identifies over 15
research directions for socio cybernetics which include the cybernetics of education, social
accountability, cyberspace and the internet, social networks, democratization, management
of complex firms, trust and problem solving. In particular, the application of cybernetics
to management and organization goes back more than half a century [29] and management
cybernetics is, by now a well studied and established domain.
Even though cybernetics has been applied separately to systems originating from both
ecological and social sciences, natural resource systems pose a unique challenge for the appli-
cation of cybernetic models as they span across both social and ecological disciplines. The
addition of a third aspect in the form of technology and its recent accentuation in CHANS
makes the challenge extremely relevant to the controls community in particular. As we have
seen in the content of the dissertation, the application of cybernetics to NRM involves the
study of human psychology, the exercise of ecological modeling and an understanding of
social interactions, all of which are beyond the conventional domain of the control sciences.
Although we have argued in support of the relevance of cybernetic methods to NRM for the
social and ecological communities, the main focus of the dissertation is geared towards the
engineering community. We have argued that the technical systems envisioned for social
and environmental control cannot be successfully realized if the human aspect is not prop-
erly accounted for. We hope that through this dissertation we have been able to depict, at
least to some extent, how this may be achieved.
11.2 Summary of Main Findings
Here we present a summary of the main findings for the technical part of the dissertation.
The language of cybernetics translates all processes into mathematical models. Whether
the models are conceptual or data-driven, they are always understood to lie at the heart of
the regulating mechanism [62]. In Chapter 4, we presented a mathematical model of con-
sumer decision making, developed from social psychological research in consumer behavior.
The model is agent-based with n equations with n consumers and one additional equation
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for the resource dynamics. Understandably, the dimension of such a system makes it less
tractable, especially due to the non-linearity of the resource dynamics, for large consuming
populations. In Chapter 5 we addressed this problem by introducing block-models of re-
source consumption where the dynamics describe not the consumption of individuals, but
the aggregate consumption of tightly knitted communities with uniform characteristics. We
found under certain structural assumptions, that the lumped parameter model has the same
form as the original model and thus in the subsequent analysis, we are able to understand
a consuming agent as either comprising a single individual, or groups of individuals with
homogeneous characteristics. Referring to the cybernetic picture of Figure 11-1, this per-
tains to understanding the process, how its dynamics are dependent on the various social
and ecological factors and the conditions under which the selected model of is valid.
Chapters 6 – 10 presented various applications and extensions of the developed model.
Chapter 6 discussed the open-loop characteristics of the system at different levels of abstrac-
tion. We saw how a mathematically straight-forward exercise such as steady-state analysis
was able to yield profound insights on phenomena such as free-riding behavior. We found
that high preference to social information and homogeneity in the levels of environmental
concern promoted self-reliant behavior. Where there was asymmetry in the environmental-
ism, the relatively environmental group showed a tendency to subsidize the consumption
of the other group. This tendency decreased with increasing levels of preference to social
behavior. We then studied the society as an aggregated single entity in Chapter 7 and
studied favorable consumption patterns via the application of optimal control theory. This
required us to define a mathematical notion of collective welfare and sustainable develop-
ment, which may require considerable debate while interpreting the results for real-world
settings (refer to the “decide” block in Figure 11-1). We found the optimal consumption
path to be sustainable if the discounting of future consumption was below a certain level,
which corresponds to a long-term planning policy in a real-world setting. We also devised
the optimal feedback law in both the sustainable and unsustainable cases. In order to
analyze the interactions between groups and how they might strategically be exploited by
the consuming agents, we analyzed the most basic network (the diad) in a game-theoretic
framework in Chapter 8. The positive role of environmental concern and preference to so-
cial information was explored along with the mixed role of heterogeneity in the consuming
society, prompting for a deeper categorization of heterogeneity beyond conventional classi-
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fications. We developed a notion of tragedy in the consumption game and saw that high
preference to social information and high levels of environmentalism were able to reduce
the game “tragicness”. In Chapter 9, we returned to the single and dual agent networks of
Chapters 7 & 8 and discussed the effects of feedback, via the optimal feedback law for the
single agent case, and via the theory of learning in games for the dual agent case where we
saw how the selected learning scheme discouraged free-riding behavior in the long-run. We
also saw in the formulated scenario that the agents were able to reach the Nash equilibrium
via simple best response dynamics. Finally, Chapter 10 intended as a possible extension,
included calculations for the equilibrium of the full n agent network for two different types
of structured populations, namely the complete network and the star network. In the end
it was discussed that the topology of the network may possibly play a significant role in
determining the overall behavior of the system via the Laplacian. If such an exercise is un-
dertaken, it may give an indication as to what type of network structures are “sustainable”
in our model of natural resource consumption.
11.3 Open Problems and Future Avenues
Here we describe a few possibilities for further research. Note that there exist some natural
extensions to the work of this dissertation that have already been discussed in the preceding
chapters. These mostly pertain to the relaxation of assumptions and the consideration of
additional effects both from within and outside the system. However the discussion below
is related to certain aspects not covered in the dissertation, that we feel must be covered in
the envisioned cybernetic foundation for natural resource governance.
11.3.1 A Rigorous Definition of Sustainability
Given the state of the current landscape in sustainability science, aspiring for a rigorous,
agreed-upon definition of sustainability is perhaps too optimistic at this point. However
consciously or unconsciously, it remains the underlying goal of any management scheme for
natural resource systems. The definition of sustainable development given by the Brundt-
land Commission [47] is as follows : “sustainable development is development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs”. While this definition of sustainability has been agreed upon and adopted by
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many nations, a clear, rigorous definition is still not evident. The different perspectives on
sustainability coming from various disciplines further aggravates the issue. For instance, in
biology sustainability means avoiding extinction and learning to survive and reproduce. In
economics sustainability means avoiding major disruptions and collapses, hedging against
instabilities and discontinuities. In ecology sustainability describes the capacity of ecosys-
tems to maintain their essential functions and processes, and retain their biodiversity in
full measure over the long-term. Costanza and Patten [64] attempt to decipher the com-
mon aspects of these various definitions and argue that a sustainable system is essentially
a system that persists.
Unfortunately, the definition of a sustainable system as one that persists poses more
questions than it answers. The foremost of them being: what characteristics of the system
must persist, and for how long? It is easy for control engineers to confuse sustainability
with stability. However, a stable system is not necessarily a sustainable one, at least on
some scale. The evolution of systems dictates that in order for the system to survive as a
whole, smaller, sub-optimal parts must adapt or vanquish. The cybernetic framework relies
much heavily on mathematical models, and any notion of sustainability applied within
the framework must be mathematically rigorous as well. There have already been some
attempts in this regard (see for instance [59], [49], [195]), however they are mostly domain
specific and have not qualified as definitions that are agreed upon across disciplines. Indeed
we admit that the definition of sustainability provided in Chapter 7 of this dissertation
also falls within this category. Nevertheless, the cybernetically inclined still yearn for a
“sustainability function” similar to the Lyapunov functions that they rely most heavily on
for characterizing long-term behavior of their systems.
11.3.2 Formulating Social Variables in the Context of Feedback Control
During the discourse of the dissertation, we have largely overlooked the “sense” and “ac-
tuate” blocks of the control loop from Figure 11-1. However these blocks hold immense
importance in any realization of feedback control. Before any mathematically intricate
issues are brought up, let us consider the following: how do we sense? and how do we
actuate? In Figure 11-1 we have listed several mechanisms by which control may be exerted
on the consuming population of a natural resource. While it is certainly hard to disagree
that mechanisms such as education, taxation and information dissemination can indeed in-
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fluence consumer behavior, the more relevant issue to us right now is how to incorporate
these strategies in a formal control law. For instance, what would education look like as a
control variable in system (4.3)? What would be the mathematical nature of that variable,
what would its units be and how would we be able to justifiably associate any numerics with
it? Clearly we are nowhere near to furnishing an answer to these questions than we are to
reaching a quantifiable notion of sustainable development. It seems befitting that Stankovic
[187] lists the incorporation of social models into the formal methodology of feedback control
as one of the major challenges for the control of CPS.
Let us now consider the “sense” block of Figure 11-1. In all the mathematical models
developed in the dissertation, it has conveniently been assumed that the state of the system
is accessible for the decision maker (whether the decision making happens in a centralized or
distributed manner). Sensing technologies have greatly evolved over time [184], with smart
sensing technologies offering opportunities for control that were not thought to be possible
a few decades ago. However, we are still not quite there yet when it comes to sensing
cognitive variables and social influences at least for the particular control loop envisioned
in Figure 11-1. Not only this, but formulation of the mathematical nature of the variables
to be sensed would pose the same challenges that have been discussed above regarding the
control variables.
On the other hand, implementing the “decide” block associated with the decision maker
requires intense debates of moral and ethical nature. The difficulty of framing the objective
of sustainability has already been discussed in the previous section. Since these issues have
been relevant long before the recent advent of control and sensing technology, they have at
least been thoroughly discussed for a long time now by the political scientists and economists
[155].
11.3.3 The Issues of Controllability and Observability
In the previous section, we have deliberated over the formulation of the various control
mechanisms listed in Figure 11-1. Assuming that this has been done successfully, the next
question that arises: is it possible to steer the system to the required state using the selected
control scheme? For instance, is educating the population enough to ensure sustainability
or is there a need for increased taxation? In order to control the consumption pattern of the
entire network, is there a need to control every consumer individually or is there a possibility
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of targeting only the most influential nodes? The set of states that are attainable using one
control mechanism may be different than that of another, which can reveal the viability of
one mechanism over the rest. This is the type of information that the controllability [81] of
the system can reveal.
Observability [81] on the other hand relates to issues in sensing. Consider the synthesis
of the feedback control law in Section 9.1, which requires complete information about the
state of the resource being available to the decision maker. Similarly, the the adjustment
process from Section 9.2 assumes that each consumer has complete knowledge about the
other consumer’s information preferences. Assuming that there existed a sensor to convey
this information, an n-agent network would require knowledge of the characteristics of all
n agents. Installing a sensor for each consumer in large populations would not only be an
extremely tedious exercise, but would also be extremely expensive both economically and
computationally. In such a scenario, the tool of observability can help identify exactly which
of the nodes need to be sensed/observed in order for the control law to serve its purpose
effectively. It can also be used to explore the feasibility across different types of sensing
mechanisms.
The concepts of controllability and observability are not new [108] and there exist elegant
results for linear systems, non-linear systems [112] and even for complex networks [121, 122]
which have the potential to yield important insights for our resource-consumer network.
11.4 Final Remark
In this chapter we have presented a concluding note to the work conducted as part of this
dissertation by summarizing the ideology and main findings of the research along with a few
considerations for further work. As a final remark we wish to emphasize that the analysis
presented in this dissertation, is in no way meant to give a complete account of the cyber-
netics of natural resources. Indeed such an exposition would require several dissertations to
say the least. Rather, it is intended to portray the potential that the cybernetic perspective
holds for the resource governance problem, and global environmental issues in general. One
must also bear in mind that at the cybernetic foundation of every synthesized regulating
mechanism, lies a mathematical model. However, no model (including the one presented
herein) is perfect, thus implying that the models and their conclusions are only as good as
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their underlying assumptions.
It would appear from this dissertation (and almost all logical treatments of NRM for
that matter) that sustainable management of our natural resources while simultaneously
catering for the needs of a growing world population, is an extremely daunting task to say
the least. Perhaps as science and human knowledge progress, mankind will be able to dig
itself out of the current environmental crisis. For now, we must stay focused on doing our
part and not lose faith in our planet. The frame of mind that should guide our environmental
research is perhaps best summarized in the following note that Donella Meadows had taped
on her office door [133] while she was still alive,
“Even if I knew the world would end tomorrow, I would plant a tree today”
- Anonymous.
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Appendix A
Game Theory Primer
This appendix gives a very brief introduction to basic game theoretical concepts. It is in
no way meant to serve as an introduction to game theory in general for which we refer
the interested reader to some excellent texts on the subject [146, 144, 27]. The extent of
the following material has been selected solely for the reader to be able to grasp the game
theoretic terminology used in this dissertation.
A.1 Definitions
A game G is defined as a three-tuple G = 〈I, (Si), (pii)〉 where
• I := {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, where n is the total number of players.
• Si is the strategy space for player i ∈ I. The elements of this set, also called the
actions may either be discrete or continuous in nature. An element from the set
S1 × · · · × Sn is called a strategy profile.
• pii : S1 × · · · × Sn → R is the payoff function for player i.
Games are commonly represented as a table. In Figure A-1 we reproduce the Prisoner’s
dilemma game from Chapter 1. Here there are two players so n = 2. The rows of the table
correspond to the strategy of Player 1, whereas the columns correspond to the strategies
of Player 2. In some writings the players are also referred to as the row player and the
column player. Each player has two possible strategies and so, according to Figure A-1,
Si = {C,D}, where C and D represent the “cooperate” and “defect” strategy respectively1.
The entries in the table depict the payoffs of each player as an ordered pair where the
first entry gives the payoff of the first player and the second entry gives the payoff of the
second player respectively, if each player plays the strategy given by that row and column
of the table. Thus from Figure A-1, if both the players cooperate, this corresponds to the
upper left corner of the table, from which we see that in this case both the players receive
payoff pi1(C,C) = pi2(C,C) = −1. The story of the prisoner’s dilemma game is usually
narrated as follows – both the players are in separate rooms of a police station where they
are being questioned about a crime they have committed together. Since the police do not
have enough evidence to evict them, each prisoner is given the following proposition. If
the prisoner confesses to the crime and rats his partner out (the “defect” strategy) but the
1where the “cooperate” strategy corresponds to pleading innocent
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C D
C -1,-1 -10,0
D 0,-10 -5,-5
Figure A-1: The prisoner’s dilemma game
other prisoner does not confess (the “cooperate” strategy), then he would be freed but his
partner would get a sentence of 10 years. However if his partner also confesses to the crime
then both would serve a 5 year sentence. If neither of them confesses, then both of them
will be evicted for a lighter crime and serve a sentence of 1 year. The payoffs in Figure
A-1 are based on the number of years the prisoners would have to serve for each possible
outcome of the game.
A.2 Dominant Strategies
Given a game in normal form, it is reasonable to expect certain strategies to be played more
often than the others. These strategies are usually the “dominant” strategies. A strategy
is said to be dominant for player i if it is guaranteed to result in the highest possible payoff
no matter what strategy the other players choose. More precisely, a strategy s′i ∈ Si is
weakly dominant if pi(s′i, s−i) ≥ pi(si, s−i) for all si ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i. s′i is then strongly
dominant (or simply dominant) pi(s′i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i) for all si ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, it is straight forward to see which strategy is the dominating
one. If the column player plays C, then the row player gets the highest payoff by playing
D. Now, if the column player plays D, the row player will still ensure the highest payoff for
himself by playing D. In both cases, D gives the highest payoff and so, D is the dominant
strategy for Player 1. Similar reasoning leads to the realization that D is also the dominant
strategy for Player 2.
A.3 Best Response
A strategy s˜i ∈ Si is said to be the best response to a fixed strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i, on
behalf of the remaining players if pi(s˜i, s−i) ≥ pi(si, s−i) for all si ∈ Si. If the best response
is unique then it is also called a strict best response.
Note that the best response is a slightly weaker concept than dominance. While a
dominant strategy might not exist for a particular player, the best response of a player to
a particular strategy of the other players always exists. A dominant strategy, if it exists, is
then the common best response to all strategies of the opposing players.
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A.4 Nash Equilibrium
A strategy profile s# =∈ S1,×,Sn is called a Nash Equilibrium if s#i is a best response to
s#−i for every i ∈ I. More precisely, s# = (s#1 , . . . , s#n ) constitutes a Nash Equilibrium if
pi(s#i , s
#
−i) ≥ pi(si, s#−i) for all si ∈ Si and all i ∈ I. While this definition appears to be
similar to that of dominance, it is important to note the subtlety that the Nash Equilibrium
requires, for every i, that s#i be the best response to only those actions of the other players
that are being played at the equilibrium, and not to the whole set of possible actions.
The Nash Equilibrium also has associated with it a notion of stability. If all players
play the Nash Equilibrium strategy, then no player can gain a higher payoff by unilaterally
changing her strategy. The Nash Equilibrium for the Prisoner’s dilemma game is given by
{D,D} and is highlighted in gray in Figure A-1. This highlights the “dilemma” of the game.
While the players can clearly get the collectively best outcome if both cooperate, rational
reasoning leads them both to defect, resulting in a worse outcome for both. The strategies
considered here are pure strategies i.e., the player commits to playing a single strategy and
plays it with certainty. There is also the possibility of a player assigning probabilities to
each of the actions such that each strategy has a certain probability of being payed. For
instance, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, one player may decide to toss a coin and play C
if head comes up and play D otherwise, thus assigning a probability of 0.5 to each action.
The act of assigning probabilities to the strategies is also considered a valid strategy and
is usually referred to as a mixed strategy. It is known that the Nash equilibrium for finite
games does not always exist in the form of pure strategies, however if mixed strategies are
also considered, then the Nash Equilibrium always exists.
A.5 Games with Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game
The concepts defined for games with discrete strategies carry forward to games with con-
tinuous strategies. We illustrate this through the Cournot game whose story is described as
follows. Imagine two firms, each producing an identical good for the same market. The two
firms 1 & 2 are the players and so I = {1, 2}. The strategy for each firm i is the quantity
of good qi it decides to produce and so Si = {qi} constitutes a continuous strategy space.
The payoffs for each firm are given by the profit each firm earns by selling the good. The
cost to produce the good is given by c > 0. The good is sold at the market-clearing price
which is given by the inverse demand curve p = a− b(q1 + q2 where p denotes the price and
a, b > 0 are constant parameters. The payoff for each firm is then given by
pii(q1, q2) =
(
a− b(q1 + q2)
)
qi − c qi i ∈ {1, 2},
The best response is given as q˜i = BRi(qj) = max
qi
pii(q1, q2) i 6= j, whose solution gives us
q˜1 = BR1(q2) =
a− c
2b
− q2
2
, q˜2 = BR2(q1) =
a− c
2b
− q1
2
.
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Figure A-2: Illustration of the Cournot Game.
The Nash Equilibrium, (q#1, q#2 ) is the strategy profile such that q
#
1 = BR1(q
#
2 ) and
q#2 = BR2(q
#
1 ). This is given by the solution to the following system
q#1 =
a− c
2b
− q
#
2
2
, q#2 =
a− c
2b
− q
#
1
2
.
Solving the above algebraically gives us the Nash Equilibrium
q#1 = q
#
2 =
a− c
3b
.
Figure A-2 gives a graphical depiction of the Equilibrium in the Cournot game. It is possible
to show that in this equilibrium of the Cournot game, the firms produce too much quantity
of the good than they would need at the point of joint profit maximization. As such, the
Cournot game is also used as a model for scenarios where individually optimum behavior
does not result in the collectively optimal outcome.
The concept of the Nash Equilibrium is named after John Nash who gave the first exis-
tence proof for finite games. There also exist other equilibrium concepts that can be used to
make descriptive or predictive reasoning about the outcome of the game. Moreover, there
exist various classifications of games based on whether the strategies are played simultane-
ously or sequentially, whether the games are played just once or repeatedly, whether the
players are allowed to form coalitions or not, whether or not the players have complete
access to information on the parameters of the game, and so on. Regarding the totality of
the game theoretic literature, the material discussed here is just a tiny tip of the proverbial
iceberg, presented only with the intention of enabling the reader to grasp the contents of
the dissertation more effectively.
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Appendix B
Basic Concepts in Economic
Growth Theory
In this appendix we provide a small compilation of a few basic concepts frequently referred
to in the resource economics and growth theory literature. The material is intended to serve
as a small supplement for the reader to better comprehend the exposition of Chapter 7.
B.1 Early Developments in Growth Theory
Economic growth theory is separated into exogenous and endogenous growth. The major
ingredients of an exogenous growth problem consist of a production function relating factors
of production to output whose level determines the current state of the economy. This is
coupled with the dynamics of the production factors usually as differential equations of
capital and labor. It is assumed that all parameters of the model are fixed from some
mechanism outside our system, thus the term exogenous growth. Equilibrium conditions
are found and policy prescriptions are made on the base of measures that have a positive
influence on steady state growth.
The first influential model of exogenous growth is the Harrod-Domar model [98] intro-
duced in 1939. This model assumed a linear production function with capital as the only
input to production. It concludes that the amount of reinvestment of the capital determines
the long term growth. Solow and Swan introduced the Solow-Swan model[185] in 1956 as an
extension to the Harrod-Domar model which relaxed the fixed capital to labor ratio assump-
tion by taking labor as a separate input to production. Later on the Mankiw-Romer-Weil
model [126] incorporated human capital as a third input to production thus distinguishing
between physical capital and human capital.
The starting point of endogenous growth theory is considered by most to be the seminal
paper by Ramsey [163]. The potential of Ramsey’s work was not realized until 1965 when
Cass and Koopmans adapted it to form the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK) model [54]. In
problems of endogenous growth, parameters assumed to be determined by outside forces
are taken so as to maximize a certain criterion for social welfare represented by an objective
function. The underlying machinery used in such problems is that of optimal control with
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle [11] used as the basic optimization apparatus. Earlier in
1961 Phelps introduced the golden savings rule [157] which was later found out to be a
special case of the RCK model.
Endogenous growth problems rely heavily on objective functions which specify aggre-
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gate and intertemporal preferences on individual utility. The normative debate on which
preference scheme is ethically correct is the foundation of the field of welfare economics
[155]. Despite criticism, discounting the utility of future generations is the most practiced
scheme by growth theorists as it allows for the intertemporal objective to converge in the
limit. In this regard, Chichilnisky developed an axiomatic criterion for optimal growth [59]
which later on was also used to develop the green golden rule [30] of resource consumption.
B.2 A Compilation of Fundamental Notions
B.2.1 The production function and returns to scale
The term returns to scale arises in the context of a firm’s production function to describe
what happens to the scale of production when all inputs to production are subject to a
given change in scale. Formally, a production function F (K,L) is defined to have
• constant returns to scale if F (aK, aL) = aF (K,L)
• increasing returns to scale if F (aK, aL) > aF (K,L)
• decreasing returns to scale if F (aK, aL) < aF (K,L)
where K and L are factors of production, usually used to represent capital and labor
respectively, and a > 0 is some constant.
B.2.2 The production function and technological progress
A production function in which technological progress enters as labour-augmenting is defined
as Harrod-neutral
Y (t) = f
(
K(t), A(t)L(t)
)
where Y(t) is the economic output and A(t) represents the level of technology at time t. If
technological progress is capital augmenting of the form
Y (t) = f
(
A(t)K(t), L(t)
)
it is defined as Solow-neutral. Finally, if technological progress simply multiplies the pro-
duction function by an increasing scale factor as
Y (t) = A(t) f
(
K(t), L(t)
)
it is defined as Hicks-neutral
B.2.3 A Note on Cobb-Douglass production functions
The Cobb-Douglass production function is a particular form of production function which
represents the technological relationship between a single good called the output, and differ-
ent factors of productions called the inputs. It was developed and tested against statistical
evidence by Charles Cobb and Paul Douglas during 1927-1947. In its most standard form,
for production of a single good with two factors of production
Y = ALβKα
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where Y is the total output, L is the labor input, K is the capital input, A is the total
factor productivity and α, β are the output elasticities of capital and labor respectively. α
and β are constants which are determined by the current level of technology. Furthermore
they control the returns to scale of the production as follows
• If α+ β = 1 then Y has constant returns to scale
• If α+ β > 1 then Y has increasing returns to scale
• If α+ β < 1 then Y has decreasing returns to scale
B.2.4 Continuity, differentiability, positive and diminishing marginal prod-
ucts, and constant returns to scale
The first common assumption on the production function in economic growth theory is as
follows: the production function F : R2+ → R+ is twice differentiable in K and L, and
satisfies
∂F (K,L)
∂K
> 0,
∂F (K,L)
∂L
> 0
∂2F (K,L)
∂K2
< 0,
∂2F (K,L)
∂L2
< 0
Moreover, F exhibits constant returns to scale in K and L.
B.2.5 The Inada conditions
The second common assumption on the production function in economic growth theory
is a collection of conditions called the Inada conditions. They are given as follows: The
production function F : R2+ → R+ satisfies
lim
K→0
∂F (K,L)
∂K
=∞, lim
K→∞
∂F (K,L)
∂K
= 0 ∀ L > 0
lim
L→0
∂F (K,L)
∂L
=∞, lim
L→∞
∂F (K,L)
∂L
= 0 ∀ K > 0
B.2.6 Some formal examples of social welfare functions
The Social Welfare Function (SWF) is a mechanism to aggregate the utilities of different
individuals to determine which set of utilities are socially favorable. Assume that there areN
individuals in a society and denote the utility of each individual as Ui where i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Following this notation, some formal examples of SWFs are given below
• Benthamite Utilitarianism
W (U1, . . . , UN ) =
N∑
i=1
ai Ui where ai > 0 ∀i
• Egalitarian
W (U1, . . . , UN ) =
N∑
i=1
−λ
N∑
i=1
(
Ui −min
i
Ui
)
where 0 < λ < 1
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• Rawlsian
W (U1, . . . , UN ) = min
i
Ui
Kenneth Arrow argued that any “reasonable” social welfare function must satisfy 6 basic
axioms and then demonstrated via his impossibility theorem [132] that no such function
exists.
B.2.7 The Brundtland Commission and sustainability
The Brundtland Commission is formally known as World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED) and aims to unite countries in the pursuit of sustainable develop-
ment. The commission’s report of 1987 titled “Our Common Future” [47] had a great impact
at the Earth Summit of 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. According to the report sustainability is
defined as
“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”
This definition of sustainability includes two major concepts. First is the concept of “needs”,
in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be
given. Second is the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social
organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.
188
Appendix C
Network topology and spectrum of
the Laplacian matrix
In Chapter 10, we mentioned the influence of the network topology on the eigenvalues of the
Laplacian matrix. There exist various formal results [60, 186, 93] on the interpretation of
the spectrum of the Laplacian and its connection to the network structure. Here, without
using any formal jargon, we give a brief illustration of how the two smallest eigenvalues of
the Laplacian matrix change as the connectedness of a simple network is varied.
Consider a weighted directed graph G on n vertices. Each edge (i, j) has associated
with it a weight wij > 0. Define the in-degree of node i as
d−i =
n∑
j=1
wji,
then the Laplacian matrix is defined as
L =

d−1 −w21 . . . −wn1
−w12 d−2 . . . −wn2
...
...
. . .
...
−w1n −w2n . . . d−n
 .
Now denote the eigenvalues of L as
λ1 ≤ λ2 · · · ≤ λn.
It is known that L will have only real eigenvalues and is positive semidefinite. The smallest
eigenvalue λ1 is always 0 and the corresponding eigenvector is [1, 1, . . . , 1]
T . The multiplicity
of 0 as an eigenvalue is equal to the number of connected components of G.
Of particular interest is the second smallest eigenvalue λ2. As the multiplicity of 0 as an
eigenvector is equal to the number of connected components, if G is connected then λ2 > 0.
Thus λ2 is also called the algebraic connectivity of G. If λ2 is positive, then the magnitude
of λ2 increases as graph connectedness is increased. This effect can be observed in Figure
C-1 in which λ2 increases as edges are added to a weakly connected graph and continues to
increase until a strongly connected regular graph is achieved at which point λ2 = λn.
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Figure C-1: Different possible networks of varying connectivity along with the eigenvalues of
the respective L matrix. All dashed links carry weight 1 (weak links), whereas continuously
drawn links carry weight 100 (strong links). It can be seen that as network connectivity
increases, so does the magnitude of the second smallest eigenvalue.
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